Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Rajasthan Single Bench of Justice Sunil Beniwal has allowed a writ petition in part by quashing and setting aside an order that had placed an elected municipal chairperson under suspension, directing her immediate reinstatement. The Bench has simultaneously permitted the State authorities to continue the already-initiated proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 before a Judicial Officer and to conclude the inquiry within a specified period.

The Court has, therefore, confirmed the competence of the authorities to proceed with the inquiry, while invalidating the suspension component of the impugned order. In doing so, the Court has recorded that the suspension, based on the same charge earlier pursued under another statute without suspension, was not justified in the present circumstances, particularly after the reference to a Judicial Officer.

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The final order further stipulates that the elected representative be permitted to resume office as Chairperson forthwith, subject to her cooperation in the inquiry. The writ petition has thus resulted in revocation of suspension and affirmation of the ongoing inquiry under the municipal law, with a mandate to complete the process expeditiously within a defined timeline.

The matter arises from administrative action connected to appointments in a local body. The elected representative at the centre of the proceedings had served as Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat. During the period in question, the Gram Panchayat faced staff shortages. In Gram Sabha meetings held on 20.11.2020 and 21.12.2020, the Panchayat decided to temporarily engage three individuals—designated as Panchayat Assistant, Chowkidar, and Peon—on a fixed remuneration basis, with effect from 25.10.2020 and 21.12.2020, respectively. On 25.02.2021, the Gram Panchayat sought approval for these engagements from the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Bikaner.

Following a complaint regarding these appointments, the Gram Panchayat resolved on 31.12.2021 to discontinue the engagements. An inquiry report dated 17.01.2022 concluded that prior approval of the Panchayat Samiti was mandatory and, in its absence, the appointments were irregular and warranted termination. A further inquiry was initiated to examine the appointments and assess any financial loss. The second report, dated 02.11.2022, recommended recovery of the amounts disbursed to the three appointees, noting that recovery had not been made by that date.

On the basis of allegations of misuse of position and causing financial loss to the Panchayati Raj Institution, the departmental authorities decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the then Sarpanch and the Gram Vikas Adhikari. A communication to that effect was issued by the Vikas Adhikari on 27.03.2023. A further notice dated 21.06.2023 asked for an explanation as to why action under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 should not be initiated. A written response was submitted on 01.11.2023. Finding the explanation unsatisfactory, a personal hearing notice issued on 28.02.2024 was followed by a formal charge-sheet under Section 38 of the 1994 Act dated 06.09.2024.

As proceedings under the Panchayati Raj framework continued, a notification dated 07.11.2024 declared the Gram Panchayat as a Class IV Municipality. Consequent to this transformation, the elected representative assumed office as Chairperson of the Municipal Board under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Thereafter, a fresh notice dated 28.05.2025 issued under Section 39(1) of the 2009 Act sought an explanation and framed charges mirroring those earlier drawn under the 1994 Act. A reply dated 02.06.2025 objected to the initiation of a fresh inquiry under the 2009 Act. The authorities, however, referred the matter to a Judicial Officer for inquiry under Section 39(3) of the 2009 Act and, in the same order dated 19.06.2025, placed the Chairperson under suspension under Section 39(6) of that Act.

The writ petition challenged the impugned order dated 19.06.2025 and sought directions permitting discharge of duties as Chairperson and Member of the Municipality, as well as an injunction against the proposed inquiry under Section 39. The petitioner’s submissions were that the allegations related to contractual engagements made in 2020 without prior approval, which were discontinued in 2021; that prolonged departmental action without earlier suspension indicated the charge was not considered grave; that initiating a fresh inquiry under municipal law for acts predating municipal status was without jurisdiction; that dual proceedings would amount to double jeopardy; and that suspension was unwarranted, particularly after entrusting the inquiry to a Judicial Officer. In support, reliance was placed on Meena Vyas v. State of Rajasthan for the proposition that after reference to a Judicial Officer, allegations of undue influence on the process are untenable, and on Geeta Devi Narooka regarding the nature of misconduct.

The State, through learned counsel, responded that Section 78(1)(b) of the 1994 Act required prior approval of the Panchayat Samiti for staffing and that no such approval had been secured; that the Panchayati Raj Institution sustained financial loss, warranting recovery and action; that the duties of a Sarpanch under Section 32(f) of the 1994 Act obliged adherence to law, which was not observed; and that suspension was justified considering the financial impact and the possibility of interference if the Chairperson continued in office. It was further contended that Section 39(1)(d) of the 2009 Act and Section 38(1)(b) of the 1994 Act are pari materia, enabling action for misconduct under municipal law; that Section 3 of the 2009 Act covered liabilities and consequences of delimitation and inclusion, allowing continuation of accountability; and that no individual can evade responsibility due to procedural transitions.

With regard to the alleged concurrency of proceedings, the State submitted that the earlier inquiry under the 1994 Act had effectively merged into the present inquiry under the 2009 Act, such that there was no double jeopardy. Reliance was placed on Nirmal Kumar Pitaliya v. State of Rajasthan to argue the State’s authority to suspend upon deciding to initiate an inquiry under Section 39 of the 2009 Act, and on Sita Devi Gurjar to suggest that judicial interference in such suspensions should be circumspect. The petitioner, in rejoinder, maintained that the 1994 Act inquiry could continue under Rule 22 of the 1996 Rules and contested the invocation of the municipal law for alleged misconduct predating municipal status.

The statutory framework extracted and considered by the Court included definitions of “Member” under the 1994 and 2009 enactments; the removal and suspension provision of Section 38 of the 1994 Act with its proviso enabling initiation or continuation of inquiry even after expiry of term and the suspension power under sub-section (4); Rule 22 of the 1996 Rules outlining the procedure of inquiry under the Panchayati Raj regime; and Sections 2, 3, 39, 40 and 41 of the 2009 Act covering delimitation, consequences of inclusion, removal and suspension of members, inquiries after expiry of term, and disability following removal. The issues framed for adjudication were whether the alleged acts amounted to misconduct warranting initiation under either statute; whether initiation under Section 39(1) of the 2009 Act was sustainable for alleged misconduct during the Panchayat tenure after the area’s declaration as a Municipality; and whether suspension under Section 39(6) was justified in view of the term expiring in October 2025.

On the question of whether the alleged acts constituted misconduct, the Court declined to render factual determinations in writ jurisdiction, noting the necessity of a regular inquiry. The Court recorded: “Whether the engagement of these three persons was necessary to discharge the duties at that time, or whether the requisite resolution or decision under the Act or Rules was passed and the act of the petitioner whether constitutes misconduct, are disputed questions of fact, which require proper inquiry.” It further stated: “Therefore, the petitioner’s submission that the alleged act does not constitute misconduct cannot be adjudicated by this Court in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

Addressing the competence to initiate proceedings under Section 39(1) of the 2009 Act for alleged misconduct during Panchayat tenure, the Court examined the effect of delimitation and inclusion under the municipal law. It observed that once the area was declared a Municipality, the 1994 Act ceased to apply to that local area by virtue of Section 3(8)(f) of the 2009 Act. The Court stated: “In other words, from the date of such declaration, the provisions of the Act of 1994 no longer apply to the local area concerned.” The Court then explained the necessity of a mechanism to conclude pending inquiries within the municipal framework, noting: “If the argument of the petitioner that proceedings cannot be continued under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 is accepted, it would leave the State Government with no legal recourse to conclude the inquiry.”

Elaborating on the applicability of Section 39(1), the Court recorded: “Once petitioner became Member under the Act of 2009, she shall be governed by the provisions of the Act of 2009 and any act of misconduct or any other disgraceful conduct would attract the action under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009.” The Court further observed with respect to liabilities and consequences: “After declaration of local area to be Municipality, all rules/provisions of Act of 1994 would cease and the local area so declared would be governed by the Act of 2009. Moreso, in view of Section 3 of the Act of 2009, the liability/assets of local area would also come within the purview of the Act of 2009.”

On the plea of double jeopardy or parallel proceedings, the Court recorded that with the cessation of the 1994 framework in the area, action under that Act could not continue, removing the possibility of concurrent inquiries. It stated: “Given that the Act of 1994 no longer applies due to the operation of Section 3(8)(f) of the Act of 2009, the authorities cannot proceed under Section 38 of the Act of 1994. As such, there is no question of parallel proceedings or double jeopardy.”

Turning to the suspension order, the Court reviewed the chronology of departmental awareness and steps taken. It noted that the authorities, despite earlier inquiry reports and the decision to proceed under Section 38 of the 1994 Act, had not chosen to suspend at that stage. In this context, the Court observed: “However, no decision to place the petitioner under suspension was taken at that stage, perhaps indicating that the nature of the charge was not considered sufficiently grave or that there was a lack of material justifying such action.” The Court then examined whether any additional material justified suspension upon initiation under the 2009 Act. It recorded: “no satisfactory response was provided” when a query was put to counsel and that “a perusal of the respondents’ reply reveals no indication that any new evidence had emerged to warrant suspension at that stage.”

With regard to the legal proposition that suspension may be ordered upon initiation of an inquiry under Section 39, the Court noted the general principle but centred the analysis on whether the power had been exercised reasonably and judiciously on the facts presented: “While the legal proposition is not in dispute, what is relevant is whether such power has been exercised reasonably and judiciously.” The Court distinguished reliance on the judgment cited by the respondents, recording that it did not constrain scrutiny in the present circumstances: “this Court finds no merit in that argument… nothing in the judgment suggests a binding principle that would restrict judicial scrutiny in the present circumstances.”

The Court then addressed the effect of entrusting the inquiry to a Judicial Officer: “Once such referral is made, the relevant records come under the custody and supervision of the Judicial Officer, thereby significantly reducing, if not eliminating, the risk of any interference or tampering by the petitioner.” The Court concluded on this aspect: “the decision to suspend the petitioner is not justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”

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Finally, synthesising the legal position, the Court stated the outcome respecting initiation under the municipal law and the invalidation of suspension: “the decision of the State Government to initiate inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 requires no interference.” It added: “Since there is no question of double jeopardy or two parallel proceedings, the State Government would be at liberty proceed against the petitioner under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 and decide the same in accordance with law.”

The Court issued clear directions combining the revocation of suspension with permission to proceed with the inquiry under the municipal statute. The order records that the writ petition is allowed in part and specifically declares: “The impugned order dated 19.06.2025 and so far as suspension of the petitioner is concerned, the same is quashed and set aside and the suspension of the petitioner is ordered to be revoked and she be permitted to join as Chairperson of the concerned Municipal Board forthwith.” In the same breath, the Court preserves the authority of the State to bring the pending inquiry to its conclusion within a defined period, stating: “However, the respondents-authorities are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 and conclude the same expeditiously within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.”

These directions are calibrated with a requirement of cooperation from the elected representative and an explicit consequence tied to non-participation. The judgment records: “Needless to observe that the petitioner shall fully cooperate in the inquiry and would not seek unnecessary adjournments. If the petitioner does not participate in the inquiry, then the respondents shall be at liberty to seek revival of the present writ petition.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Rajesh Joshi, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. Madhav Vyas

For the Respondents: Mr. Rajesh Panwar, Sr. Advocate – cum-Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Monal Chugh and Mr. Ayush Gehlot

Case Title: Sarla Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.

Neutral Citation: 2025: RJ-JD:33910

Case Number: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12122/2025

Bench: Justice Sunil Beniwal