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Calcutta High Court Sets Aside Bail In POCSO Case ; Bail In Serious POCSO Cases Cannot Be Granted As A Matter Of Course Solely On Chargesheet Filing 

Calcutta High Court Sets Aside Bail In POCSO Case ; Bail In Serious POCSO Cases Cannot Be Granted As A Matter Of Course Solely On Chargesheet Filing 

Sanchayita Lahkar

 

The High Court of Calcutta, Single Bench of Justice Bivas Pattanayak, cancelled the bail granted to an accused charged with aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a 14-year-old girl, holding that the mere filing of a chargesheet cannot serve as the sole basis for granting bail in serious POCSO matters. Setting aside the Sessions Court's order, the Court observed that bail discretion must be exercised judiciously, with due regard to the gravity of allegations, the victim's vulnerability, and the likelihood of witness intimidation, and not as a matter of course.

 

The matter arose from a complaint lodged by the mother of a 14-year-old girl alleging sexual exploitation by the accused, who was her English tutor. Based on the written complaint submitted before the Inspector-in-Charge of Egra Police Station, an FIR was registered under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The accused first sought anticipatory bail before the trial court, which was rejected considering the seriousness of the allegations and the stage of investigation. Thereafter, the accused surrendered before the court and applied for regular bail, which was also rejected.

 

Also Read: High Court's Contempt Jurisdiction Not Extinguished By Doctrine Of Merger When SC Merely Affirms Without Fresh Directions: Supreme Court

 

Subsequently, the investigating agency submitted a chargesheet against the accused. Soon thereafter, the trial court granted bail primarily on the ground that investigation had been completed and chargesheet had been filed. The de facto complainant challenged the order granting bail and sought cancellation of the same before the High Court. It was contended that the trial court ignored the gravity of the allegations, the victim’s statement, and the possibility of witness intimidation and tampering with evidence.

 

The accused opposed the application for cancellation of bail, arguing that no supervening circumstances existed warranting cancellation and that allegations regarding intimidation were unsupported by materials. The State submitted that further investigation had subsequently been carried out and a supplementary chargesheet had also been filed.

 

While considering the issue of maintainability, the Court referred to the distinction between cancellation of bail due to subsequent misconduct and interference with a bail order that is itself legally infirm. The Court recorded the principle stated by the Supreme Court “If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail.”

 

The Court further recorded the principle governing interference with bail orders “Under Section 439 (2) of CrPC, the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere.”

 

Examining the factual matrix, the Court referred to the statement of the minor victim recorded under Section 164 CrPC and other materials in the case diary. The Court observed that the victim had clearly implicated the accused and alleged repeated sexual assault and blackmail. The Court recorded “A child victim’s statement is not that of an accomplice but of a victim suffering physical, psychological, and emotional trauma, and stands on a higher pedestal than even an injured witness’s testimony.”

 

The Court also noted that the trial court had earlier rejected the accused’s bail application after considering the victim’s statement and other materials but later granted bail within a short span of time without any substantial change in circumstances. The Court recorded “the learned trial court just after 10 days despite finding that there are materials in the case diary against the accused, yet granted bail to him on the sole ground that upon completion of investigation chargesheet has been submitted.”

 

Addressing the principles governing grant of bail, the Court stated “The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.” The Court further recorded that bail orders must indicate reasons reflecting consideration of relevant factors “Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind.”

 

After examining the impugned order, the Court recorded that the trial court had not considered essential factors relevant for granting bail. It observed “none of the above parameters have been taken into consideration by the learned trial court while granting bail to the accused-opposite party no.2 save and except the fact that upon completion of investigation chargesheet has been submitted.”

 

Also Read: Order XI Rule 1(5) CPC | No Absolute Bar On Late Document Disclosure; Courts Can Permit Production At Any Stage On Reasonable Cause: Calcutta High Court

 

With regard to offences against children, the Court observed “commission of offence against the children should be viewed as heinous and serious offence and should not be taken lightly as offence of private nature and in fact such offences are bound to be taken as an offence against the society.”

 

The Court directed that “the bail granted to the accused-opposite party no.2 by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Contai vide order dated 20th July, 2024 stands cancelled. The accused-opposite party no.2 is directed to surrender before the learned trial court within a period of 10 days from date of this order failing which, the learned trial court shall take appropriate coercive steps for committing the accused to custody.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Sabyasachi Banerjee, Senior Advocate; Mr. Anirban Dutta, Advocate; Mr. Ayan Mondal, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr. Tilak Mitra, Advocate; Mr. Praloy Bhattacharyee, Advocate; Mr. Soumon Nanda, Advocate; Mr. Koushik Roy, Advocate; Mr. Arijit Ganguli, Advocate; Mr. Sujan Chatterjee, Advocate

 

Case Title: XXXX vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026: CHC-AS:358
Case Number: C.R.M. (M) 1069 of 2025
Bench: Justice Bivas Pattanayak

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