Kiran Raj

The High Court of Jharkhand Division Bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava held that a private minority-aided educational institution receiving public funds and governed by statutory regulations falls under the ambit of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the intra-court appeal filed by the appellant institution challenging the maintainability of a writ petition against it. The Court declared that the college, although established by a religious minority, operates under pervasive governmental control and hence is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The final direction affirmed the maintainability of the writ petition and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal accordingly, with a modification to the reasoning applied by the learned Single Judge.

The intra-court appeal was filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by a private religious minority-aided institution, Nirmala College, against the order dated 04.10.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 5791 of 2022. The Single Judge had held that the writ petition filed by an Assistant Professor of the college was maintainable. Aggrieved by this order, the college approached the Division Bench challenging the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that it is not “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution and hence not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

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The writ petitioner was initially appointed in 2005 as a Lecturer in the Department of History at Nirmala College. She was confirmed in her position on 01.07.2006 and subsequently served as Assistant Professor and Head of the Department. Her grievance began with a delay in receiving arrears of salary under the 6th Pay Revision effective from 01.01.2006. Despite repeated representations, the college failed to resolve her complaints. Instead, the college initiated departmental proceedings against her via Memorandum dated 21.10.2022.

This prompted her to file a writ petition challenging both the initiation of the departmental proceedings and the denial of access to relevant documents through a subsequent memorandum dated 14.11.2022. During the pendency of the writ petition, the college dismissed her from service on 03.03.2023 following the conclusion of departmental proceedings. Post-facto approval of this dismissal was granted by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC) on 28.06.2023. The petitioner amended her writ petition accordingly, challenging the order of dismissal and the JPSC's post-facto approval.

In the amended petition, the petitioner sought several reliefs, including the quashing of:

• The departmental proceedings memorandum dated 21.10.2022.

• The communication dated 14.11.2022 denying access to relevant documents.

• The letter dated 22.11.2022 from the Governing Body of the college.

• The dismissal order dated 03.03.2023.

• The JPSC approval dated 28.06.2023.

She further sought reinstatement with all consequential benefits and requested that the college declare the disciplinary authority and comply with Section 57A of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000, which mandates prior approval from JPSC before initiating disciplinary action.

On 23.09.2024, when the writ petition was listed for hearing, the college raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability. It argued that it is a private minority-aided institution receiving grant-in-aid for payment of some teachers' salaries and hence not “State” under Article 12 or an “authority” under Article 226 of the Constitution. The college further contended that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Section 8 of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 and that the dispute, being a service matter in the private realm, could not be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction.

In support of these arguments, the appellant relied on:

• St. Mary's Education Society & Ors v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors, (2023) 4 SCC 498.

• Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683.

The petitioner opposed these contentions. Her counsel argued that the existence of an alternative remedy does not preclude the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. He also asserted that the college's action was contrary to Section 57A(1) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000, which mandates approval from JPSC for initiating disciplinary action, especially in institutions affiliated under the Act. The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava & Ors, (2020) 14 SCC 449.

Further submissions were made by Ranchi University and JPSC supporting the petitioner's stance. The University stated that the college was governed under the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 and that Statute 32 provided for management of religious minority institutions under its fold. According to the University, provisions under the Statute and Section 57A established clear State and University control over such colleges.

JPSC also submitted that under the Act, approval from the Commission was necessary at both the stage of appointment and disciplinary action involving dismissal or termination.

The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, rejected the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition was maintainable. This order formed the basis of the intra-court appeal.

In the intra-court appeal, the college reiterated its earlier submissions, emphasizing that the absence of pervasive control by the State or University meant that it was not “State” under Article 12. The appellant argued that disciplinary action and appointment decisions, although involving JPSC, did not amount to State control in the constitutional sense.

The petitioner and the University responded that JPSC’s mandatory approval before disciplinary action clearly established State control and public element, and therefore the institution was amenable to writ jurisdiction. They maintained that Statute 32 and Section 57A(1) created a comprehensive regulatory framework ensuring that such colleges remained within the ambit of Article 12.

The Division Bench noted the existence of various statutory controls including:

• Mandatory JPSC involvement under Section 57A(1).

• University regulations under Statute 32, which included State and University representatives in the college's governing body.

• Government-sanctioned posts supported by grant-in-aid from the State.

The Bench concluded that these features amounted to pervasive State control and engagement in public duties, thereby rendering the college subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The Division Bench, before examining the maintainability of the writ petition, outlined several issues for determination. The core questions were whether Nirmala College falls within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution, whether it qualifies as an “authority” amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and whether the dispute raised involved a public element warranting judicial review.

The Court observed: “The college in question, Nirmala College, has been established under the Society of Registration Act, 1860… Further, the college… is the minority religious institution and the affiliation has been granted by the University and as such the appellant… is an affiliated college under the fold of Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000.”

The Court referred to Section 2(c) of the Act, noting that affiliated colleges are educational institutions that receive privileges from the University under the Act and applicable statutes.

It also recorded: “The fact about regulation by the UGC Act has not been disputed… in absence of the regulation having not been formulated under the UGC Act, 1956 no college can be allowed to run particularly if a college in question is affiliated one.”

The Division Bench emphasized that the college’s operations are substantially regulated through statute and statutory bodies. “The post… from which the writ petitioner has been dispensed with from service by passing the order of termination on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, is also stated to be sanctioned one and the salary was backed by the grant-in-aid against the aforesaid particular post.”

The Court extensively quoted from Statute 32 of the Manual of Bihar Universities Laws, which defines the management structure and control of the governing body of minority religious colleges. It noted: “It is evident that in the Governing Body there are members from the State Government as also from the University.”

Regarding the core provision at issue, the Court examined Section 57A(1) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000: “Appointment of teachers of affiliated Colleges not maintained by the State Government shall be made by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the Jharkhand Public Service Commission. Dismissal, termination, removal, retirement from service or demotion in rank… shall be done by the Governing Body in consultation with the Jharkhand Public Service Commission…”

The first proviso was critical: “The Governing Bodies of affiliated minority Colleges based on religion and language shall appoint, dismiss, remove or terminate the services of teachers or take disciplinary action against them with the approval of the Jharkhand Public Service Commission.”

The Court interpreted the phrase “with the approval” as a mandatory requirement before disciplinary action, observing: “The first proviso therefore is very much specific that even at the stage of initiation of departmental proceeding the same will be with the approval of the Jharkhand Public Service Commission.”

Rejecting the appellant's contention that post-facto approval would suffice, the Court stated: “Once the disciplinary proceeding has been concluded then it is not available for the disciplinary authority to take the ground that the approval can be sought for at any time even after order of termination having been passed.”

It further clarified: “If the word to the effect that to take disciplinary proceeding against the teachers with the approval of Jharkhand Public Service Commission would not have been there in the first proviso… then what has been submitted on behalf of the appellant can be said to be correct but that is not the legal requirement.”

The appellant had relied on U.P. Avas Evem Vikas Parishad & Anr. v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd., arguing that “approval” does not mean “prior approval.” However, the Division Bench distinguished the ruling, stating: “The issue was with respect to the acquisition of the land… Here, we are dealing with the provision of Section 57A(1)… which itself mean that the disciplinary proceeding cannot be allowed to be concluded without the approval of the commission.”

The Court also addressed whether the college was subject to pervasive governmental control. It stated: “The moment the word ‘with the approval of the JPSC’ has been inserted in the said provision… impliedly mean[s] that the moment decision has been taken by the governing body the same is by way of one transaction needs approval by the JPSC…”

On the point of whether the institution qualifies as “State,” the Court concluded: “The appellant-Nirmala College comes under the fold of Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to be amenable under Article 226…”

Although the Single Judge had reasoned that the case involved a “public element,” the Division Bench modified this aspect, observing: “We… are of the view that the college having the pervasive control of the university and the State… cannot be construed to be an authority within the meaning of Article 226… rather it comes under the fold and ambit of Article 12…”

The Court rejected the alternative remedy argument under the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, holding: “The existence of an alternative remedy does not create a bar in entertaining a writ petition… when the institution is a State within Article 12 and governed under the applicable statutory framework.”

In conclusion, the Division Bench found that the institution’s governance, funding, and disciplinary actions were all subject to regulation and approval by statutory authorities including the University and the JPSC. Accordingly, the writ petition was held to be maintainable.

The Court issued the following directions:

“This Court, on the basis of aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the issue as referred hereinabove is being answered in favour of the writ petitioner and hold that the appellant-Nirmala College comes under the fold of Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to be amenable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

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The Court further stated: “This Court now coming to the finding recorded by learned Single Judge has found that the learned Single Judge… has answered that the writ petition would definitely come within the purview of public element and would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. But, we, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove… are of the view that the college in question is having under the pervasive control of the University and the State… as also in view of the fact as has been admitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the post which was being held by the writ petitioner was sanctioned one, supported by grant-in-aid which was given by the State and further being regulated under the University Grant Commission Act and further the provision as contained under the 57A(1) read with Statute 32, are of the view that the college in question comes under the fold of Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to be amenable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

However, the Court found it appropriate to modify the reasoning adopted by the Single Judge. It clarified: “We are conscious that Article 226 can be amenable against the institution which is coming under the fold of authority. But based upon the aforesaid discussion we are of the view that the college having the pervasive control of the university and the State… cannot be construed to be an authority within the meaning of Article 226… rather it comes under the fold and ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India being State so as to maintain a writ petition under Article 226…”

In conclusion, the Court held: “The instant intra-court appeal accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid modification. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners:
Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate; Mr. Shubhashis Rasik Soren, Advocate; Ms. Shobha Gloria Lakra, Advocate; Ms. Mrinalini Adela Tete, Advocate; Ms. Preeti Hembrom, Advocate; Ms. Singi Sharon Devita, Advocate

For the Respondents:
Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate; Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate; Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate; Mr. C. Vijay, Advocate; Mr. Nillohit Choubey, Advocate; Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate; Ms. Sanya Kumari, Advocate; Mr. K. Hari, Advocate, Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III; Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III, Mr. Abhay Prakash, Advocate; Mr. Amritanshu Singh, Advocate; Mr. Durgesh Agarwal, Advocate, Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate; Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Pratyush, Advocate

Case Title: Nirmala College v. State of Jharkhand & Others

Neutral Citation: 2025:JHHC:10469-DB

Case Number: L.P.A. No. 63 of 2025

Bench: Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad, Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava