Delhi High Court Criticizes Arbitrary Land Cancellation | Observes DDA Acted Without Proper Notice Or Justification
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Delhi, Single Bench of Justice Dharmesh Sharma, in a common judgment, disposed of a batch of writ petitions filed by individuals seeking reliefs against the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB). The petitioners had challenged the proposed demolition of their jhuggi-jhopris in Bhoomiheen Camp, Govind Puri, Kalkaji, South Delhi, and sought directions for a survey and rehabilitation in accordance with the Delhi Slum & Jhuggi Jhopri Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015. The Court held that the petitioners, who were either minors as on the cut-off date of 01.01.2015 or whose jhuggis were found to be used exclusively for commercial purposes, did not fulfil the eligibility criteria under the 2015 Policy. Consequently, the High Court dismissed all the writ petitions, stating they were “devoid of merit,” and also disposed of pending applications. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Eligibility Determination Committee and the Appellate Authority, which had deemed the petitioner’s ineligible for rehabilitation.
The petitioners, residents of Bhoomiheen Camp, Govind Puri, Kalkaji, claimed to have been in continuous possession of their jhuggi-jhopris since the early 1990s. They argued that the DDA's proposed demolition was arbitrary and violated the 2015 Policy, which mandates in-situ rehabilitation for eligible jhuggi dwellers and designates DUSIB as the nodal agency. The policy stipulates that JJ bastis existing before 01.01.2006 should not be demolished without providing alternative housing, with the cut-off date for residence eligibility being 01.01.2015.
Part B of the 2015 Policy requires a JJ dweller to furnish one of twelve specified documents issued before 01.01.2015 as proof of eligibility. These include a passport, ration card with photograph, electricity bill, driving license, government-issued identity card, public sector bank passbook, SC/ST/OBC certificate, pension documents, Freedom Fighter Identity Card, certificate of physical disability, Smart Card under a Health Insurance Scheme, or a certificate from a government school Principal. Additional criteria include the dweller's name appearing in electoral rolls of 2012-2015 and the year of the survey, and mention in the Joint Survey by DUSIB and the Land-Owning Agency (LOA).
The petitions were broadly categorized into two groups. The first group, with W.P.(C) No. 2785/2023 (Arun Das v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr.) as the lead matter, involved petitioners whose appeals for rehabilitation were rejected because they had not attained the age of majority (18 years) as on the cut-off date of 01.01.2015, a requirement under Paragraph 1(i) of Part B of the 2015 Policy. The second group, with W.P.(C) No. 6291/2023 (Kashmir Lal v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr.) as the lead, comprised petitioners whose appeals were rejected because their jhuggis were found to be used exclusively for commercial purposes at the time of a survey in October 2019, contravening Paragraph 1(viii) of Part B of the 2015 Policy.
Petitioners in the second category argued that Paragraph 1(ix) of Part B allows for rehabilitation if a jhuggi is used for both residential and commercial purposes. They alleged that the surveys were flawed, conducted by an outsourced agency appointed by DDA without DUSIB's involvement, and violated the "Protocol 2015." They contended that the DDA's actions violated their right to shelter under Article 21 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
DUSIB, in its counter-affidavit for W.P.(C) No. 2785/2023, stated that while it is the nodal agency, the land in question falls under the Central Government's jurisdiction, and removal/resettlement requires prior consent. It submitted that DDA, as the LOA, is the implementing authority for in-situ rehabilitation under PMAY-HFA(U) in this case, and DUSIB had no role in the sealing drive or eligibility determination. DUSIB reiterated that the petitioner Arun Das was a minor on 01.01.2015 and stated policy clauses requiring appearance in voter lists and non-ownership of a pucca house.
DDA, in its counter-affidavit for W.P.(C) No. 2785/2023, argued for dismissal, stating the petitioner admitted before the Appellate Authority to not possessing a Ration Card for the jhuggi and that a Ration Card later annexed to the writ petition was never produced before the Eligibility Determination Committee (EDC) or Appellate Authority. DDA asserted the petitioner failed to submit essential documents like a valid Voter Identity Card issued before 01.01.2015.
For the commercial use cases (W.P.(C) No. 6291/2023), DUSIB reiterated its general stand. DDA, in its counter-affidavit, contended that the petitioner's appeal was dismissed because the jhuggi was found to be in commercial use, corroborated by the petitioner's admission before the Appellate Authority. DDA maintained that multiple opportunities were given to JJ dwellers to furnish documents and that the survey was conducted in October 2019, followed by notices and a facilitation camp. DDA stated that the right to rehabilitation is governed by policy, which must be adhered to, and that the appellate process was fair, involving examination of survey reports and video recordings.
Petitioners in the "minor" category argued that the cut-off date of 01.01.2015 pertained to residence, not necessarily age for all purposes, and that some prescribed documents could be held by minors. They relied on Udal & Ors. v. DDA & Ors. (2017 SCC OnLine Del 9715) to argue for a holistic view where other documents establish residence. For instance, Arun Das presented an Aadhaar Card from 2013 and an electricity bill in his mother's name predating 01.01.2015. Mangal Karan (W.P.(C) 2352/2023) claimed residence since 2012, initially with relatives, then independently, providing a bank passbook opened in 2014.
Petitioners in the "commercial use" category argued that only a limited portion of their jhuggis was used commercially and cited Clause 1(ix) of Part B of the 2015 Policy, which allows for allotment if a jhuggi is used for both residential and commercial purposes. They relied on Sudama Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010 SCC OnLine Del 612) regarding the careful conduct of surveys.
DDA countered that the 2015 Policy was not challenged vires, and the 01.01.2015 cut-off date is paramount. It detailed a five-tier process for transparency: notice of survey, conduct of survey, post-survey awareness camp, Claims and Objections Committee, and EDC, followed by an appeal to the Appellate Authority. DDA argued that eligibility requires attaining 18 years by 01.01.2015, non-commercial use, no alternative residence, and name in voter lists for 2012-2015 and the survey year. For "minor" cases, DDA stated the policy unequivocally disqualifies those not majors on the cut-off date. For "commercial use" cases, DDA submitted that thorough factual and videographic surveys established exclusive commercial use, and the genuineness of the survey was not challenged.
The High Court of Delhi, in its analysis, first addressed a preliminary objection regarding DUSIB's non-involvement in the joint survey process. The Court stated, “the preliminary objections raised by learned counsels for the petitioners in the present writ petition as well as in the connected matters to the effect that under the DUSIB Act, the DUSIB was designated as the Nodal Agency for implementation of the 2015 Policy read with the Protocol-2015 but the respondent DDA allegedly sidelined DUSIB and did not involve it in the joint survey process, and therefore, the entire process of determination of eligibility conditions is flawed and unconstitutional, has already been addressed by this Court in W.P.(C) 6290/2023, titled Sanjeev Bhadra & Anr. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, along with a batch of other writ petitions, vide order dated 26.05.2025, and the preliminary objections have been found to be unsustainable in law. The said order is not repeated for the sake of brevity and may be read as forming an integral part of the present judgment.”
Regarding the petitions where rejection was due to the claimant being a minor on the cut-off date (W.P.(C) 2785/2023, W.P.(C) 2352/2023 & W.P.(C) 9038/2023), the Court observed, “it becomes evident that each of the petitioners was a minor as on the cut-off date, i.e., 01.01.2015.”
The Court further noted, “It is not in dispute that the 2015 Policy applies only to those jhuggi-jhopri clusters which came into existence prior to 01.01.2006... However, the necessary corollary flowing from the above discussion is that JJ bastis or clusters which came up after 01.01.2006 but before 01.01.2015 do not fall within the protective umbrella of the DUSIB Act, and the dwellers of such post-2006 JJ clusters are not entitled to any relocation or rehabilitation under the 2015 Policy. Consequently, JJ bastis/clusters established after 01.01.2015 are, a fortiori, excluded from consideration for the purposes of relocation or rehabilitation.”
The Court stated the unchallenged validity of the policy itself: “It is also pertinent to note that the constitutional validity of the 2015 Policy has not been challenged by the petitioners. As per Part B, Clause (1) of the said Policy, the foremost eligibility criterion for allotment of an alternative dwelling unit under the rehabilitation and relocation scheme is that the JJ dweller must be a citizen of India and not less than 18 years of age as on the cut-off date, i.e., 01.01.2015.”
The judgment then reproduced detailed reasons for rejection from the Appellate Authority's orders for each petitioner in this category. For Arun Das (W.P.(C) 2785/2023, DOB 15.07.1998), the Appellate Authority's order dated 15.12.2022 stated, “The admission of the Appellant/Claimant is a clincher piece of evidence and it shows that he was minor on the cut off date of 01.01.2015... Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the Appellant/Claimant was a minor on the cut off date of 01.01.2015 and further he was not having a Voter ID Card on the cut off date of 01.01.2015 and accordingly he does not fulfill the eligibility criteria as per the guidelines issued by DDA.” Similar findings were noted for Mangal Karan (W.P.(C) 2352/2023, DOB 12.05.1997) and Rahul (W.P.(C) 9038/2023, DOB 29.09.1999), whose Voter ID cards were issued much after the 01.01.2015 cut-off date, and their names did not appear in the requisite voter lists.
The Court concluded on this set of petitions: “A careful perusal of the aforesaid reasons by the Appellate Authority undisputable holding that the petitioners had not attained the age of 18 years as on the cut-off date, they are per se ineligible for any benefit under the 2015 Policy. The contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel for the DDA that no obligation is cast upon the respondent-authority to consider ineligible claims is well-founded.”
For the petitions concerning rejection due to commercial use of jhuggis (W.P.(C) 6291/2023 and W.P.(C) 11015/2023), the Court referred to Part-B of the 2015 Policy, specifically clauses (8) and (9): “(8) No dwelling unit shall be allotted if the jhuggi is used solely for commercial purpose. (9) In case, the jhuggie being used for both residential and commercial purposes can be considered allotment of one residential plot only. In case, the ground floor of the jhuggie is being used for commercial purposes and other floors for residential purposes that will entitle him for one residential plot only, if such commercial and residential unit is occupied by the same person.”
The Court observed, “In the present cases, findings of fact have been duly recorded by the EDC, and the same have been affirmed by the Appellate Authority after providing due opportunity to the petitioners, including confronting them with videographic evidence of the site in question.”
It further stated, “The petitioners were found to have been utilising the subject jhuggi-jhopri structures exclusively for commercial purposes. In such a scenario, the production of documents merely indicating possession would be of no consequence in establishing entitlement to rehabilitation under the 2015 Policy. The bottom line is that findings of fact, duly arrived at by the designated authorities in accordance with the policy framework, cannot be reappreciated or interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
The judgment then detailed the Appellate Authority's reasons for Kashmir Lal (W.P.(C) 6291/2023). The order dated 31.03.2023 noted, “As per survey record, the Jhuggi bearing No. B-300 was found to be used for commercial purposes... The admission of the Appellant/Claimant is a clincher piece of evidence. The survey records as well as the four video clips furnished by DDA shows that the Jhuggi No. B-300 is exclusively used by the Appellant/Claimant for commercial purposes for running a shop for selling spices... Further, the Appellant/Claimant has specifically admitted that he is running a shop from Jhuggi No. B-300 and has been living on rent somewhere else... Thus Jhuggi No. B-300 is not used for both residential and commercial purposes but it is solely used for commercial purposes.”
For Mithlesh (W.P.(C) 11015/2023), the Appellate Authority's order dated 15.02.2023 stated, “The Appellant/Claimant is having a double storey Jhuggi No. D-152... The room on the ground floor is used as shop wherein her husband Jagdish Prasad is running an electricity shop... DDA has made allotment in favour of her daughter-in-law Sangeeta W/o Indrajit against the first floor of the said Jhuggi No. D-152... Therefore, for all purposes the double storey jhuggi is a single dwelling unit... DDA has made allotment in favour of Sangeeta W/o Indrajit against the first floor of the said Jhuggi No. D-152 and accordingly two allotments against the same dwelling unit are not permissible as per the guidelines issued by DDA... the Appellant /Claimant is not entitled to seek second allotment against then same dwelling unit.”
The High Court of Delhi, after a thorough examination of the facts, arguments, and the applicable provisions of the Delhi Slum & Jhuggi Jhopri Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, issued clear directives concerning the batch of writ petitions.
For the writ petitions W.P.(C) 2785/2023, W.P.(C) 2352/2023, and W.P.(C) 9038/2023, where the petitioners' claims for rehabilitation were rejected primarily on the ground that they were minors as on the cut-off date of 01.01.2015 and thus did not meet the age eligibility criterion stipulated in the 2015 Policy, the Court found no merit in their contentions. The Court upheld the decisions of the Eligibility Determination Committee and the Appellate Authority.
The judgment stated: “A careful perusal of the aforesaid reasons by the Appellate Authority undisputable holding that the petitioners had not attained the age of 18 years as on the cut-off date, they are per se ineligible for any benefit under the 2015 Policy. The contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel for the DDA that no obligation is cast upon the respondent-authority to consider ineligible claims is well-founded.” Consequently, the Court directed the dismissal of these petitions. The specific directive was: “Accordingly, these writ petitions, being devoid of merit, are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.”
Regarding the writ petitions W.P.(C) 6291/2023 and W.P.(C) 11015/2023, where the petitioners' claims were rejected because their respective jhuggis were found to be used solely for commercial purposes, or where an allotment had already been made for the residential portion of a mixed-use jhuggi, the Court also found no grounds to interfere with the authorities' decisions. The Court stated that findings of fact, established through due process including the examination of videographic evidence and admissions by the appellants before the Appellate Authority, cannot be re-evaluated in writ jurisdiction.
The judgment recorded: “The petitioners were found to have been utilising the subject jhuggi-jhopri structures exclusively for commercial purposes... The bottom line is that findings of fact, duly arrived at by the designated authorities in accordance with the policy framework, cannot be reappreciated or interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” For these petitions, the Court concluded: “Without further ado, the aforesaid findings on facts in each case cannot be challenged in the instant writ petitions.” Therefore, the Court also directed the dismissal of these petitions.
The final overarching directive encompassing all the petitions in the batch was pronounced as follows: “Accordingly, the present writ petitions are devoid of merit and are, therefore, dismissed.” Furthermore, the Court also directed: “The pending applications also stand disposed of.” Thus, all interim reliefs stood vacated, and the actions of the respondent authorities in declaring the petitioner’s ineligible were effectively upheld.
Case Title: Arun Das v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr. (Lead matter in a batch of petitions)
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:4666
Case Number: W.P.(C) 2785/2023 (and connected matters as listed in the judgment)
Bench: Justice Dharmesh Sharma
[Read/Download order]
