Absence Of Section 45 UAPA Sanction For A Particular Accused Does Not Bar Charge Framing; Karnataka High Court Denies Bail To Alleged PFI Member
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Karnataka Division Bench of Justice H.P. Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T dismissed an accused’s appeal and declined to grant bail in a prosecution alleging involvement with the banned Popular Front of India. The court found no reason to interfere with the trial court’s refusal of bail. The case concerns allegations that office-bearers and members of the organisation conspired to promote unlawful activities, including radicalising Muslim youth through meetings and training, and raising funds to facilitate terrorist acts. The bench also held that the Section 45 UAPA sanction requirement attaches to taking cognizance of offences under Chapters IV and VI, not to separate sanctions for each accused, and that absence of a specific sanction for an individual does not by itself bar framing of charges or continuation once cognizance is taken.
The prosecution alleged that the accused were office bearers, members, and cadres of an organisation accused of engaging in activities intended to radicalise youth, raise funds, organise training camps, and promote unlawful objectives.
According to the charge-sheet, the accused allegedly participated in meetings, indoctrination programmes, and fundraising activities over several years, with funds allegedly being utilised for unlawful purposes. The appellant was arrested in September 2022 and sought bail before the Special Court, which rejected the application on the ground that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations were prima facie true and that the statutory bar under the UAPA applied.
The appellant challenged the rejection by filing an appeal under the National Investigation Agency Act read with the UAPA, contending inter alia that there was no valid sanction for certain offences, that procedural requirements relating to seizure of property were not followed, and that prolonged custody coupled with delay in trial warranted grant of bail. The State opposed the appeal, asserting that no change in circumstances was shown and that the statutory embargo on bail continued to operate.
The Division Bench noted that the appellant had filed successive bail applications and recorded that “successive bail applications are not barred per se”, but clarified that “they can be entertained only if there is demonstrable change in circumstances since the prior rejection.” The Court observed that re-agitating earlier grounds would lead to “speculation and uncertainty in the administration of justice and may lead to forum hunting.”
On the issue of sanction, the Court examined Section 45 of the UAPA and recorded that “A plain reading of Section 45 of UAP Act makes it clear that the bar against taking cognizance applies to offences covered under Chapter IV and VI of UAP Act, unless prior sanction is obtained from the appropriate Government. The term 'cognisance' refers that it has to be taken in respect of offences and not against an individual. Thus, Section 45 of the UAP Act mandates that sanction is pre-condition for the Court to take cognisance of an offence and not necessarily tied to a particular accused”.
The Bench noted that absence of sanction in respect of a particular accused “does not by itself preclude the framing of charges or continuation of the proceedings, if cognizance has been taken for the offences alleged.”
With regard to the seizure of cash, the Court acknowledged that “the Investigating Officer did not strictly comply with the procedure prescribed under Section 25 of UAP Act at the time of seizure,” but held that “the failure to follow this procedural formality does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail.” It observed that such lapse “may, at best, be treated as an irregularity and does not go to the root of the case of the prosecution.”
On the request to summon the case diary, the Court referred to Section 172(2) CrPC and recorded that “the appellant is not entitled to call for the case-diary to examine the same,” adding that “it is only for the purpose of reference of the Court and if the Court requires, it can be called for.” The Bench concluded that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations made against the appellant are prima facie true,” thereby attracting the statutory bar on bail.
The Court ordered that “the appeal is dismissed.” It further directed that “I.A. No.2 of 2025 filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is also dismissed. Consequently, pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand dismissed.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Appellant: Sri Mohammed Tahir, Advocate
For the Respondent-State: Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, Special Public Prosecutor
Case Title: Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No.1475 of 2025
Bench: Justice H.P. Sandesh, Justice Venkatesh Naik T
