Safiya Malik

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Division Bench of Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj held that the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority is legally competent to delegate disciplinary powers to the District Legal Services Authority. The Court upheld the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a Senior Assistant of the District Legal Services Authority, Mandi, observing that the District and Sessions Judge had acted within the scope of the delegated authority. It further noted that proper authorisation had been granted by the Executive Chairman and no procedural irregularity was established. Consequently, the Court concluded that the disciplinary action, including the issuance of the charge-sheet and appointment of inquiry officials, was valid and required no judicial interference.

The matter concerns a writ petition filed by Om Prakash, a Senior Assistant working with the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA), Mandi, challenging the initiation of disciplinary proceedings dated 10 July 2024 under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The petitioner had been appointed by the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority (SLSA) on 25 October 2016 and posted to DLSA Mandi for duty. He contested the jurisdiction of the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi—acting as Chairman, DLSA—to initiate disciplinary action, arguing that only SLSA, being his appointing authority under Section 6 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, could do so.

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The disciplinary proceedings included appointment of an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer through orders dated 31 July 2024. The articles of charge concern allegations of insubordination, non-compliance with directions, dereliction of duty, misclassification of funds, and withholding of mediators’ honorarium.

The respondents submitted that the DLSA Chairman is competent under Section 9(2)(a) of the Act, and that the Executive Chairman of SLSA had expressly directed, through a note dated 21 March 2024 and communicated through a letter dated 22 March 2024, that all complaints and related material regarding the petitioner be forwarded to the Chairman, DLSA, for “further necessary action at your own level being the Chairman-cum-Controlling Officer of DLSA, Mandi.” The communication, along with the petitioner’s reply, formed the basis of the disciplinary initiation.

The petitioner further contended that the Member Secretary of SLSA could not delegate authority to the District Authority under the 1995 Rules. Respondents relied on a recent Supreme Court decision clarifying that disciplinary authorities may “draw up” or “cause to be drawn up” charges through delegated authority.

The statutory provisions relied upon include Sections 6 and 9 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

The Court recorded that the petitioner’s argument “at the first blush appears to be very attractive,” but the record demonstrated that the petitioner had earlier responded to a communication dated 16 March 2024 “but never raised the issue of jurisdiction,” and the matter had moved through proper channels.

It was observed that the noting portion dated 21 March 2024 showed that “the then Executive Chairman, SLSA, had approved the proposal as such that the Chairman, DLSA, would take necessary action at his own level,” and had also approved steps to examine financial irregularities.

The Court recorded that the Executive Chairman’s approval led to the Member Secretary’s letter dated 22 March 2024 directing the DLSA Chairman to take action “at your own level being the Chairman-cum-Controlling Officer of DLSA, Mandi.”

In analysing the petitioner’s reliance on precedent, the Court quoted the Supreme Court’s interpretation that disciplinary authorities may “draw up” or “cause to be drawn up” charges and that “the effect of it is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may not prepare the document but rather delegate the task to someone else.” It further noted the Supreme Court’s view that when delegation is “proved to have been made in favour of an authority holding an office superior,” the courts “ought to exercise restraint.”

Referring to the Supreme Court’s findings, the Court quoted that interference occurs when lower courts accept “the specious plea” regarding lack of approval despite clear evidence of delegation, cautioned that such interference may result in “grave miscarriage of justice.”

The Court stated that “once the record goes on to show that the Executive Chairman had delegated the power at the district level to the DLSA… no fault as such can be found in the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings.”

The Court also observed that the petitioner’s own pleadings claiming “no delegation” were “contrary to the communication dated 22.03.2024,” which explicitly referred to directions from the Executive Chairman.

In addressing the argument of absence of delegation power under the Act, the Court stated that this contention had been “squarely met by the judgment of the Apex Court itself. Finally, the Court noted that the petitioner, being a Senior Assistant, was not superior in rank to the District Judge, and therefore “there can be no prejudice as such to him.”

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The Court concluded that “the present writ petition stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.”

Advocates Representing The Parties

For the Petitioner: Mr. B.L. Soni and Mr. Nitin Soni, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Shriyek Sharda, Advocate; Mr. Arjun Lall, Advocate.

Case Title: Om Prakash v. Hon’ble High Court of H.P. & Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: HHC:36364
Case Number: CWP No. 8622 of 2024
Bench: Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj