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Arrest Prior To Supreme Court’s ‘Pankaj Bansal’ Judgment Not Illegal For Want Of Written Grounds; Karnataka High Court Denies Bail To NIA Terror Accused, Directs Expedited Trial

Arrest Prior To Supreme Court’s ‘Pankaj Bansal’ Judgment Not Illegal For Want Of Written Grounds; Karnataka High Court Denies Bail To NIA Terror Accused, Directs Expedited Trial

Isabella Mariam

 

The High Court of Karnataka Division Bench of Justice H.P. Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T dismissed an appeal challenging a trial court’s refusal of bail to an accused booked by the National Investigation Agency for alleged links to a banned terrorist outfit and participation in a criminal conspiracy involving recruitment and facilitation of travel to join and fight in Syria. The court held that the Supreme Court’s direction in Pankaj Bansal on supplying written grounds of arrest operates prospectively, and an accused arrested in 2020 cannot invoke the absence of written grounds to contend that the arrest was illegal. While declining bail, the Bench directed the special court to expedite the trial.

 

The appeal arose from the rejection of a bail application filed by accused No.3 before the Special Court for trial of NIA cases at Bengaluru. The prosecution case, as recorded in the judgment, concerns alleged affiliation with the banned terrorist organization Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). During investigation, it was alleged that certain individuals were involved in identifying and radicalizing Muslim youths, recruiting them, raising funds, and facilitating travel to Syria to join ISIS. Pursuant to directions issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Investigation Agency registered a case invoking Sections 120B and 125 of the IPC and Sections 17, 18 and 18B of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

 

Also Read: Photocopied Power Of Attorney No Evidence Unless Section 65 Conditions For Secondary Evidence Met: Supreme Court

 

Searches were conducted at the premises of accused No.3, during which digital and physical materials were seized. The appellant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. The Special Court rejected bail, citing Section 43D of the UAP Act.

 

Before the High Court, the appellant contended delay in trial, non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest, and health concerns. The prosecution opposed the appeal, contending that successive bail applications were not maintainable without change in circumstances and that material evidence established a prima facie case.

 

The Bench recorded that “personal liberty cannot be taken away, except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Personal liberty is a constitutional guarantee.” It further observed that “the person’s bail application once rejected is not precluded from filing a subsequent application for grant of bail, if there is a change in the fact situation.” However, the Court stated that “the issues which have been canvassed earlier could not be permitted to be re-agitated, as the same leads to speculation and uncertainty in the administration of justice and they lead to forum hunting.”

 

On successive bail applications, the Court observed that “successive bail applications are not barred per se, but they can be entertained only if there is a demonstrable change in circumstances since the rejection of the previous application.”

 

With respect to delay in trial, the Court recorded that “the prosecution has got examined 19 witnesses out of 60 witnesses and has shown substantial progress in recording the evidence.” It further observed that “"Hence, the delay cannot be attributed to the prosecution and the accused person shall not be permitted to take the benefit from his own wrong doing as the prosecution has got examined 19 witnesses out of 60 witnesses and has shown substantial progress in recording the evidence.”

 

On the issue of non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest, the Court referred to Supreme Court precedent and recorded that “the Investigating Officer shall be duty bound to furnish the grounds of arrest ‘henceforth’ i.e., from the date of said judgment i.e., 03.10.2023.” It noted that the appellant was arrested prior to that date and observed that “the non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest does not render his arrest illegal.”

 

The Bench noted that the use of "henceforth" in Pankaj Bansal indicates that the mandate "applies prospectively, from the date of the judgment". It said: "Consequently, the failure to provide written grounds of arrest prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal (Supra) judgment, cannot be deemed illegal, nor can the action of the concerned officer be faulted on that ground. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that oral communication of the grounds of arrest to the arrestee constitutes sufficient compliance with Section 19 of the PMLA as well as Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. In the present case, accused No. 3 was arrested prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal (Supra) judgment, and the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to him at the time of his arrest. In light of the above authoritative pronouncement, such oral communication satisfies the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, and accused No.3 is not entitled to bail on this ground. Such being the case, the aforementioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.3 is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, in view of the same, the appellant cannot avail such ground.”

The Court concluded that “such oral communication satisfies the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.” Regarding health grounds, the Bench recorded that “the appellant has not furnished any documents with regard to the same.”

 

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The Court ordered that “The Criminal Appeal is dismissed. The Special Court is directed to expedite the trial. Pending applications, if any, stands dismissed.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Sri Ravi L. Vaidya, Advocate


For the Respondents: Sri Sachin C., Advocate for Sri Prasanna Kumar P., Special Public Prosecutor

 

Case Title: Mr. Irfan Nasir @ Irfi v. National Investigation Agency

Neutral Citation: 2026: KHC:4947-DB

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No.1015 of 2025

Bench: Justice H.P. Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T

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