Continuity Of Service For Pension Benefits Preserved When Employee Tenders Technical Resignation And Rejoins Same Post Next Day Without Break Under CCS (Pension) Rules: Orissa High Court
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Orissa Division Bench of Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad and Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra dismissed a writ petition filed by the Union Government and upheld a tribunal direction requiring that an employee’s earlier temporary service be counted as qualifying service for pension and other terminal benefits. The dispute concerned whether the employee’s service rendered in a central government research project before his subsequent regular appointment could be excluded on the ground that his resignation was not formally accepted and therefore broke service. The Bench found that where an employee tenders a technical resignation through proper channel and joins the same post under the same employer the next day without any gap, continuity for pension purposes remains intact under the CCS (Pension) framework.
The petitioners, representing the Central Government authorities, approached the Orissa High Court seeking interference with a tribunal order that treated the employee’s earlier project tenure as qualifying service for pension and other terminal benefits. They contended that his prior engagement in the malaria research project could not be counted and that his resignation was not accepted by the competent authority; they also relied on a Madras High Court decision in support.
The employee stated that he had served in the IDVC Project on temporary appointments from 4 January 1988 and was later selected into the regular cadre as Senior Research Officer under the same employer. The record reproduced his letter dated 15 March 2007 describing it as a “technical resignation” and his joining report dated 16 March 2007 addressed to the Director, National Institute of Malaria Research.
The dispute concerned whether the resignation and immediate rejoining preserved continuity for pension purposes and whether the earlier temporary service was to be reckoned as qualifying service. The provisions discussed included Rule 13 and Rule 26(2)–(3) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
The Bench noted the challenge mounted by the petitioners, including the reliance placed on a Madras High Court ruling: “(iii) The Tribunal grossly erred in not following the decision of Madras High Court in P. Philip Samuel v. The Director, Vector Control Research Centre, IMCR and thus there is error apparent on the face of record, warranting interference of this Court for setting the same at naught.” It then recorded its conclusion on interference at the threshold: “Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the petition papers, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:”
On the core dispute about acceptance of technical resignation, the Bench stated: “The vehement submission of learned DSGI that Petitioner’s Technical Resignation was never accepted, although he was permitted to join the post in question on being freshly appointed in a selection process, is bit difficult to countenance.” Referring to the resignation and joining letters addressed to the same authority, it recorded: “Thirdly, both the resignation letter and the joining report are addressed to the very same authority, namely, the Director, National Institute of Malaria Research, Delhi and the gap between the two letters is less than 24 hours. Therefore, when duty report of the OP was accepted without any demur, the Technical Resignation is deemed to have been accepted.”
The Bench added: “Ordinarily, resignation would take effect once the request is accepted, regardless of its communication, unless the Rules otherwise provide. If the resignation is accepted by a formal record, that would be very ideal. However, cases of tacit acceptance of resignation, by way of conduct of the authorities, are not unknown to Service Jurisprudence.”
On the distinction between ordinary and technical resignation, and the precedents it drew upon, the Bench observed: “It hardly needs to be stated that the Service Jurisprudence broadly recognizes the difference between ordinary resignation & the Technical Resignation.” It then stated: “The decisions in Krishna Kant Tiwari v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghatana and Sh. Jitendra Kumar v. Indraprastha Power Generation Co. Ltd., broadly echo the same view. It is observed in the said decisions that resignation tendered for joining another Government post through proper channel is a Technical Resignation, and that the employee is entitled to continuity of service. However, this is not a Thumb Rule, is also true.”
Turning to pensionability of past service, the Bench set out Rule 13: “Subject to the provisions of these rules, qualifying service of a Government servant shall commence from the date he takes charge of the post to which he is first appointed either substantively or in an officiating or temporary capacity: Provided that officiating or temporary service is followed without interruption by substantive appointment in the same or another service or post:” It stated: “This Rule by its very text is expansive and intends to extent benefit to a temporary employee who gains permanent one subsequently… the previous temporary service… cannot be wiped out while computing the qualifying service for determining the pension & other terminal benefits.”
It extracted Rule 26(2) and (3) and recorded the consequence: “(2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of post service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies.” and “(3) Interruption in service in a case falling under sub-rule (2)… shall be covered by grant of leave… or by formal condonation…” ; followed by: “A plain reading of these sub-rules of Rule 26 coupled with Rule 13… would unmistakably lead to a conclusion that the previous temporary service of an employee has to be reckoned along with regular service for the purpose of determining the terminal benefits…”
On the reliance on the Madras High Court decision, it stated: “The last contention of learned DSGI that the Tribunal erred in deviating from the ratio of Madras High Court decision in Philip Samuel supra, is difficult to countenance.” It then referred to authority of precedents by quoting Lord Halsbury: “…a decision is an authority for the proposition that has been laid down in the given fact matrix of a case, and not for all that which logically follows… as observed by Lord Halsbury more than a century ago in Quinn v. Letham.”
On the scope of supervisory jurisdiction, the Bench recorded: “A Writ Court exercising a limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India… does not sit in appeal over the decisions of a statutory Tribunal… as construed by the Apex Court in L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India.”
The Court directed: “In the above circumstances, this petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is… The impugned order of the Tribunal to be implemented within sixty days, without giving scope for contempt proceedings.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. P.K. Parhi, DSGI along with Mr. D.R. Bhokta, CGC
For the Respondents: Mr. Abhaya Kumar Behera, Sr. Advocate with M/s. R.K. Bisoi, A.K. Samantray, D.P. Parija & A. Mishra, Advocates
Case Title: Union of India and others v. Dr. Manoj Kumar Das
Case Number: W.P.(C) No.27890 of 2025
Bench: Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad; Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra
