Gang Rape | Supreme Court Upholds Conviction as Penetrative Act by One Fixes Guilt on All If Common Intention Exists | Life Sentence Reduced to 10 Years
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice K.V. Viswanathan has partly allowed the appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. While upholding the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The sentence of life imprisonment awarded for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years, along with a fine and default sentence in case of non-payment. All sentences were directed to run concurrently.
The prosecution case commenced with the filing of a missing report on 24.06.2004 at 18:30 hours at Police Station, Kymore, District Katni, Madhya Pradesh. The complainant informed that his daughter (referred to as ‘R’), who had gone to attend a wedding along with her friend (DW-1), did not return home. Details regarding her attire and description were recorded.
Subsequently, on 28.06.2004, ‘R’ was found from the house of ‘LB’, who was associated with the appellant. The recovery memo, witnessed by independent witness PW-3 and Sub-Inspector PW-11 J.L. Mishra, recorded that ‘R’ had been brought to LB’s house from the appellant’s house. The prosecutrix and her father consented to her medical examination.
Based on her statement, an FIR was registered under Sections 376, 363, 366, 342, 506/34 IPC and Section 3(1-12) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 on 28.06.2004. The prosecutrix narrated that accused Jalandhar Kol abducted her and committed rape, while the appellant assisted Jalandhar and confined her at multiple locations.
On 30.06.2004, PW-2, the prosecutrix’s father, submitted Exhibit P-3, elaborating that ‘R’ was kidnapped and confined with the appellant’s involvement. It was asserted that threats were issued by the accused when police involvement became known. The appellant was arrested on 23.07.2004 and co-accused Jalandhar Kol on 22.05.2005. A charge-sheet was filed on 31.07.2004 listing charges under IPC and the 1989 Act.
The trial commenced after charges were framed on 25.05.2005 under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), 342 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. Thirteen prosecution witnesses and two defence witnesses were examined. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Trial Court convicted the appellant and Jalandhar Kol. The appellant was sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment under Section 366 IPC, life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, six months rigorous imprisonment under Section 342 IPC, and life imprisonment under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act, with fines imposed for each offence. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.
The prosecutrix’s testimony formed the backbone of the prosecution case. She stated that after attending the wedding ceremony, she and her friend halted to attend nature’s call. At this point, the accused forcibly abducted her. According to her, the appellant and Jalandhar caught hold of her and gagged her mouth. They then forcibly placed her on a two-wheeler and transported her to the appellant’s house located in an isolated field. There, she was locked in a room and subjected to sexual assault. She described how both accused took turns committing sexual acts against her will.
She further stated that later she was confined in another location in Dair Salaiya, where she was again sexually assaulted. During her captivity, she stayed at ‘LB’s house, where she did not disclose her ordeal. Her testimony also included accounts of being forced to consume alcohol and being threatened by the accused. She categorically denied suggestions that she voluntarily accompanied the accused or had any consensual relationship.
The defence witnesses, including DW-1 and DW-2, gave evidence supporting the defence narrative. DW-1, a friend of the prosecutrix, stated that ‘R’ voluntarily went with Jalandhar and that the appellant was not involved. However, in cross-examination, DW-1 admitted that she did not know where ‘R’ went or what transpired. DW-2, ‘LB’, claimed that the prosecutrix rented the house voluntarily and paid rent, though no supporting documentation was produced.
The Trial Court and High Court both rejected the defence case. The courts found the prosecutrix’s evidence to be natural, consistent, and credible despite minor contradictions. The recovery of the prosecutrix, her prompt statements, and corroborative evidence from witnesses and documents were accepted.
The defence also argued regarding medical evidence, particularly the absence of visible injuries. The courts, however, noted that clear and convincing oral testimony from the prosecutrix sufficed in establishing the charges.
Finally, while upholding the conviction under IPC provisions, the Supreme Court closely examined the applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. Referring to earlier precedents, it noted that there was no evidence that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. Consequently, the conviction under this provision was found unsustainable.
The Supreme Court examined the evidence, legal provisions, and precedents in arriving at its conclusions.
At the outset, the Court recorded: “We are convinced that notwithstanding the minor contradictions, her evidence inspires confidence and that she has clearly spoken about the accused abducting her and also committing rape on her.”
The Court noted that the prosecutrix was consistent in her testimony about abduction, wrongful confinement, and being subjected to sexual assault. It stated: “Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to dilute her testimony. The charges under Section 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 IPC are clearly made out.”
The Court reaffirmed the principle that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sufficient in sexual assault cases if it is credible: “It is now fairly well settled that the prosecutrix is not an accomplice and that if the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it can be acted upon without corroboration.”
Regarding variations in the FIR and the complaint, the Court recorded: “The variation in the narration in the FIR and the complaint and the minor contractions in the evidence do not detract from the clinching testimony of the prosecutrix clearly implicating the appellant and the co-accused.”
The Court analysed the legal position on gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC. Citing statutory provisions and previous judgments, it observed: “In view of this, it is very clear that in a case of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention.”
The Bench referred to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003) and explained the concept of joint liability: “The essence of that liability is the existence of common intention... there must be criminal sharing marking out a certain measure of jointness in the commission of offence.”
In relation to the defence argument suggesting consensual relationship with the co-accused, the Court applied Section 114A of the Evidence Act: “A reading of the evidence of the prosecutrix makes it amply clear that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse against her consent. She has also specifically denied the suggestion that she went with Jalandhar on her free will.”
The defence witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, were disbelieved. The Court stated regarding DW-1: “We are not inclined to believe DW-1... She clarified that she did not know what Jalandhar did with the prosecutrix after taking her away nor did she know where they went.”
Similarly, on DW-2: “Equally, the evidence of DW-2... is also not sounding true or natural. The defence witnesses have been put up only to present a false narrative.”
On medical evidence, the Court recorded that absence of injuries does not negate the occurrence of rape: “Her evidence that no definite opinion could be given... does not mean that sexual assault was not committed on the prosecutrix.”
The Court reaffirmed that ocular evidence is paramount: “It is also well-settled that where the ocular evidence is clear, it will prevail over the medical evidence.”
While criticising the use of the two-finger test conducted at that time, the Court held: “We are only reiterating this aspect so that in future these practices do not recur.”
On the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act, the Court examined precedents and the statutory provision. Referring to decisions such as Dinesh alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan (2006), Asharfi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018), and Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2021), the Court clarified the legal position.
It summarised the settled principle: “It is clear that the sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that the offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.”
In the present case, the Court held: “There is no evidence whatsoever to establish that the victim’s caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence.”
The Court concluded its observations by holding: “In the absence of any evidence attracting the offence of Section 3(2)(v), we are constrained to record an acquittal for the appellant from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.”
While upholding the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Court categorically held: “We set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.”
With respect to sentencing, the Court took note of the fact that the co-accused Jalandhar Kol had been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC. Considering this, it directed modification of the sentence awarded to the appellant for parity. The Court stated: “To bring the sentence on par with that imposed on Jalandhar Kol (A-2) for the offence under Section 376(2)(g), we modify the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant to that of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year in case of non-payment of fine.”
Regarding the other offences under IPC, the Court found no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. It recorded: “We are not inclined to disturb the sentence of five years imposed on the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 366 IPC as well as the fine and default sentence imposed on him by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court.”
Similarly, in respect of the offence under Section 342 IPC, the Court observed: “We are also not inclined to disturb the sentence imposed under Section 342 IPC by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court.”
The Court directed that all sentences shall run concurrently.
Finally, the Court directed the appellant to undergo the remaining sentence as modified. It held: “The accused, who is in custody, shall serve out the remaining sentence, as directed.”
Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed. The Court stated: “The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Susheel Tomar, Adv., Mr. Vishnu Kant, Adv., Ms. Harshita Verma, Adv., Mr. Avinash Tiwari, Adv., Mr. Sanjeev Malhotra, AOR.
For the Respondents: Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, AOR, Mr. Sarthak Raizada-G.A., Adv., Mr. Mukesh Kumar Verma, Adv., Mr. Aditya Chaudhary, Adv., Ms. Chhavi Khandelwal, Adv.
Case Title: XXX v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 615
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. __ of 2025 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 17398/2024)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
[Read/Download order]
