Delhi High Court | Women SSC Candidates Must Be Considered for Unfilled Male Vacancies | Section 12 Army Act Notifications Cannot Be Undermined by Vacancy Caps
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Delhi Division Bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla directed that five young women candidates aspiring to join the Indian Army through the Short Service Commission (Non-Technical) be considered against 62 unfilled vacancies originally notified for men. Referring to Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 and applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, the Court held that once women are permitted entry into notified corps and services, their induction cannot be restricted by limiting vacancies. The petition was accordingly allowed.
The petitioners, five young women, aspired to join the Indian Army as Short Service Commissioned (SSC) Officers (Non-Technical) through the Combined Defence Services Examination (II) 2021. The Union Public Service Commission issued the examination notification on 4 August 2021, specifying 169 vacancies for men and 16 for women in the SSC (NT) category. All petitioners cleared the examination. Two of them were already selected and undergoing training, leaving the dispute relevant to the remaining five petitioners.
While all 16 women’s vacancies were filled, only 107 of the 169 male vacancies were occupied, leaving 62 posts unfilled. The petitioners claimed entitlement to these vacancies, arguing that the Army’s reservation of separate quotas for men and women was unconstitutional. They sought writs of mandamus directing the respondents—Union of India and authorities concerned—to allocate vacancies on a gender-neutral basis, issue joining letters permitting their training at the Officers Training Academy (OTA), grant age relaxation where required, and provide other consequential reliefs.
In support, the petitioners relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1668), which held that once women were notified for induction under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, their entry could not be restricted by limiting the number of vacancies. The petitioners argued that their claim to unfilled men’s vacancies was fully covered by that precedent.
The respondents, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, contended that Arshnoor Kaur applied specifically to the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Branch and should not be generalized. They argued that restricting women’s induction served policy objectives of operational preparedness and combat readiness. They further raised a plea of estoppel, submitting that the petitioners had participated in the process knowing that only 16 posts were available for women and could not now challenge it.
The petitioners countered that fundamental rights, particularly the right to equality under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution, could not be waived by participation in a flawed selection process. They also highlighted that similar arguments had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Arshnoor Kaur.
The Court examined the statutory basis under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, which governs eligibility of women for enrolment, and considered its interplay with constitutional provisions mandating equality.
The Court recorded that the dispute was “squarely covered by the decision in Arshnoor Kaur.” It noted the Supreme Court’s holding that: “once the Army permits women officers to join any corps, department or branch forming a part of the regular Army, it cannot impose an additional restriction with regard to ‘extent of induction’ of women officers in the said corps, department or branch—as Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 does not empower it do so.”
The Bench observed that ten corps and services notified under Section 12 permitted women’s entry, including the Army Postal Service, Judge Advocate General’s Department, Army Education Corps, Corps of Signals, Intelligence Corps, Corps of Engineers, and others. It emphasized that the restriction of women’s induction to fixed numbers within these corps lacked statutory basis: “there is no basis to say that women can be appointed ‘only up to a certain extent’ in such streams.”
The Court rejected the argument that Arshnoor Kaur was limited to the JAG branch. It recorded: “the controversy in issue is squarely covered by the decision in Arshnoor Kaur, which binds us.”
On the plea of estoppel, the Court quoted the Supreme Court in Arshnoor Kaur: “It is settled law that it is not open to the Respondent-Union of India to contend that a person is not entitled to enforce his/her Fundamental Rights… because he/she has waived it.” It added: “Where, therefore, the challenge is on the ground of invidious discrimination, and violation of constitutional principles, and is found by the Court to be substantial, the plea of estoppel by participation must be consigned to oblivion.”
The Court acknowledged the government’s claim of commitment to gender neutrality but held that constitutional imperatives outweighed administrative limitations. It further clarified that fundamental rights cannot be subjected to waiver by procedural participation.
The Bench concluded: “We, therefore, are of the opinion that the controversy in issue is squarely covered by the decision in Arshnoor Kaur, which binds us.”
The Court directed: “We, therefore, direct that the petitioners be considered against the 62 unfilled vacancies of men, as there could have been no limitation on the number of women who could be entitled to recruitment against the corps and services identified in para 45 of Arshnoor Kaur.”
“The entitlement of the petitioners to appointment and deployment against the remaining 62 unfilled vacancies of men would be conditional upon their being found suitable for deployment against one or more of the identified corps and services identified in para 45 of the decision in Arshnoor Kaur.”
“The benefits of this judgment would be available to those petitioners who were within the prescribed age on the date of declaration of the result.”
“If there are any pre-training formalities such as medical clearance, which are required to be fulfilled, it goes without saying that the petitioners would be required to fulfil them, before undergoing training.”
The petitioners, upon qualifying and selection, would be entitled to all consequential benefits in law. “The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Indra Sen Singh, Mr. Nasir Mohd, Ms. Kaberi Sharma, Advocates
For the Respondents: Mr. Chetan Sharma, Additional Solicitor General with Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, Central Government Standing Counsel, Mr. Amit Gupta, Senior Panel Counsel with Mr. Kautilya Birat, Mr. Ankush Kapoor, Mr. Vishwadeep, Advocates, with Major Anish Muralidhar and Capt. Carolin Johnson
Case Title: Shruti Vyas & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC: 8222 - DB
Case Number: W.P.(C) 1106/2024
Bench: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Om Prakash Shukla
