Calcutta HC Dismisses Bank’s Appeal Against Compulsory Retirement Order, Citing ‘Denial of Reasonable Opportunity’ and ‘Violation of Natural Justice
Sanchayita Lahkar
The Calcutta High Court Division Bench comprising Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, held that the disciplinary proceedings against a bank employee stood vitiated due to the denial of reasonable opportunity to respond to the Enquiry Report (ER) before the Disciplinary Authority (DA) arrived at its conclusion. The court concluded that “denial of the opportunity to deal with the ER before the DA took its decision on the charges, is denial of reasonable opportunity” and stated that the learned Single Judge had committed no error in setting aside the punishment imposed. The Court observed that “Manash was not supplied a copy of the ER before the DA arrived at its conclusion with regard to the alleged guilt”, and the admitted delay of over 15 years in litigation further precluded any liberty to the employer to recommence proceedings, especially as the employee had already retired in 2018.
The matter arose from a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Bank of India against an employee, Manash Sen Chowdhury, who served as a Staff Clerk Cashier at its South Suburbs (Behala) Branch. The disciplinary action commenced through a chargesheet dated 9 July 2007. Three primary charges were levelled: first, that he failed to account for cash received across the counter on 29 June 2006, temporarily misappropriating ₹18,000 until 11 July 2006; second, that his account transactions indicated engagement in trade or business outside the scope of employment; and third, that he had availed loans from external entities in contravention of the terms attached to an overdraft facility provided by the bank.
An Enquiry Officer (EO) was appointed, and an enquiry proceeded with the participation of the employee. The employee was suspended on 22 December 2006. A show cause notice was later issued by the DA on 22 January 2008, enclosing for the first time a copy of the ER dated 29 November 2007. The employee replied on 7 February 2008, and a punishment order of compulsory retirement was communicated by the DA on 12/19 February 2008. A statutory appeal was dismissed on 29 August 2008, leading the employee to file a writ petition.
The ER recorded that the second and third charges were proved. Regarding the first charge, the EO found it “Partially Proved. Misappropriation of the amount of Rs. 18,000/- is proved while the refund of the said amount by CE through his spouse is not proved.” In contrast, the DA, in its notice dated 22 January 2008, stated that “on the basis of preponderance of probability, it is established in the enquiry that Mrs. Chitra Sen Chowdhury handed over Rs. 18000/- on 11.07.2006 to the Senior Branch Manager, Ultadanga Branch and hence... Charge-1 is conclusively proved.”
Counsel for the appellant bank, contended that the second and third charges had been concurrently found proved and the difference in opinion regarding the first charge justified the penalty of compulsory retirement. He argued that banking personnel are held to a standard of absolute integrity, and failure to uphold such discipline impairs public confidence. He referred to the employee’s purported signature on a paying-in-slip, arguing that its authenticity was affirmed by a document examiner. He also contended that disputed factual matters ought to have been addressed before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the employee qualified as a workman under Section 2(s) thereof. It was submitted that the existence of an alternative remedy barred the maintainability of the writ petition.
Further, he submitted that the employee had responded to the show cause notice and appeared for a personal hearing along with his defence representative. He asserted that all contentions were duly considered, and the allegation of breach of natural justice was baseless. He also contended that such arguments were not adequately addressed by the learned Single Judge, which constituted a ground for interference.
Conversely, counsel for the respondent employee, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Neogi, along with Ms. Ananya Neogi and Ms. Anushka Ghosh, argued that the ER had never been served on the employee prior to the show cause notice. The right to respond to the ER before the DA determines guilt, he submitted, is fundamental. He stated that “a delinquent has a right to receive the ER before the DA arrives at its conclusion as regards the guilt” and submitted that such procedural violation was rightly considered by the learned Single Judge.
He also argued that, although the disciplinary proceeding began in 2007 and the order of punishment was passed in 2008, the writ petition had been pending since 2008, and the employee had retired in 2018. In this factual context, it was recorded by the Single Judge that “no further liberty can be afforded to the bank to continue with the DP.”
Mr. Neogi further submitted that the presence of an alternative remedy is a rule of convenience and not an absolute legal bar, particularly in cases of procedural irregularity and violation of natural justice. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions in State of H.P. and Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 499] and Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2024) 5 SCC 217] to support this submission.
The Division Bench recorded that the fact that the ER was served only along with the show cause notice was not disputed. The court stated that “the denial of the opportunity to deal with the ER before the DA took its decision on the charges, is denial of reasonable opportunity and we do not find any infirmity in such finding warranting interference in appeal.”
On the issue of alternative remedy, the court stated that it is “not an absolute bar against maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” The Bench noted that the breach of natural justice could not have been rectified even by the Tribunal, although a fresh opportunity to establish the charge could have been available there.
The court considered that the disciplinary process had been ongoing for over 15 years. It stated, “Manash cannot be directly held responsible for such efflux of time,” and recognised that since he had retired in 2018, no meaningful continuation of proceedings could be envisaged. It observed that the learned Single Judge had “rightly balanced the equities among the parties” by denying financial back benefits but setting aside the punishment.
The court further noted that the learned Single Judge’s findings were based on a correct appreciation of facts and law and recorded: “there is no error, least to say any patent error of law in the judgment impugned and as such no interference is called for in the present appeal.”
The appeal filed by the Bank of India was dismissed. The connected application was also dismissed. The Division Bench directed that “there shall, however, be no order as to costs.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. R.N. Majumder, Advocate; Mr. S.M. Obaidullah, Advocate; Mr. Roni Chowdhury, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Bikash Ranjan Neogi, Advocate; Ms. Ananya Neogi, Advocate; Ms. Anushka Ghosh, Advocate
Case Title: Bank of India v. Shri Manash Sen Chowdhury & Ors.
Case Number: FMA 1110 of 2024 with IA No. CAN 1 of 2024
Bench: Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra
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