Disclosing Matrimonial Litigation Details To Defend Collateral Civil And Criminal Cases Not Barred Under Section 22 HMA | Delhi High Court Says Legal References Do Not Amount To Unlawful Publication
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Delhi Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar dismissed an appeal seeking injunctive relief against the disclosure of matrimonial litigation details. The Court concluded that the disclosures in question did not constitute publication in the public domain and therefore did not breach the confidentiality provisions of Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court upheld the Family Court’s decision and directed that no case for injunction had been made out under the statutory framework.
The appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 arose from the Order dated 29.03.2025 passed by the Family Court-01, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in HMA No. 1089/2018. The application filed by the appellant under Section 22 of the HMA sought an injunction against the respondent, her brother, and her employer to restrain them from disclosing or disseminating information related to the matrimonial proceedings.
The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 22.04.2006, and a girl child was born on 11.02.2013. Matrimonial discord followed, leading to the institution of HMA No. 1089/2018 by the respondent-wife seeking dissolution of marriage.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the appellant filed multiple applications dated 17.08.2021, 05.12.2022, 10.09.2023, and 30.05.2024 under Section 22 of the HMA. The applications alleged that the respondent, her brother, and her employer had disclosed confidential information about the matrimonial proceedings and custody litigation to third parties. These disclosures, according to the appellant, included sharing material with police officials, the child’s school, the respondent’s employer, and references in a POCSO complaint.
The Family Court dismissed all four applications via a common order on 29.03.2025. The Court held that no breach of Section 22 of the HMA had been established, stating that the alleged disclosures were not made through print or public media and were instead limited to legal and administrative settings in response to proceedings initiated by the appellant.
The appellant, appearing in person, submitted before the High Court that the Family Court failed to correctly interpret the intent of Section 22 of the HMA. He argued that disclosures made, even if not through public media, still amounted to a violation of confidentiality by being used in collateral proceedings without prior leave of court. He also stated that these disclosures compromised the privacy of the minor child.
The appellant further argued that Section 22 mandates strict confidentiality of matrimonial proceedings, and a narrow construction of the term "publication" undermines this legislative intent. He submitted that the Family Court’s reliance on the defence of fair trial was misplaced without assessing the necessity and proportionality of the respondent’s actions.
To support his position, the appellant cited the Madras High Court’s decision in R. Sukanya v. R. Sridhar [MANU/TN/1115/2008], which held that in-camera proceedings are meant to protect the privacy and dignity of the litigants and any unauthorised publication attracts penal consequences. However, the Family Court distinguished this decision on the ground that mere reference in legal proceedings does not amount to publication.
The High Court observed: “The learned Family Court considered the applications filed by the Appellant collectively as raising substantially similar grievances and dismissed all four by a common impugned order.” It was recorded that the Court found “no case for breach of Section 22 of the HMA was made out, as the disclosures in question had neither been printed nor published in the public domain or on any social platform.”
Addressing the appellant’s claims, the Court recorded: “The references made by the Respondent and her brother to the pendency of the matrimonial proceedings were in response to various legal actions initiated by the Appellant himself, including criminal complaints and professional inquiries, and thus constituted a legitimate exercise of their right to defence.”
The Bench further stated: “The prohibition under Section 22 of the HMA is not absolute in scope. What is barred is publication in the sense of making such material publicly accessible through print or other media.”
The Court held that “references made in a POCSO complaint by the Respondent, though serious in nature, cannot be equated with publication under Section 22 of the HMA, where they arise in the course of seeking redressal through appropriate legal channels.”
It was also noted: “This Court specifically queried the Appellant as to the precise manner in which the alleged ‘publication’ under Section 22 of the HMA had taken place. However, no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming.”
Rejecting the appellant’s claim, the Court stated: “The Appellant was unable to point out any instance where the confidential details of the matrimonial proceedings had been printed, circulated, or otherwise made publicly accessible in a manner that would fall within the mischief of ‘publication’ as contemplated under the said provision.”
The Court concluded: “The disclosures in question were not found to be in breach of the statutory embargo on publication, as they were made in the context of defending separate proceedings initiated by the Appellant himself and did not amount to printing or publishing information in the public domain.”
The Division Bench directed: “We do not find any reason to interfere with the Impugned Order passed by the learned Family Court.” Accordingly, the Court stated: “Having found no merit in the Appeal, the same, along with the pending application, is accordingly dismissed.”
The Bench clarified that the present order will not influence the ongoing trial: “We make it clear that observations made hereinabove shall not affect the merits of the case pending before the learned Family Court, which shall be decided uninfluenced by any observations made herein.”
Case Title: XXX v YYY
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:6077-DB
Case Number: MAT. APP. (F.C.) 264/2025
Bench: Justice Anil Kshetrapal, Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar
