Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra held that a juvenile’s conviction under the Juvenile Justice law cannot be treated as a disqualification for public employment, relying on Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which is substantially similar to Section 24 of the 2015 Act. The Bench directed reinstatement of a teacher whose appointment had been terminated for allegedly concealing a criminal case registered when he was a minor. Setting aside the Tribunal’s remand order, the Court clarified that under the Juvenile Justice framework, offences committed during minority— even if proved—do not attract service disqualification and cannot justify termination from employment.

The dispute arose out of a recruitment process conducted in 2019 by Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti for the post of Post Graduate Teacher (Mathematics). The selected candidate joined service in August 2020 at Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Gauriganj, Amethi, after receiving an appointment letter in July 2020. Subsequently, a complaint was received by the employer alleging that the candidate had concealed the pendency of a criminal case while submitting his application. The competent authority issued a notice in September 2021, to which the employee furnished a detailed reply in October 2021 explaining that the incident underlying the case had occurred in 2011, when he was about 17 years old, and that a final report had initially been submitted by the Investigating Officer. He stated that the subsequent charge sheet was filed after re-investigation without his knowledge and that the matter arose out of a minor civil dispute.

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Despite the explanation, an order terminating his services was passed in November 2021. The employee challenged the termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal, contending that the order ignored his response and that he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offence. The Tribunal examined the matter with reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) concerning non-disclosure of criminal cases and held that the department was required to consider the nature of the case, age at the time of the incident, and subsequent developments before taking disciplinary action.

During the proceedings, the Juvenile Justice Board, by an order dated June 2024, declared the employee to have been a juvenile at the time of the alleged offence. The parties relied upon provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, particularly Section 19, and corresponding provisions of the 2015 Act, which provide that a juvenile dealt with under the Act shall not suffer any disqualification attached to conviction under other laws.

The Court observed that it was undisputed that at the time of the alleged incident in April 2011, the individual concerned “was aged about 17 years, hence, a juvenile.” It noted that this finding had not been shown to be perverse and referred to the “order dated 04.06.2024 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the respondent as juvenile.” The Bench stated that the validity of the Tribunal’s order had to be examined “from both perspectives, i.e. as to whether setting aside of termination order was justified and as to whether remand was necessary in the facts of the case.”

The Court recorded that the termination order was passed “without any consideration of the reply” furnished by the employee and that “the authority was bound to examine each and every aspect of the matter including the defence put forth by the respondent as per the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra).” It stated that the department “failed to discharge lawful duty cast on it,” and found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s setting aside of the termination.

While examining the effect of juvenility, the Court reproduced Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and observed: “A bare perusal of Section 19(1) of the Act makes it clear that it starts with a ‘non-obstante clause’ excluding the applicability of any other law... It means that even if a juvenile is convicted for an offence committed by him, his conviction would not be treated as a disqualification.”

Relying on Union of India and others v. Ramesh Bishnoi (2019) 19 SCC 710, the Court recorded that “even if he had been convicted, the same could not have been held against him for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when the alleged offences were committed.” The Bench also cited that “requirement of disclosing details of criminal prosecution faced as a juvenile is violative of right to privacy and right to reputation of child... and therefore, it was not expected from the petitioner to disclose details of criminal prosecution faced as a juvenile.”

The Court further stated that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, though replaced by the 2015 Act, continued to apply as per Section 111(2) of the latter statute, and clarified that the proviso under Section 24(1) of the 2015 Act would not apply since the alleged offence occurred when the earlier law was in force. It observed that “even conviction of a juvenile has been found to be irrelevant qua his services,” noting that precedents such as Shivam Maurya v. State of U.P. and Abhishek Kumar Yadav v. Union of India consistently applied the same principle.

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“In view of above discussion, Writ-A No. 9462 of 2025 has no merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Accordingly, Writ-A No. 6670 of 2025 is allowed.”

“The order dated 03.01.2025 passed by the Tribunal is set aside to the extent the Tribunal has remanded the matter to the authorities for fresh consideration and both the orders impugned in this petition are modified with a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant him all consequential financial and service benefits within a period of one month from the date an authentic copy of this order is produced before them.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Rajesh Tripathi, Advocate; Devesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate; Pankaj Kumar Gupta, Advocate

For the Respondents: A.S.G.I. (Assistant Solicitor General of India); Devesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate; Pankaj Kumar Gupta, Advocate; Anant Kumar Tiwari, Advocate

Case Title: Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti and 2 others v. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak and another; with Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak v. Union of India and 3 others
Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:187064-DB
Case Number: Writ-A No. 9462 of 2025; Writ-A No. 6670 of 2025
Bench: Chief Justice Arun Bhansali, Justice Kshitij Shailendra