FIR Contents Inadmissible If Informant Dies Naturally & Cannot Be Proved Through Investigating Officer: Supreme Court

Pranav B Prem

The Supreme Court has ruled that if the informant of a First Information Report (FIR) passes away due to natural causes, the contents of the FIR cannot be treated as substantive evidence or be proved through the Investigating Officer. The Court clarified that an FIR can be considered as evidence only if it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.

FIR Not A Substantive Piece Of Evidence

A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, while deciding an appeal against the acquittal of the accused in a case involving allegations of cruelty and abetment of suicide, explained the limited evidentiary value of an FIR. The Court stated: “Another important thing is that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved. It has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the same in the case. The F.I.R. can be used by the defence to impeach the credit of the person who lodged the F.I.R. under Section 154(3) of the Evidence Act. In case the death of the informant has no nexus with the complaint lodged i.e. he died a natural death and did not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter, the contents of the F.I.R. would not be admissible in evidence. In such circumstances, the contents cannot be proved through the Investigating Officer.”

The case arose from an FIR lodged by the father of the deceased woman, who had alleged that she was driven to suicide due to harassment by her husband, in-laws, and her husband’s first wife. However, before the trial commenced, the informant passed away. The Trial Court convicted the accused and permitted the Investigating Officer to prove the contents of the FIR. The High Court, upon re-evaluating the evidence, reversed this decision and acquitted the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, emphasizing the inadmissibility of the FIR contents in such circumstances.

Investigating Officer Cannot Prove FIR Contents

The Court ruled that an Investigating Officer can only confirm the registration of the FIR and identify the signatures present on it but cannot testify to the contents of the FIR as substantive evidence. It held: “The Investigating Officer, in the course of his deposition, should not be permitted to depose the exact contents of the F.I.R. so as to make them admissible in evidence. All that is permissible in law is that the Investigating Officer can, in his deposition, identify the signature of the first informant and that of his own on the First Information Report and he can depose about the factum of the F.I.R. being registered by him on a particular date on a particular police station.”

FIR As A Dying Declaration

The Court reiterated that an FIR can be used as evidence only if it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act: “If the informant dies, the First Information Report can be, unquestionably, used as a substantive evidence. A prerequisite condition must be fulfilled before the F.I.R. is taken as a substantive piece of evidence i.e. the death of the informant must have nexus with the F.I.R. filed or somehow having some link with any evidence regarding the F.I.R.” The Court referred to precedents such as Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab [(1997) 11 SCC 215] and Munna Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104], which establish that an FIR can be a dying declaration if the informant succumbs to injuries related to the alleged crime.

Incorrect Reliance On FIR Contents

The Supreme Court found that both the Trial Court and the High Court erred in allowing the police officer to prove the FIR contents, stating: “It is absolutely incorrect on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court to say that in the absence of the first informant, the police officer can prove the contents of the F.I.R. as per Section 67 of the Evidence Act.” By dismissing the appeal, the Court reinforced the principle that an FIR alone does not constitute substantive evidence unless it meets the criteria of a dying declaration.