Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur, Single Bench of Justice Prafulla S. Khubalkar held that condonation of delay cannot be granted where the substantive review application itself is not maintainable under law. By its oral judgment pronounced on 18 August 2025, the court quashed and set aside the order of the First Labour Court, Nagpur, which had condoned the delay in filing a review application against an earlier award. The court declared that in absence of any statutory power of review under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings, thereby allowing the writ petition and rejecting the review application.

The matter originated from a dispute involving termination of services of an employee. The petitioner no.1 was a company engaged in processing steel material, while petitioner no.2 was a contractor registered under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, who had undertaken the works of the petitioner company. The respondent was an employee of the contractor, but claimed to be an employee of the petitioner company. Following termination of his services, the respondent-initiated proceedings before the Additional Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur, which were referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Reference (IDA) Case No.02/2017 was decided on merits, holding that the respondent was not entitled to reinstatement in service.

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Subsequently, the employee filed Review Application No.02/2023 seeking to review the award passed in Reference (IDA) Case No.02/2017. The review application was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay of 333 days in filing the same. The petitioners opposed this application, raising objections to the maintainability of the review application itself on the ground that the Labour Court lacked the statutory power of review under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Despite these objections, the First Labour Court, Nagpur, by order dated 07 December 2024, allowed the application for condonation of delay. This order was subsequently challenged before the High Court in the present writ petition.

The petitioners’ counsel, Mr. S.N. Kumar, contended that the impugned order was without jurisdiction, as there was no provision either express or implied in the Industrial Disputes Act or Rules permitting the Labour Court to exercise powers of review. He relied upon the judgment in Sudhir Janardhan Desai v. Hyphosphite and Co. (2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 223), wherein it was observed that the Labour Court is a creature of statute and its powers are confined to those expressly conferred under the law. He submitted that “the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law, either specifically or by necessary implication.”

On the other hand, the respondent’s counsel, Mr. S.A. Mohta, argued that the application for condonation of delay was required to be considered independently on the strength of contentions demonstrating sufficient cause. He maintained that while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the court is not required to examine the maintainability of the review application, which must instead be considered when the review application is itself taken up for adjudication. He supported the Labour Court’s approach of considering sufficiency of cause and condoning the delay.

The central issue before the High Court was whether the Labour Court could entertain an application for condonation of delay in filing a review application, when no power of review was conferred upon it by statute.

Justice Prafulla S. Khubalkar observed that there was no dispute as to the absence of any express power conferred on the Labour Court to review its award. Referring to the judgment in Sudhir Janardhan Desai v. Hyphosphite and Co., the court recorded that “the Labour Court is a creature of the statute i.e. the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, whatever powers are to be exercised by the Labour Court are circumscribed by the powers conferred on it by the statute. The Labour Court cannot exceed such powers. On a perusal of the Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder, there is no express power conferred on the Labour Court for reviewing its own order neither is there any implied power.”

The court held that “the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law, either specifically or by necessary implication. There is no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act or the Rules framed thereunder, conferring such a power specifically or by necessary implication on the Labour Court.”

Justice Khubalkar noted that although ordinarily while entertaining an application for condonation of delay, the court is not required to go into merits of the matter, it remains crucial to ascertain whether the proceedings sought to be initiated are maintainable in law. In the present case, the Labour Court had condoned the delay by observing that the issue about maintainability of the review application requires full-fledged arguments of both parties. However, the High Court held that the question of maintainability could not be deferred.

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The court referred to the judgment of the Division Bench in Nivruti G. Ahire v. State of Maharashtra (2007 SCC Online Bom 492), where it was categorically held that “in order to entertain an application for condonation of delay, the appeal or the application in respect of which there has been delay on the part of the applicant, and the condonation of which is sought for, the same must be maintainable in law. If the main application for review is itself not maintainable in law, question of condonation of delay in filing such an application would not arise at all.”

Justice Khubalkar observed that the position of law as elucidated in the above judgment applied squarely to the facts of the case. The court recorded that although the Industrial Disputes Act is a social welfare legislation and a lenient view is often adopted while condoning delay in matters concerning employees, the clear position of law laid down by the Division Bench could not be ignored. Thus, the Labour Court’s order condoning the delay was without jurisdiction and unsustainable.

Based on the judicial reasoning, the High Court allowed the writ petition. Justice Khubalkar held: “The impugned order dated 07.12.2024 passed by the Labour Court in Misc. Application IDA (Review) case No.02/2023 is quashed and set aside. The Misc. Application IDA (Review) case No.2/2023 is rejected. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. S.N. Kumar, Advocate

For the Respondent: Mr. S.A. Mohta, Advocate

Case Title: JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Amarlal s/o Parashramji Sharma

Neutral Citation: 2025: BHC-NAG:8111

Case Number: Writ Petition No.1017 of 2025

Bench: Justice Prafulla S. Khubalkar