Safiya Malik

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh Single Bench of Justice Ajay Mohan Goel held that under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, the requirement is only to ensure that land is put to use for its sanctioned purpose within the stipulated period, and not that the entire project must be completed. The Court noted that the Legislature intentionally employed the phrase “put to use” rather than “complete the project,” indicating that demonstrable progress within the permitted time constitutes compliance. Setting aside the government’s refusal to extend time for a housing project, the Court directed authorities to reconsider the developer’s revised plans within six weeks.

M/s Springdale Resorts and Villas Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act, sought to develop an Integrated Housing Project in Village Anech, Tehsil and District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. The project covered approximately 144 bighas of land obtained through multiple agreements to sell executed with local landowners. The company received an Essentiality Certificate from the Town and Country Planning Department on May 27, 2014, recommending the transfer of land. Subsequently, permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 was granted on September 24, 2014, allowing the purchase of the land for residential development.

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Following the registration of sale deeds in September 2018, the petitioner obtained a promoter registration certificate in February 2015. However, delays arose due to administrative requirements, litigation involving certain landowners, and external circumstances such as demonetization and the COVID-19 pandemic. Extensions were granted by the Government, the last being valid up to September 28, 2021.

Despite receiving development permission under Section 31(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act on September 18, 2021, and beginning site works, the Town and Country Planner later stated that the land had not been put to use and demanded fresh permission under Section 118. The petitioner challenged these communications—dated February 3, 2024, and January 17, 2025—and sought their quashing, arguing that the land had been utilized as certified by the local Revenue Officer in September 2021.

The State argued that no further extensions could be granted beyond the three-year limit and claimed that the petitioner failed to comply within the statutory period, causing the permission to lapse.

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel examined whether the petitioner had fulfilled the statutory requirement under Section 118(2)(h) of the 1972 Act to “put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted.” The Court observed that the expression must not be construed narrowly. The judgment recorded that “the words ‘shall put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted’ are not to be interpreted as myopically as the respondents want the Court to read them.” It added that the legislative intent did not require a project to be completed in its entirety within the prescribed period but merely that genuine steps toward its use must be demonstrated.

The Bench stated that “the concern of the State, that the land should be used for the project for which the consent has been granted, is a genuine and bona fide concern. However, the period of two years along with extension, as prescribed in this statute, cannot be construed in a myopic manner so as to mean that everything with regard to the project has to be completed before the expiry of the period.” The Court stated that the legislative intent was that steps should be taken to put the land to use, not necessarily that the entire project must be finalized.

The judgment further noted that “the only meaningful interpretation which can be given to these words is that the beneficiary of the permission has to demonstrate that cogent and meaningful steps stand taken by it to put the land to use for the purpose for which the permission has been granted.” It clarified that the phrase should be interpreted pragmatically, allowing for reasonable administrative and external delays.

Referring to the Division Bench judgement in Ravinder Chauhan and Others v. State of Himachal Pradesh (AIR 1999 HP 43), Justice Goel cited that vesting of land in the State does not occur automatically upon expiry of the stipulated period but requires adjudication after providing the party an opportunity to be heard. The Court quoted, “It is not that on the mere expiry of a period of two years or a further period not exceeding one year that the vesting will automatically take place.” The Bench found that the petitioner had indeed taken “cogent and meaningful steps” by obtaining necessary permissions, initiating site development, and securing a valid RERA project registration.

The Bench stated: “As the petitioner has already put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted, therefore, the permission granted in favour of the petitioner under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act has not expired.”

Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned communications issued by the authorities—dated February 3, 2024, from the Town and Country Planner, and January 17, 2025, from the Additional Chief Secretary (Revenue), Government of Himachal Pradesh—that rejected the petitioner’s request for extension and asserted non-utilization of the land. Justice Goel ordered that “communications dated 03.02.2024 (Annexure P-16) and 17.01.2025 (Annexure P-23) are quashed and set aside.”

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Further, the High Court directed the respondent authorities to reconsider the case of M/s Springdale Resorts and Villas Pvt. Ltd. for the revision of its project drawings in light of prevailing rules and regulations. The Bench directed that appropriate orders be passed within six weeks from the date of the judgment, ensuring adherence to the statutory framework governing development permissions.

In summation, the Court noted that the statutory phrase ‘shall put the land to such use’ cannot be rigidly construed to require complete project execution within the statutory period. Instead, it requires that “cogent and meaningful steps” be taken within the allowed timeframe, a test which the petitioner had satisfied.

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Vivek Negi, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajpal Thakur, Additional Advocate General.

Case Title: M/s Springdale Resorts and Villas Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: HHC:33720
Case Number: CWP No. 3363 of 2025
Bench: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel