“Blanket Denial of Premature Release for Convicts of Woman or Child Murder Violates Human Rights, Not Conducive to a Welfare State: Kerala HC”
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Kerala Single Bench of Justice Dr. Kauser Edappagath set aside the Government’s rejection of a life convict’s request for premature release, holding that the impugned order was unsustainable in law. The Court directed the competent authority to reconsider the petitioner’s case afresh in accordance with statutory provisions and binding judicial guidelines. The directive was issued in light of procedural lapses and the improper application of executive policy that excluded certain categories of convicts from consideration.
The petitioner, a life convict, was serving his sentence at Central Prison, Trichy, Tamil Nadu, having been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of a woman named Suvarna. The offence was committed by drowning the victim and robbing her gold chain. He was convicted by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc), Fast Track Court-I, Thrissur in Sessions Case No.441 of 2002. His conviction and sentence were considered by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.418 of 2021 on 26 August 2021.
As of 13 December 2023, the petitioner had completed 22 years and 5 months of actual imprisonment. He sought premature release under statutory and prison manual provisions. His plea was supported by various prison and police authorities. The Probation Officer in his report dated 31 March 2023, recommended the petitioner’s release. The Jail Advisory Committee at Viyyur Central Prison and Correctional Home had also endorsed the request during its meeting on 10 July 2023. The Director General of Prisons and Correctional Services forwarded the recommendations to the State Government for consideration.
However, the State Level Advisory Committee (SLAC), in its meeting held on 14 August 2024, rejected the recommendation solely on the ground that the petitioner had been convicted for the brutal murder of a poor woman. Subsequently, the Government of Kerala, aligning with the SLAC’s stance, passed Government Order G.O.(Rt) No.2900/2024/Home dated 8 October 2024 (Ext.P4), declining the petitioner’s request.
The petitioner challenged this decision before the High Court, arguing that the rejection was contrary to statutory mandates, constitutional principles, and binding precedent. It was submitted that the SLAC and the Government had ignored favourable recommendations from the Probation Officer, Superintendent of Police, and prison authorities, as well as his good conduct record during incarceration.
The State, represented by the Senior Public Prosecutor, contended that the Government had exercised its discretion lawfully after considering the gravity of the offence. It was argued that remission is not an indefeasible right, and the petitioner’s case was not suitable for release due to the heinous nature of the crime. Reliance was placed on judgments of the Supreme Court including Rajan v. Home Secretary, Tamil Nadu [(2019) 14 SCC 114] and Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India [(2024) 5 SCC 481].
The petitioner, in contrast, relied on Joseph v. State of Kerala and Others [2023 (4) KLJ 903], which held that the exclusion of certain offences from remission eligibility via executive orders was impermissible.
Justice Edappagath reviewed the statutory, constitutional, and executive framework governing premature release. The Court recorded:
“Premature release of a convicted prisoner is based on the concept of reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners back into society.”
Discussing the applicable provisions under the Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act, 2010, and the 2014 Rules, the Court noted that Rule 465(2) mandates consideration of the victim’s family response, police and probation reports. These, the Court observed, were favourable to the petitioner.
“The Jail Advisory Committee has recommended the premature release of the petitioner. These factors that have a bearing on the concept of reformation cannot be ignored on the bare premise that persons who have committed the murder of women will not be given remission of sentence.”
The Court addressed the legality of the executive policy, stating:
“The said Government Order came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Joseph (supra). It was held that blanket exclusion of certain offences from the scope of the grant of remission, especially by way of an executive policy, is not only arbitrary, but turns the ideals of reformation... on its head.”
“Statutory discretion cannot be fettered by self-created rules or policy.”
Justice Edappagath further elaborated:
“A blanket stance that all persons who have murdered a woman or a child shall not be prematurely released de hors any other circumstances is not conducive to a welfare State.”
“The rejection of the petitioner's request for premature release only on the ground that the petitioner was convicted for the murder of a woman cannot be justified.”
Recognising the petitioner’s conduct, background, and institutional assessments, the Court stated:
“It was specifically mentioned in the probation report that the convict could lead a normal life after release by doing agricultural labour work in his own village.”
“The murder was committed when the petitioner was only 18 years of age, and he is now around 42 years.”
“Premature release has been recognized as one of the facets of the human rights of prisoners.”
“The remission policy manifests a process of reshaping a person who... is required to be rehabilitated.”
Citing Supreme Court guidance in Mohinder Singh [(2000) 3 SCC 394], the Court stated:
“The power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant remission has to be well-informed, reasonable, and fair to all concerned.”
Finally, the Court stated that it could not issue a positive directive to release, referencing Rajan and Bilkis Yakub Rasool.
“However, it is well settled that this Court cannot direct the respondents to release the prisoner forthwith or to remit the remaining sentence.”
The Court concluded by holding:
“For the reasons stated above, Ext.P4 order is not sustainable, and accordingly, it is set aside.”
It further directed:
“The 1st respondent is directed to consider the recommendation of the Jail Advisory Committee relating to the premature release of the petitioner in the light of the observations made in this judgment, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.”
The writ petition was accordingly disposed of.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Smruthi Sasidharan, V.P. Brijesh, Aswathy Amby
For the Respondents: P. Narayanan, Senior Public Prosecutor; Shri Sajju S., Senior Government Pleader
Case Title: Balu v. State of Kerala and Others
Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:27890
Case Number: WP(Crl) No.1215 of 2024
Bench: Justice Dr. Kauser Edappagath
[Read/Download order]
