Dark Mode
Image
Logo

Karnataka High Court Lifts Gag On YouTube Channel 'Kudla Rampage' In Dharmasthala Burial Case | Civil Court Directed To Take Fresh Call On Interim Injunction After Hearing All Parties

Karnataka High Court Lifts Gag On YouTube Channel 'Kudla Rampage' In Dharmasthala Burial Case | Civil Court Directed To Take Fresh Call On Interim Injunction After Hearing All Parties

Safiya Malik

 

The High Court of Karnataka Single Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna, on August 1, 2025, allowed in part a writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Court quashed an ex parte order dated July 18, 2025, passed by the X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, on interlocutory applications filed in a civil suit. The ex parte order had restrained one of the defendants, among others, from publishing content alleged to be defamatory and had directed de-indexing of online material. The High Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable in law for lack of reasons and for having granted sweeping relief at an interim stage without notice to the parties. The matter was remanded to the trial court for fresh consideration of the interlocutory applications in accordance with law.

 

The writ petition arose from proceedings in a civil suit bearing O.S. No. 5185 of 2025 pending before the X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. The plaintiff in the suit had filed a suit for defamation against 338 defendants, seeking prohibitory and mandatory injunctions.

 

Also Read: Supreme Court Quashes Two-Decade-Old Criminal Case Over Alleged Forged Will | Says Civil Dispute Was Misused to Launch Criminal Proceedings

 

The background of the suit originated from a complaint filed by a former sanitation worker, alleging that human remains had been buried secretly in the precincts of Dharmasthala over nearly two decades. The complaint also included allegations of rape and murder, allegedly implicating individuals associated with the temple administration. This complaint resulted in the registration of Crime No. 39 of 2025 at Dharmasthala Police Station under Section 211(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

 

The petitioner in the writ proceedings was a digital media journalist who reported on the developments arising from the complaint. Subsequently, another complaint was filed by a former stenographer, alleging the disappearance of her daughter from the temple area in 2003.

 

The plaintiff in the civil suit sought to restrain the defendants from publishing or disseminating content related to the complaints or the investigation, claiming that such publications were defamatory. An application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) was filed seeking interim relief, including a direction to take down over 8,842 web links and to prevent future publication of allegedly defamatory material.

 

On July 18, 2025, the trial court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction. The order restrained the defendants, including the petitioner, from publishing any defamatory content against the plaintiff, the temple, its institutions, and associated persons. It also directed the removal and de-indexing of identified web links.

 

Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the ex parte order and remand of the matter for a fresh hearing after affording an opportunity to be heard.

 

The petitioner, represented by counsel, argued that the impugned order was mandatory in nature, granting drastic relief without notice and in violation of Order XXXIX Rule 3(a) CPC. It was submitted that the order imposed a complete gag on media reporting, infringing the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The counsel further submitted that the content in question pertained to a criminal complaint, registration of an FIR, and investigation by a Special Investigating Team, all of which were matters of public record and public importance.

 

The petitioner contended that the order constituted a "John Doe" injunction, applying to undefined future speakers, and thus amounted to a perpetual restraint. It was further contended that the reasons for granting such a sweeping injunction were absent from the impugned order.

 

On the issue of maintainability, the first respondent's counsel argued that an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC was the proper remedy and that the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 227. It was also submitted that the petitioner had previously been restrained by judicial orders and continued to publish derogatory content despite such directions. The counsel argued that the ex parte order was in accordance with law and that alternative remedies, including an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, were available to the petitioner.

 

The petitioner's counsel responded that the remedy of appeal was not available against an ex parte order and that the order was passed in violation of procedural safeguards under CPC. The counsel asserted that the impugned order lacked judicial reasoning and amounted to a final relief being granted at an interim stage.

 

The suit filed by the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove and de-index allegedly defamatory content and web links, as well as a permanent injunction against future publication of such content. The suit and the interim application relied on the contention that the material was false, baseless, and defamatory, affecting the reputation of the plaintiff, the temple, and associated individuals and institutions.

 

The High Court observed that the impugned order "while ostensibly couched as an interim measure, in truth and effect, partakes the character of a final determination."

 

It was "recorded that the concerned Court, at the threshold and without the benefit of adversarial hearing, has ventured to grant a sweeping mandatory injunction, a relief which ordinarily ought to await the culmination of the trial."

 

The Court clarified that its observation should not be construed to mean that civil courts lack the power to grant mandatory injunctions. However, it stated that "it is only the cautious approach and a reasoned order that is what is expected of a civil Court while granting temporary injunction of the kind that is granted in the case at hand."

 

Regarding the procedural lapse, the Court observed that "the mandate of the law unequivocally demands that where injunction is granted ex parte, the Court must articulate reasons demonstrating why notice to the opposite party would frustrate the very object of the injunction."

 

The High Court noted that Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC requires recording of reasons while granting injunctions without notice. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s judgement in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, which held that a higher threshold is required for granting mandatory injunctions even at interim stages.

 

It was "observed that grant or refusal of interlocutory and mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in sound judicial discretion" and that discretion must be guided by settled principles.

The Court also relied on Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, stating that "ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances." The judgment listed several factors for consideration, including whether refusal of injunction would cause greater injustice, the time of notice of the act complained of, the conduct of the plaintiff, and the need for utmost good faith.

 

The High Court quoted from Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, where it was held that "the court shall 'record the reasons' why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case."

 

It noted that the impugned order lacked such foundational reasoning: "the impugned order though spanning multiple pages, conspicuously lacks the foundational reason required for grant of such extraordinary relief." The Court added that "mere volume cannot substitute judicial evaluation; nor can length masquerade legal necessity."

 

It was stated that "the order may span pages, but spanning pages has not depicted application of mind. It is application of mind that is required, in a reasoned order, and not application of ink."

 

Regarding the issuance of a "John Doe" or "Ashok Kumar" order, the Court stated that while such orders are recognised, "they must be wielded with great care and judicious foresight." It was "observed that in the case at hand, the Court for the asking, has issued the said order" and that "the order has now cast its net so wide that it threatens to ensnare any voice against the plaintiff, the family or the place."

 

It was "recorded that this could not have been issued on bereft of reasons" and "there is no semblance of reason for the ultimate relief that is granted."

 

The Court found that the impugned order failed to comply with mandatory procedural requirements and therefore warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

 

The High Court allowed the writ petition in part.

 

It quashed the impugned ex parte order dated July 18, 2025, passed by the X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, on interlocutory applications I.A. Nos. I and II in O.S. No. 5185 of 2025, "qua defendant No.66/petitioner herein."

 

The Court directed that "the matter is remanded to the concerned Court, with a direction to consider the interlocutory applications afresh, bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order."

 

It further recorded that "the concerned Court shall expeditiously adjudicate the applications so filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC."

 

Also Read: HP Land Revenue Act | Himachal Pradesh High Court Quashes Financial Commissioner’s Order for Acting Beyond Jurisdiction and Relying on "Irrelevant and Non-Existent Material", Holds Collector's Choice "Not to be Interfered With" Absent Perversity

 

The Court clarified that "this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the civil suit, the criminal proceedings, or the veracity of the allegations and the counter allegations."

 

It stated that "all contentions, except the one considered in the course of the order between the parties, shall remain open."

 

It also observed that "the petitioner and other parties shall extend their full cooperation to the concerned Court in passing of necessary orders, in the light of the observations made in the course of the order."

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Sri A. Velan, Advocate a/w Sri Vishwas N.B., Advocate

For the Respondents: Sri Udaya Holla, Sr. Advocate a/w Sri S. Rajashekar, Advocate

 

Case Title: Kudla Rampage v. Sri Harshendra Kumar D. and Others

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 22528 of 2025 (GM - CPC)

Bench: Justice M. Nagaprasanna

 

Comment / Reply From

You May Also Like

Newsletter

Subscribe to our mailing list to get the new updates!