Delhi High Court Set Aside Conviction, Citing 'Unsubstantiated Dying Declaration' and 'Unbroken Chain of Circumstances' Requirement
- Post By 24law
- March 14, 2025

Safiya Malik
The Delhi High Court has set aside the conviction of a man sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly murdering his wife by setting her ablaze. A Division Bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Dharmesh Sharma stated that the prosecution failed to establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing contradictions in witness testimonies and forensic findings.
The case originated from an appeal filed under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the judgment dated March 2, 2002, which convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined Rs. 3,000, with an additional one-month simple imprisonment in default of payment.
Also Read: Sudden Provocation Leading to Spur-of-the-Moment Incident: SC Modifies Murder Conviction
The prosecution alleged that the appellant was married to the victim, Anita Rani, since March 1991 and that she had been subjected to cruelty over dowry demands. The prosecution’s case was that on July 5, 1998, at approximately 5:00 PM, the appellant poured kerosene oil on Anita Rani and set her on fire using matchsticks. The incident took place at their residence in Najafgarh, Delhi. The appellant allegedly fled the scene through the back door, leaving the victim with severe burn injuries. The victim was initially admitted to a local hospital and later transferred to Safdarjung Hospital, where she succumbed to septicaemia on August 24, 1998, after 48 days of treatment.
The prosecution relied heavily on the victim's statements, including two dying declarations. One statement was recorded by the investigating officer at the hospital, and another was taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM). Both statements implicated the appellant as the person who set her on fire. The forensic examination of the crime scene confirmed the presence of kerosene on seized objects, including two small makeshift lamps, matchsticks, and the victim’s clothing.
The appellant, however, maintained that his wife had set herself on fire. He argued that there was no eyewitness testimony to his presence at the crime scene at the crucial moment. The defense presented witness testimonies from the couple’s minor daughter and neighbours. The daughter stated that her mother poured oil on herself and then asked her to call a neighbour before lighting the match. The neighbours testified that they saw the victim emerge from the house engulfed in flames but did not see the appellant present at the scene or fleeing through the alleged back door.
The defense further contended that the victim was discharged from Safdarjung Hospital in a stable condition on July 9, 1998, and that her subsequent death due to septicaemia was not a direct consequence of burn injuries inflicted by the appellant. They stated that medical records showed the victim had suffered 35-40% burn injuries, which, according to medical literature, do not necessarily result in death.
The High Court examined the case from multiple angles, including the credibility of the victim’s dying declarations, medical evidence, and forensic findings. The court noted that there was a significant delay between the alleged incident and the victim’s death. The court stated: “Axiomatically, it is the aforesaid statement which is canvassed to be a ‘dying declaration’ consequent to the death of the victim on 24.08.1998. However, the victim was discharged from the hospital in a satisfactory condition as per the death summary and was only re-admitted after a month.”
The court found that the prosecution failed to establish a clear, unbroken chain of events linking the appellant’s actions to the victim’s death. The post-mortem report stated that the cause of death was “septicaemia consequent upon 35-40% ante-mortem infected flame burns” but did not clarify whether the burns alone were fatal in the ordinary course of nature.
The judgment cited medical literature, indicating that burn injuries of 35-40% do not always result in death and that complications such as infections and lack of proper post-discharge care can contribute to fatal outcomes. The court further referred to Supreme Court judgements that stated the importance of establishing direct causation in cases of delayed death.
The court also examined inconsistencies in the victim’s statements. While the victim stated in one declaration that her husband had doused her with kerosene from two small bottles, forensic examination revealed that the bottles were designed as makeshift lamps with wicks, making it difficult to pour kerosene quickly. The court noted: “Given that the two small bottles had wicks passing through holes with intact lids, it defies logic that the appellant could have sprinkled kerosene oil drop by drop and simultaneously used matchsticks to set the victim on fire without resistance or cries for help.”
The court further noted that no independent eyewitness testified to having seen the appellant fleeing the scene or engaging in any suspicious behaviour immediately before or after the incident. The court observed: “Nobody saw the appellant present in the house at or around the time of incident. The version of the victim that her husband had fled away through the back door is not substantiated by the site plan, which shows no existence of a back door.”
The court also considered the statements of the defense witnesses, particularly that of the couple’s daughter and two neighbours. The court acknowledged that the neighbours’ accounts aligned with the defense’s argument that the victim had set herself on fire.
Based on these findings, the High Court stated that the conviction under Section 302 IPC could not be sustained. It held that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the appellant. The court observed: “The present appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment dated 02.03.2002 convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is hereby set aside. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Appellant: Mr. Harsh Prabhakar, Mr. Anirudh Tanwar, Mr. Dhruv Chaudhry, Mr. Adeeb Ahmad & Ms. Eshita Pallavi.
For the State: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, Additional Public Prosecutor, with Ms. Divya Yadav, Advocate, Inspector O.P. Bishnoi.
Case Title: Sushil Kumar alias Raju v. State
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:1612-DB
Case Number: CRL.A. 378/2002
Bench: Justice Prathiba M. Singh, Justice Dharmesh Sharma
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