Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Gujarat Single Bench of Justice J. C. Doshi has quashed criminal proceedings arising from a Forest Offence First Report and chargesheet filed under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, on the ground that the cognizance taken by the trial court was legally unsustainable in the absence of a statutory complaint by an authorised officer. The court held that the bar contained in Section 55 of the Act operated with full force, thereby rendering the institution and continuation of proceedings against the petitioner vitiated. The order clarified that the quashing would not preclude authorised officers from initiating proceedings in accordance with law based on material already collected.

The matter concerned a petition seeking quashing of Forest Offence First Report No. 2/2009-10 dated 6 November 2009 and all consequential proceedings. The petitioner, a journalist with over fourteen years of experience and working as a South Gujarat correspondent, visited Gir National Park and Sanctuary on 4 and 5 November 2009 with two individuals affiliated with an NGO working in wildlife and environmental welfare. The visit was undertaken with valid permits and an official guide.

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Later that night, while refuelling in the city, the petitioner received information from villagers about a lion feeding on its prey in an agricultural field outside sanctuary limits. Proceeding to the location within the revenue area, they joined other villagers who had gathered there. At the site, the group was intercepted by the Range Forest Officer, who suspected the petitioner of conducting a sting operation. The Forest Offence First Report was registered under Sections 2(16)(b), 2(33), 9, 39 and 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, alleging disturbance to a lion while feeding. No allegations of hunting were made, nor were any weapons or contraband recovered. The Gram Panchayat's Rojkam indicated that the location was outside forest limits. The petitioner was released on bail the same day, and a chargesheet was subsequently filed.

The petitioner’s counsel contended that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences. It was submitted that, even if accepted in entirety, the facts did not constitute "hunting" under Section 2(16)(b), which defines acts such as capturing, killing, trapping, or baiting wild animals. The petitioner further argued that proceedings were barred by Section 55 of the Act, which requires a complaint by designated authorities for the court to take cognizance. In the present case, no such complaint was filed, and the prosecution proceeded on a police-style report, which was impermissible.

Without prejudice to these legal submissions, counsel stated that the petitioner accepted having caused some disturbance to the lion and had expressed remorse by voluntarily donating Rs. 1,00,000 to the Gujarat State Lion Conservation Society, Junagadh. The donation receipt was placed on record.

The learned Public Prosecutor, representing the State, did not dispute the statutory position under Section 55 and was unable to point to any provision enabling lawful cognizance on the basis of a chargesheet in the absence of a complaint by a competent authority.

The statutory framework cited by the court included:

• Section 2(16)(b), defining "hunting" to include capturing, coursing, snaring, trapping, driving, or baiting wild animals.
• Section 2(33), defining "vehicle".
• Section 9, prohibiting hunting of animals specified in Schedules I and II except as provided under Sections 11 and 12.
• Section 39, declaring certain wild animals and related articles as Government property.
• Section 51, prescribing penalties for contraventions.
• Section 55, specifying authorised persons entitled to file complaints.

The court examined the Rojkam, which recorded that during night lion counting duty, the forest team observed a vehicle with headlights directed at a lion feeding on prey, with occupants taking photographs. The vehicle, cameras, and occupants were seized, and the accused were produced before the Magistrate and released on bail.

The court recorded: "even if the said facts, as recorded by the forest authorities, are taken at their face value, a bare comparison with the statutory definition of 'hunting' under Section 2(16)(b) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, clearly indicates that the act attributed to the petitioner does not fall within the scope of 'hunting'".

It further stated: "Merely disturbing a lion does not meet the threshold to constitute an offence of 'hunting' under the Act."

The court noted: "Consequently, the residual provisions—namely, Sections 9, 39, and 51—which are premised upon the commission of an act of hunting or unlawful possession of wild animals or their parts, also fail to attract, in the absence of any foundational ingredient being satisfied."

On the jurisdictional bar, the court stated: "Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, imposes a statutory bar on any Court taking cognizance of an offence under the Act except upon a complaint filed by the Director of Wildlife Preservation, the Chief Wildlife Warden, or any officer duly authorised in this behalf by the Central or State Government."

It recorded: "the proceedings have been initiated solely on the basis of a police-style Forest Offence Report, and not by way of a complaint as required under Section 55."

The court noted the Public Prosecutor’s concession that an FIR and chargesheet by a Range Forest Officer did not qualify as a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 2(1)(h) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

Referring to Supreme Court precedent in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and Karnataka High Court authority, the court stated: "proceedings initiated in breach of Section 55 are liable to be quashed as being non est in the eye of law."

While noting the petitioner’s conduct, the court observed: "such actions can only be described as reckless and antagonistic to wildlife conservation ethics", but acknowledged the petitioner’s remorse and donation.

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Applying the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the court found that "there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act... to the institution and continuance of the proceedings".

The court ordered: "the petition is ALLOWED. The Forest Offence First Report No. 2/2009-10 and all further and consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed and set aside."

It further directed: "this order shall not preclude the authorized officer under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 from initiating or instituting appropriate proceedings against the petitioner, in accordance with law, on the basis of the material collected during the course of investigation."

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioner: Mr. Aditya J. Pandya, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr. Hardik Dave, Public Prosecutor with Mr. Chintan Dave, Additional Public Prosecutor

Case Title: Manish Bhupendrabhai Panwala v. State of Gujarat & Anr.

Case Number: R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 77 of 2014

Bench: Justice J. C. Doshi