Delhi High Court Quashes Two FIRs | Finds Proceedings Driven By Personal Vendetta And Business Rivalry, Not Criminal Intent
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna held that two First Information Reports (FIRs), FIR No. 614/2015 registered under Sections 354/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) at Police Station Amar Colony, and FIR No. 67/2018 registered under Sections 509/354(D)/204/500 IPC and Sections 66E/67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) at Police Station Kalkaji, were liable to be quashed. This decision was based on the finding that the criminal proceedings were instituted with mala fide intentions and as a result of private and personal grudges arising from business disputes that had soured between the parties involved.
The matter before the High Court involved two petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C by the petitioner seeking the quashing of two FIRs lodged against him. The judgment details that the petitioner’s company, M/s Easy Trip Planners Pvt. Ltd., and two companies of Respondent No. 2, namely M/s Airworth Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. and M/s One World Solution Pvt. Ltd., commenced business dealings in 2012. This business arrangement, involving the booking of domestic and international air tickets, continued until 2015, during which period disputes arose and their relationship became strained.
The petitioner submitted that from November 15, 2014, Respondent No. 2 and her husband, began pressuring him to pay extra money due to their financial problems, with an assurance of future adjustment or repayment. A demand for Rs. 10,00,00,000 was allegedly made, which the petitioner characterized as an extortion attempt. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2’s company allegedly started cancelling confirmed tickets issued through the petitioner's company. These disputes led the petitioner to file CS(OS) No. 406/2015 for Permanent and Mandatory Injunction. An ex-parte order dated February 15, 2015, restrained the defendants, including Respondent No. 2, from cancelling air tickets issued through the petitioner for a specified period. An appeal against this order, FAO(OS) 457/2015, preferred by Respondent No. 2, was dismissed on August 31, 2015.
The petitioner also initiated proceedings under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, concerning three cheques of Rs. 5 crores each. A summary suit, CS(OS) No. 576/2015, for the recovery of Rs. 9,29,50,502 was also filed by the petitioner. Further, the petitioner filed a criminal complaint dated February 27, 2015, against Respondent No. 2, her husband, and their companies. Upon no action by the police, a criminal complaint CC No. 18/1/2015 under Section 190 Cr.P.C. with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed, leading to the registration of FIR No. 119/2015 under Sections 406/409/420/268/384/506/34 IPC at Police Station Economic Offence Wing. The petitioner also reported threats to life allegedly made on March 14, 2015, by unknown persons on behalf of Gourav Mehra, resulting in NCR No. 606/2015 under Section 506 IPC.
The petitioner contended that to create a defence and exert pressure, Respondent No. 2, through her father, made a complaint to the police on February 17, 2015. This led to the registration of FIR No. 614/2015 on May 17, 2015, under Sections 506/509 IPC at Police Station Amar Colony. The petitioner stated that Respondent No. 2 then gave a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. dated April 26, 2015 (as per para 9 of the judgment, though other paras mention May 26, 2015), based on which Section 354 IPC was added. The quashing of this FIR was sought on grounds that it was motivated, based on false allegations, a counter-blast to cases filed by the petitioner, and intended to pressure him to withdraw his cases. The petitioner argued that the allegations were contradictory, pertained to 2012 and November 2014 with unexplained delay, and did not satisfy the ingredients of the offences.
Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 filed another complaint on September 25, 2017, at Police Station Kalkaji, alleging that the petitioner, intending to harm her reputation, forwarded her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. to persons known to her and her husband. She claimed to have learned on September 6, 2017, through Vikas Tandon, a friend of her husband, that he had received a copy of her statement from the petitioner. She further alleged that the petitioner was stalking her on Instagram and had made threats to her life, property, and family, causing her constant fear. This complaint led to FIR No. 67/2018, registered on February 27, 2018, under Sections 509/354(D) IPC and Sections 66E/67 IT Act. A chargesheet was filed on June 6, 2019, adding Sections 204 and 500 IPC. The petitioner sought quashing of this FIR, arguing no specific date of incident, inordinate delay in registration, offences not made out, misuse of law, and ulterior motives. He asserted that Instagram interactions were not an offence as profiles were public.
Respondent No. 2, in her reply, contended that the petitions were an abuse of process and based on suppression of facts. She submitted that FIR No. 120/2015 under Sections 409/467/468/471/107/109/120B/34 IPC had been registered against the petitioner on a complaint by her husband, and the present petitions were a counter-blast. She argued that the remedy under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was unavailable as the chargesheet had been filed and the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. to challenge the summoning order. She cited several judgments to support that quashing should not be entertained once a chargesheet is filed if an offence is made out. On merits, she asserted that she was molested and harassed by the petitioner but had not reported incidents due to threats. She claimed her father was told in February 2015, leading to his complaint, and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (recorded on May 26, 2015, as per her reply) narrated all incidents without contradiction.
The State, through status reports, outlined the facts leading to the FIRs and, for FIR No. 614/2015, prayed for the petition not to be allowed. For FIR No. 67/2018, it was initially stated that the investigation was at an initial stage and Section 500 IPC had been added. The petitioner reaffirmed his assertions in the rejoinder.
The Court first addressed a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition concerning FIR No. 614/2015, given that a chargesheet had been filed. The Court observed, citing Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel & Another v. State of Gujarat & Ors., that "if upon a reading of the contents of the FIR and the Chargesheet together, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is satisfied that no offence is disclosed and that the continuation of such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, then the FIR, even when the Chargesheet stands filed, may be quashed."
Further, referencing Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, the Court noted that "the power to examine whether a prima facie case is made out or not still vests with the High Court even after the filing of the filing of the Chargesheet."
The Court also relied on Mamta Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Abhishek v. State of M.P., stating, "when it comes to the power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of court or miscarriage of justice, there is no bar to exercising such power even when the chargesheet has already been filed. In such cases, where no prima facie case is made out or where there are no specific allegations against the accused, the continuation of proceedings would amount to a travesty of justice." Consequently, the Court concluded, "Therefore, in light of the aforesaid discussion, there is no bar on exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR when chargesheet already stands filed."
The Court then considered the test for intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C., referring to State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, which delineated categories including: "(i) where the allegations made in the first information report or the Complaint even if taken on face value and accepted in its entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused and (ii) where the allegations made in the FIR or Complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused; and (iii) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
The Court also cited State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, observing that "Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR, can be considered for quashing of an FIR." Additionally, Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. was referenced, where it was observed that "the Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
Examining FIR No. 614/2015, the Court noted the timeline of the business relationship turning sour and the subsequent litigations. Regarding the initial complaint by Respondent No. 2’s father on February 11, 2015, the Court stated, "From the Complaint of the father, it is quite evident that it was only since few days that the Petitioner, had started abusing and making bad gesture at his daughter. This is pertinent in the context that the business being done between the Companies of Petitioner, and the family of Respondent No.2, developed differences and litigations started in 2014 and therefore, it was stated that since last few days, which indicate that the Complaint was prompted by the differences in business which had emerged between the Companies of the two parties."
Concerning Respondent No. 2’s statement to the police on May 17, 2015, which formed the basis of the FIR, the Court observed, "The Statement made by the Complainant on 17.05.2015 to the Police, which became the basis of registration, also stated that since some time ago, which again reflects that the Respondent No. 2, allegedly started misbehaving since some time ago, which is relatable to the emergence of business differences. Also, the only claim was that he used to make eye gestures and threatened her with dire consequences, if she reported it to anyone. There were no allegations of sexual abuse or any attempt to molest her decency."
The Court then addressed Respondent No. 2’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded on May 26, 2015, where more serious allegations were made, including acts dating back to 2012 and an incident in November 2014. The Court described this as "an absolutely exaggerated version."
The Court concluded on this FIR that "these allegations essentially were prompted on account of the multiple litigations, which got initiated between the parties." The Court acknowledged the sensitivity in cases involving offences against women, stating, "In the offences against the women, the court has to be extra cautious and cognizant of the fact that bashfulness and reluctance to report the matter promptly is often a cause for delay in reporting the incident, but at the same time it cannot be overlooked that since many a times there is no corroboration except the sole statement of the Complainant, it at times becomes essential to consider the surrounding circumstances to prima facie assess its credibility. A delicate balance needs to be maintained between the rights of the victim and the accused."
Comparing the initial complaints with the later statement, the Court found, "If the initial Complaint dated 11.02.2015 of the father is read with the Statement of the Complainant made to the Police on 17.05.2015, clearly shows that even prima facie no allegations of molestation were made out and the FIR was also registered only under Section 506/509 IPC. The allegations of has been subsequently introduced in the Statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 26.05.2015. It is clearly an afterthought; moreover, the nature of allegations which also are vague and exaggerated, which clearly brings forth the falsity of the allegations made therein."
The Court further recorded, "The Complaint made by the father, the Statement given by the Respondent No. 2/Complainant, to the Police and her Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly brings forth that the allegations made by the Complainant, were crafted purely to wreak vengeance and out of personal grudges."
Regarding FIR No. 67/2018, the Court examined the allegation of the petitioner circulating Respondent No. 2's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement. It noted that while a close firnd of her husband claimed to have received it, another person named by him "clearly refuted having received any such WhatsApp message."
The Court found "no prima facie evidence even reflected in the entire Chargesheet filed in FIR No. 67/2018 dated 27.02.2018 to show that there was any circulation of the Statement made by the Respondent No.2 to people at large. Only one person has been identified as having received the copy of Statement on Whatsapp. However, even if these entire facts are admitted, there can be no case of Section 509 and Section 354(D) IPC said to be made out."
On Section 204 IPC (destruction of documents), the Court stated, "The entire Chargesheet does not disclose as to what documents have been destroyed and thus, had been prevented from being brought on record during the Trial. Therefore, no offence under Section 204 IPC is made out."
Concerning Sections 66E and 67 of the IT Act, the Court observed, "The only averment is that the Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. had been transmitted electronically, but by no interpretation can be termed as obscene material nor does it constitutes an offense in terms of Section 67 IT Act. Even if the entire case is admitted, no offence under Section 66E and 67 of IT Act is made out."
Regarding the allegation of stalking under Section 354D IPC via Instagram, the Court found, "The Respondent No.2, had alleged that she was being stalked on Instagram, but it has been found that the Petitioner, in the friend list of Instagram and she was interacting with all the other friends including the Petitioner, on public platform. Admittedly, they had good business and social relations and, therefore, were exchanging messages on Instagram. The day the dispute arose as per the Respondent No.2 herself, she blocked the Petitioner. There is not a single Instagram message which has been placed on record from where it could be said that he was stalking her on the social media. Even if the entire case of the Respondent No.2 is admitted, it does not disclose commission of any offence of stalking under S.354D IPC."
Concluding its observations on both FIRs, the Court stated, "Keeping in mind the facts and circumstances stated above both of these cases falls in the category of ‘a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge’ tantamounting to an abuse of process of the law and would not promote the interest of justice, as defined in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the circumstances mandates the jurisdiction under S.482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised to quash the proceeding, in the interest of justice."
The Court, in allowing both petitions, issued the final directive: "The aforesaid two Petitions are accordingly allowed and FIR No. 614/2015 under Section 506/509 IPC, PS Amar Colony dated 17.05.2015 and FIR No.67/2018 under Section 509/354(D) IPC and Section 66E/67 IT Act, P.S. Kalkaji, and all the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby, quashed."
Finally, the Court stated: "The petitions are accordingly, disposed of along with the pending Application(s)."
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Ms. Rajdipa Behura, Senior Advocate with Ms. Chandrani Prasad, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, ASC for the State.
Case Title: XXX v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:4583
Case Number: CRL.M.C.3879/2015 & W.P.(CRL) 1319/2018
Bench: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna
[Read/Download order]
