Safiya Malik

A significant judgement has been delivered concerning the maintainability of appeals against orders condoning delays in appellate proceedings under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (MLRC). The court adjudicated on whether an appeal can be filed against an order passed by a lower appellate authority merely condoning the delay in filing an appeal.

The dispute arises from an appeal regarding a mutation entry in land records. The petitioners challenged an order condoning the delay in filing an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Alibag. The land in question, bearing Gat No.248/1/C, admeasuring 0.08 Hector 60 R, is located in Village Thal, Taluka Alibag, District Raigad. Mutation Entry No.6866 was certified on May 13, 1960, deleting the name of Krishna Bhaskar Mhatre and entering the name of Gajanan Thakur as the holder of the land. Respondent No.1 filed R.T.S. Appeal No.43 of 2023 before the SDO, Alibag, challenging this mutation entry after 65 years, along with an application for condonation of delay.

The SDO issued notices regarding the condonation application, but the petitioners did not appear. After hearing the submissions of the appellant (Respondent No.1), the SDO passed an order on May 17, 2023, condoning the delay and fixing a date for the appeal’s hearing on merits. Aggrieved by this, the petitioners filed Appeal No.294 of 2023 before the Additional Collector, Raigad, challenging the SDO’s decision to condone the delay. However, the Additional Collector dismissed the appeal as not maintainable under Section 252 of the MLRC. The petitioners subsequently approached the High Court, contesting the Additional Collector’s order.

The petitioners contended that the Additional Collector erred in dismissing their appeal, arguing that there is no explicit prohibition under MLRC barring an appeal against an order condoning delay. The petitioners relied on prior judgments where such appeals were entertained and adjudicated upon. They further argued that condonation of delay significantly affects the rights of the opposing party and should not be shielded from appellate scrutiny.

Respondent No.1, on the other hand, supported the Additional Collector’s view, arguing that once an appeal is admitted by condoning delay, no further appeal lies. They relied on Section 252 of the MLRC, which states that no appeal shall be entertained against an order admitting an appeal under Section 251. Respondent No.1 contended that the only available remedy for the petitioners was to seek revision before the State Government under Section 257.

The court examined whether an appeal is maintainable against an order condoning delay under Section 251 of the MLRC. The court noted that different interpretations had been placed on this issue in past judgments, leading to confusion. The statutory framework of MLRC was analyzed, particularly Sections 247, 251, 252, and 255, which deal with appeals, condonation of delay, and powers of appellate authorities.

The court observed that Section 251 allows an appeal to be admitted after the limitation period if sufficient cause is demonstrated. However, Section 252 explicitly bars an appeal against an order “admitting an appeal or an application for review under Section 251.” The court stated that once the delay is condoned, the appeal automatically gets registered and proceeds to the next stage, making further appeal against the condonation impermissible.

The court further elaborated that there are two types of admissions:

1. Ministerial Admission under Section 251: Condonation of delay automatically leads to the registration of an appeal without requiring further admission.

2. Adjudicatory Admission under Section 255: The appellate authority may admit or summarily reject an appeal after examining its merits.

The court distinguished between these two admissions, stating that while an appeal admitted under Section 255 may be challenged, no such challenge is permitted against an appeal admitted after condonation of delay under Section 251. The court further examined previous judgments that had allowed appeals against condonation orders and concluded that such interpretations were contrary to the express language of Section 252.

The court also addressed the potential impact of its ruling on future cases. It noted that allowing appeals against condonation of delay would result in a prolonged litigation cycle, leading to procedural bottlenecks. The legislative intent behind Section 252 was to prevent unnecessary delays in the appellate process and ensure that appeals proceed expeditiously once admitted. The court stated that the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party is to file a revision application before the State Government under Section 257 of the MLRC.

Additionally, the court examined the judicial precedent relied upon by both parties. It found that in Sadanand Tukaram Suroshe v. Ashok Gajanan Suroshe, a coordinate bench had held that appeals against orders condoning delay are not maintainable and that revision before the State Government is the only remedy. The court maintained this position and held that any contrary rulings must be reconsidered in light of the statutory bar under Section 252.

Considering the relevant facts and legal provisions, the court held:

• No appeal is maintainable against an order passed under Section 251 of the MLRC condoning the delay.

• The appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party is to file a revision before the State Government under Section 257 of the MLRC.

• The judgment of the Additional Collector, Raigad, dismissing the petitioners’ appeal as not maintainable, was upheld.

• The petition was dismissed, confirming the lower appellate authority's discretion in condoning delays without further appellate intervention.

Case Title: Pravin Gajanan Thakur & Ors. v. Kalpana Virbhadra Raut & Ors.

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 5716 of 2024

Bench: Justice Sandeep V. Marne

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