Safiya Malik

The High Court at Calcutta Division Bench of Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi delivered its judgment on August 26, 2025, allowing the prayer for bail of an accused whose earlier bail had been cancelled following the inclusion of provisions under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Division Bench directed that the appellant be released on bail upon furnishing a bond, subject to specific conditions including appearance before the trial court and restrictions on entering the jurisdiction of the concerned local police station. The Court concluded that there were no materials on record suggesting that the accused was involved in activities threatening the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India, and consequently allowed the appeal against the order rejecting bail.

The proceedings arose from an order dated March 10, 2025, passed by the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta, in NIA Case No. 05 of 2022. The order had refused bail to the appellant after provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) were invoked. Initially, the appellant had been granted bail on May 21, 2022, in connection with a police case. Subsequently, following a bomb blast incident on January 17, 2022, registered under Beldanga Police Station Case No. 26 of 2022, additional provisions under UAPA were applied once the National Investigating Agency (NIA) took over the investigation on September 20, 2022.

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The police had initially seized 75 live socket/pipe bombs from the site of the incident and, in subsequent searches and recoveries based on statements of arrested persons, recovered further crude bombs. The NIA later submitted a charge sheet on December 12, 2023, against seven accused, including the appellant, invoking provisions under the Indian Penal Code, the Explosive Substances Act, and Section 18 of UAPA.

According to the NIA, the appellant was allegedly leading a gang in the village, procuring explosives, and using crude bombs to terrorize local residents. Records also showed that the appellant was involved in multiple criminal cases under the Explosives Act and the Arms Act. A dying declaration recorded in a video transcription implicated the appellant in calling the victim to prepare crude bombs, which subsequently led to a fatal blast. Statements from protected and other witnesses further implicated the appellant in gang-related violence intended to terrorize villagers.

The appellant’s counsel contended that mere seizure of explosives or allegations of possession of crude bombs did not, by themselves, constitute terrorism under the Act of 1967 unless the ingredients of Section 15 were satisfied. The defense argued that terrorist activities required an element of threat to the unity, integrity, or sovereignty of India, and not all acts of local violence could be elevated to terrorism. Counsel relied upon precedents including Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) and Natasha Narwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2021) to argue that courts must prevent the unwarranted extension of statutory provisions to cases not envisaged by the legislature.

The NIA countered by submitting that possession of more than one hundred crude bombs, coupled with witness statements, showed intent to strike terror among people. It was argued that the appellant’s conduct fell squarely within the ambit of Sections 15 and 18 of the UAPA. The prosecution also relied upon the Supreme Court judgement in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019), which held that courts must be satisfied at the bail stage that accusations appear prima facie true.

The Division Bench carefully examined the statutory provisions under UAPA and the factual matrix placed before it. The Court observed that Section 15 of the Act of 1967 defines a terrorist act in terms of acts threatening or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India, or intended to strike terror in people. The Court noted: “All forms of public disorder therefore, cannot be classified as one which is threatening the safety and security of the nation. Distinction has to be therefore, drawn between a public disorder calculated to endanger the security of the nation and the public disorder of a purely local significance.”

The Court further recorded: “In our view, Section 15 of the Act of 1967, has defined a terrorist act to be something which impinges upon the safety and security of the nation. The nature of the criminal activities which impinges upon the safety and security of the nation are enumerated in Section 15 (1)(a) to (c) of the Act of 1967. Citizens constitute a nation. The threat or the likelihood thereof to the people must be in relation to the unity, integrity, security including economic security and/or sovereignty of India for the Act of 1967 to be attracted in all its rigours.”

The Bench relied on the Law Commission’s 43rd Report, which distinguished between minor breaches of public order of local significance and aggravated forms of public disorder threatening national security. Referring to case law, the Court noted that while criminal activities and terrorist activities may overlap, terrorism, as contemplated under UAPA, required a higher threshold of threat to national integrity and sovereignty. “Any other activity howsoever heinous not affecting India in the manner as delineated under Section 15 of the Act of 1967 would not constitute a terrorist act within the meaning of the Act of 1967 even though directed against a section of the people in India.”

While acknowledging that the case diary and witness statements implicated the appellant in gang violence and local terrorization, the Court explicitly stated: “Our attention has not been drawn to any material in the case diary suggesting that the appellant was involved in threatening the unity, integrity, security including economic security and sovereignty of India.” The Court also recorded that the appellant had been on bail from May 21, 2022, until March 10, 2025, and no misuse of liberty was alleged during this period.

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Having considered the statutory framework and the materials on record, the Division Bench concluded that continued pre-trial detention was not justified. The Court ordered: “In such circumstances we grant bail to the appellant.” It directed that the appellant be released upon furnishing a bond of Rs. 50,000 with two sureties of like amount, one of whom must be local, to the satisfaction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata.

The Court further directed that the appellant must appear before the trial court on every hearing date until further orders. The appellant was restrained from intimidating witnesses or tampering with evidence in any manner. The Court ordered that the appellant would not enter into the jurisdiction of the concerned local police station, except for attending the trial court. The appellant was also required to inform the officer-in-charge of both his local police station and the police station where he resides.

The Bench clarified: “In the event the appellant fails to appear before the Trial Court without any justifiable cause, the Trial Court shall be at liberty to cancel the bail of the appellant without further reference to this Court.” Concluding, the Division Bench allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of March 10, 2025, that had cancelled bail.

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellant: Mr. Sabyasachi Banerjee, Senior Advocate, Ms. Diksha Ghosh, Advocate, Ms. Pragya Banerjee.

For the NIA: Mr. Arun Kumar Maiti (Mohanty), Learned Special Public Prosecutor, NIA, Mr. Anirban Mitra, Learned Special Public Prosecutor, NIA, Mr. Bhaskar Prosad Banerjee, Learned Special Public Prosecutor, NIA, Mr. Debashish Tandon, Learned Public Prosecutor, NIA.

Case Title: Md. Imadul Haque v. National Investigating Agency

Case Number: CRA(DB) 137 of 2025

Bench: Justice Debangsu Basak, Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi