Compassionate Appointment Not Barred Due To Deceased Having Under Three Years’ Service Left; Gauhati High Court
Sanchayita Lahkar
The Gauhati High Court Division Bench of Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury disposed of the State’s appeals arising from challenges to an order that set aside a compassionate-appointment eligibility cut-off linked to a deceased employee’s remaining service. The Bench sustained the invalidation of Clause 1 of the 01 June 2015 Office Memorandum, which excluded dependants from consideration if the employee had less than three years of service left, holding the condition arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Observing that the classification “is neither intelligible nor has any nexus with the differentia sought to be achieved,” the Court maintained directions for authorities to reconsider earlier rejections under the policy applicable on the date of death, while giving due weight to the passage of time.
The proceedings arose from a batch of writ appeals filed by the State challenging a common judgment of a Single Judge, which had examined the validity of a policy condition governing compassionate appointment. The dispute concerned Clause 1 of an Office Memorandum dated 01 June 2015, which restricted eligibility for compassionate appointment to dependants of deceased government employees only if the employee had a minimum of three years of service remaining at the time of death.
Several writ petitioners, whose applications had been rejected solely on the basis of this residual service requirement, approached the High Court. They contended that the cut-off created an arbitrary classification among similarly situated dependants of employees who died in harness. The State defended the clause as a rational policy choice, asserting that compassionate appointment was not a vested right but a concession intended to prevent destitution, and that the condition was designed to avoid misuse and align with broader principles governing such appointments. The Single Judge struck down the clause as unconstitutional and directed reconsideration of the rejected claims, leading the State to file the present appeals.
The Division Bench examined the validity of the residual service cut-off prescribed under the Office Memorandum dated 01 June 2015 and observed that “the classification made on the basis of the remaining service period left for the deceased employee is neither intelligible nor has any nexus with the differentia sought to be achieved.”
The Court recorded that “the respondents constitute a homogenous class of persons, whose bread-earners have died in harness,” and held that they “come within exception laid down in D.S. Nakara.”
Dealing with the State’s justification that the impugned condition was intended to prevent fraud and misuse, the Bench stated that “Fraud or misuse may occur, irrespective of the length of service remaining. Limiting the benefits to dependants of the deceased employees, who have 3(three) years of service remaining, does not necessarily reduce the risk of fraudulent claims; a would-be fraudster could equally fabricate or collude in cases where a deceased employee had long remaining service. There is no logical causal connection between the duration of remaining service and the likelihood of such misuse.”
The Court observed: “The absence of any contemporaneous reasoning diminishes any claim of the State that the choice of 3(three) years was the product of considered administrative evaluation for it not to be interfered with on the ground of such administrative policy being within the domain of executive and the usual restraint of the Courts in treading in such field.”
It added: “The executive must always conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Policy classifications must not be arbitrary, irrational or discriminatory without an intelligible basis. Compassionate appointment may not be an absolute vested right but it is a benefit conferred by the employer subject to policy conditions. The non-vested status of compassionate employment does not immunize arbitrary classifications from constitutional scrutiny,”
Addressing the issue of delay, the Bench took note of binding precedent and recorded that “in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant or the authorities, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost.” However, the Court clarified that “the correctness of the declaration of unconstitutionality of Clause 1 does not become academic merely because of the passage of time.”
The Bench ultimately held that “the declaration of Clause 1 of the Office Memorandum dated 01.06.2015 to be constitutionally invalid by the learned Single Judge is wholly justified.”
On replacing Compassionate Appointment with Compassionate Family Pension Scheme the Court observed: “the Policy of the State, which was prevalent at the time of death of the employees, would only be applicable to the respondents and in that case, there would be some justification for sustaining the relegating order by the learned Single Judge, notwithstanding the passage of more than 10(ten) years since the deaths.”
The Division Bench directed that “we thus affirm the relegating order passed by the learned Single Judge. While making such application before the concerned authorities, the private respondents, we may caution, must not entertain any false hopes and the concerned authorities also shall consider the “passage of time” aspect seriously while assessing the suitability of the private respondents for compassionate appointment, which would be the most important factor in recommending the cases of the private respondents for compassionate appointment, which ultimately may not withstand the judicial scrutiny if such recommendation is made after a long lapse of time since the death of the deceased employees.
“With the afore-noted observations, we close these appeals with the hope that the statutory authorities while deciding the cases of the private respondents shall appropriately apply the law with regard to compassionate appointment. The appeals stand disposed off accordingly.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners (State): Mr. D. Saikia, Advocate General, Assam; Mr. D. Nath, Senior Government Advocate; Mr. D.K. Sharma, Additional Senior Government Advocate; Standing Counsel for concerned Departments.
For the Respondents: Mr. D.P. Chaliha, Senior Advocate, assisted by multiple Advocates on record as reflected in the judgment.
Case Title: State of Assam v. Dipak Gogoi & Ors. (and connected matters)
Neutral Citation: 2025: GAU-AS:17234-DB
Case Number: Writ Appeal No. 287/2023 and connected appeals
Bench: Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar, Justice Arun Dev Choudhury
