“Defendants’ critique based on verifiable lab reports falls within journalistic freedom; interim injunction refused” : Delhi High Court holds influencers’ videos not prima facie defamatory
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Amit Bansal held that an interim injunction cannot be granted to restrain the continued publication of online video content criticizing a commercial nutritional product. The Court found that the content in question was based on laboratory reports and did not, at the interim stage, establish a prima facie case of defamation, disparagement, or trade mark infringement. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for interim relief. It further held that the suit qualifies as a commercial suit within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and that it is not barred by limitation. The Court directed that the content may remain publicly accessible and that the matter shall proceed to trial for determination of final issues on merits.
The plaintiff is a private limited company engaged in the sale and marketing of dietary and nutritional supplement products, including whey protein, vitamins, amino acids, fat burners, and related merchandise. The plaintiff began operations in 2018 under the trade marks "DC DOCTOR’S CHOICE" and related marks, including "DC DOCTOR’S CHOICE ISO PRO." It claims registration of these marks and states that its products are manufactured by third parties and approved by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI). The plaintiff markets its products online via its website and on platforms such as Amazon and Flipkart, and through various social media platforms and a mobile app.
The plaintiff contends that the defendants — identified as individual social media influencers — published videos between June and December 2022 on platforms including YouTube and Instagram. These videos are alleged to contain false, defamatory, and disparaging claims against the plaintiff’s ISO PRO protein product. The videos include assertions of incorrect nutritional labeling and suggestions that the product is substandard. The plaintiff asserts that these videos have negatively affected its sales, goodwill, and reputation.
The plaintiff alleges that the content amounts to defamation, disparagement, infringement of trade marks, and unfair trade practices. It asserts that the use of product images, packaging, and names in video thumbnails and titles constitutes unauthorized use of its registered trade marks and copyrighted content. The plaintiff further claims that the defendants are commercially aligned with competitors, notably referencing links to coupon codes and promotional content for other brands such as MuscleBlaze.
The plaintiff filed two interlocutory applications seeking, among other reliefs, an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, restraining publication and dissemination of the impugned videos. A separate application was filed by defendant no.1 seeking rejection or return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC, arguing that the suit was time-barred under Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that the Court lacked jurisdiction under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
Defendant no.1 contended that he is a certified personal trainer and sports nutritionist who runs a YouTube channel titled “All About Nutrition.” He claims to have reviewed the plaintiff’s ISO PRO product based on laboratory testing conducted at NABL-accredited laboratories — Varni Analytical Laboratory (VAL), Micro Tech Laboratory (MTL), and Eurofins Analytical Services India — and to have disclosed the test results through the videos. Defendant no.1 argued that the test reports indicated significant discrepancies in protein and carbohydrate content between the plaintiff’s claims and the actual findings. He asserted that his review content was created in public interest and that he issued disclaimers within the videos, which were educational in nature.
The other individual defendants are also content creators operating under social media handles such as @HealthByKilo, @Manishhkeshwani, and @Corefitlab. The plaintiff claims that these defendants published similar videos citing the findings of defendant no.1 and amplified the allegedly defamatory claims. The plaintiff also impleaded Google LLC (operator of YouTube) and Meta Platforms Inc. (operator of Instagram) as parties.
The plaintiff argued that its sales declined significantly following the publication of the videos and submitted sales data for the relevant periods. It also cited adverse customer reviews and social media comments as indicative of reputational harm. It contended that the laboratory testing methodology was flawed and that some kits used by the defendants were not FSSAI-approved. However, it did not submit independent lab reports contradicting the findings relied upon by the defendants.
The plaintiff invoked Sections 29 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alleging infringement. It also relied on the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The defence cited Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, arguing that the reviews fell within the domain of free speech and fair comment. Defendant no.1 also cited Section 43 of the FSS Act to argue that laboratory accreditation falls within regulatory compliance and does not disqualify the credibility of the results obtained.
Two amici curiae — Mr. Aditya Gupta and Mr. Varun Pathak — were appointed by the Court to assist with legal analysis on defamation, disparagement, and trademark issues, including the scope of interim injunctions in such contexts.
The Court noted that the present case involves the interplay and balancing of three fundamental rights under the Constitution: “(i) The plaintiff’s right to reputation and its economic rights (Article 21); (ii) The defendants’ right to freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)); (iii) Public’s right to know (Article 19(1)(a)).”
It recorded that the plaintiff’s claims were based on defamation, disparagement, and trade mark infringement. Regarding defamation, the Court observed: “Any oral or written statement, which includes a video, that lowers or tends to lower the reputation of a claimant, is considered to be defamatory. However, all defamatory statements are not actionable as the law provides certain defences...”
On the defence of truth, it held: “It is a settled position of law that truth or justification is a complete defence to an action for defamation. The onus is on the defendant to show that the statement made by him was true or substantially true.” Citing Ram Jethmalani, it further stated: “Even if the defendant acted with malice, so long as the statement made by him is a true statement, the element of malice is to be ignored.”
On fair comment: “The defence of fair comment provides protection for statements made on the basis of honest opinion, as opposed to statements of facts.” The defendant must show that the comment was based on facts that are sufficiently true, was on a matter of public interest, and could be honestly formed.
Regarding disparagement, the Court said: “The tort of disparagement falls within malicious falsehood and seeks to protect economic interests.” It reaffirmed that the plaintiff must prove the statement is false, made maliciously, and caused special damage.
The Court invoked the Bonnard v. Perryman principle, stating: “An interim injunction should not be granted unless the defence set up by the defendant was bound to fail in trial.” It quoted: “The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess… unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed.”
On the facts, it held: “The defendant no.1 has substantiated the claims made in the impugned video 1 with laboratory reports from reputed laboratories, which are prima facie reliable.” It acknowledged reports from VAL, MTL, and Eurofins and noted: “The plaintiff has nowhere questioned the veracity of the findings… nor has it submitted any laboratory report or other scientific material of its own to rebut.”
The Court found the lab reports trustworthy: “All the laboratories… are NABL accredited. MTL and Eurofins are also recognized by FSSAI under Section 43 of the FSS Act. Therefore, at a prima facie stage, the laboratory reports… cannot be disregarded.”
On video 6, it noted: “The defendant no.1 has only used a satirical name to refer to the plaintiff’s brand and has not made any direct false assertion.”
The Court considered arguments about the defendant’s qualifications and potential malice. It stated: “The defendant no.1 is a social media influencer… certified by the American Council on Exercise and K-11 School of Fitness Science.” It rejected claims of recklessness: “In my view… the impugned statements… have not been made in a reckless manner. On the contrary… they are backed up by test reports.”
The Court also reviewed impugned videos 2 to 5. It noted defendant no.2’s disclaimers and public interest intent, defendant no.3’s reliance on existing test results, and that “the defendants no.2 and 3 are engaging in constructive criticism of the plaintiff’s product.” Regarding video 4 by defendant no.4, the Court noted: “The test results… are more or less in line with the results obtained by the defendant no.1 from NABL accredited laboratories.” It called the term “Fake Protein” “nothing more than an exaggeration or hyperbole.”
Responding to the plaintiff’s reliance on Zydus v. Prashant Desai, the Court distinguished it: “The statements made by the defendants… are not unsubstantiated and are based on objective material.”
On trade mark use, it observed: “The defendants have not used the plaintiff’s marks… in the course of trade. The plaintiff’s marks have been used… only to review the plaintiff’s own goods.” It ruled Section 29(4) and (8) of the Trade Marks Act were not applicable.
Addressing other case law such as Greenpeace, Bloomberg, and Khushwant Singh, the Court reaffirmed: “Reasonable criticism, comment and parody is largely protected within the right to free speech under the Constitution… adopting a different approach would result in disturbing the balance between free speech and the interest of the plaintiff.”
It concluded: “The plaintiff has failed to show that the defences of ‘truth’ and ‘fair comment’ put up by the defendants are palpably false and/ or are bound to fail at the stage of trial.” It found: “The statements made by the defendants would be entitled to protection of free speech.”
The Court recorded the following conclusions and final directives:
“In view of the discussion above, the plaintiff has failed to show that the defences of ‘truth’ and ‘fair comment’ put up by the defendants are palpably false and/ or are bound to fail at the stage of trial.” It continued, “On a prima facie view, the plaintiff has also failed to make out a case for disparagement against the defendants as it cannot be said that the contents of the impugned videos are false or misleading or have been made in a malicious manner with an objective to cause damage or injury to the plaintiff.”
“Therefore, applying the Bonnard principle as approved by the judgements of the Supreme Court as well as this Court, the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction against the defendants and the statements made by the defendants would be entitled to protection of free speech.”
“The plaintiff has also not been able to establish a prima facie case for infringement of trade marks/ copyright against the defendants.”
“The balance of convenience would also be in favour of the defendants and granting an interim injunction would be to their prejudice as it would result in putting fetters on their right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and would also deprive the right of the public at large to receive information on matters of health.”
“Accordingly, the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction is dismissed.”
The Court also recorded: “The Court highly appreciates the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Aditya Gupta and Mr. Varun Pathak, the learned amici curiae, in the present suit.”
Lastly, the matter was scheduled for further proceedings: “List before the Joint Registrar on 7th July 2025 for further proceedings.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Plaintiff: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Senior Advocate with Ms. Kangan Roda, Mr. Tanishq Sharma, Mr. R. Abhishek, Mr. Sarthak Sharma, and Mr. Chirantan Priyadarshan, Advocates.
For the Defendants: Mr. Ramchandra Madan and Mr. Tushar Nigam, Advocates for D-1; Ms. Aishwarya Kane, Mr. Sauhard Alung, and Mr. Shuvam Bhattacharya, Advocates for D-5; Mr. Yash Karunakaran, Mr. Vishwajeet Deshmukh, and Ms. A. Mehra, Advocates for D-6.
Amici Curiae: Mr. Aditya Gupta and Mr. Varun Pathak.
Case Title: San Nutrition Private Limited v. Arpit Mangal and Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC: 2973
Case Number: CS(COMM) 420/2024
Bench: Justice Amit Bansal
[Read/Download order]
