Kerala High Court | Scope of ‘Dispute’ Under Section 3H(4) of National Highways Act Limited to Apportionment and Entitlement | Challenges to Title Deeds Require Independent Civil Suit
- Post By 24law
- September 18, 2025

Safiya Malik
The High Court of Kerala Division Bench of Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Harisankar V. Menon clarified the ambit of “dispute” under Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956, while considering compensation claims arising from land acquisition. The Court stated that reference to a civil court is required only where the Competent Authority cannot resolve issues without adjudication, such as apportionment or entitlement to compensation. It further noted that challenges to facially valid title deeds cannot be entertained in acquisition proceedings and must instead be pursued through independent civil suits, subject to limitation, with liberty reserved to the appellant.
The case arose from a writ appeal filed by the petitioner challenging the disbursal of compensation awarded for land acquired under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. The appellant claimed entitlement to the compensation on the basis of a settlement deed (Ext.P1) executed in 1968 by his father, Mr. Natarajan, during the appellant’s minority. According to the appellant, the deed transferring the property was invalid as it had been executed without obtaining prior permission from a civil court.
The land in question was subsequently acquired by the National Highways Authority of India for development under the National Highways Act. Compensation was disbursed to the party respondents on the strength of their title deeds. The appellant contested that the respondents’ entitlement was defective and that the amount should have been awarded to him instead.
The appellant relied primarily on Ext.P1 settlement deed and argued that the subsequent conveyances executed by his father could not have transferred valid title. He contended that the Competent Authority, before disbursing compensation, ought to have referred the dispute to a civil court under Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act.
The statutory framework at issue was Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956, which provides that when there is a dispute regarding apportionment of compensation or the person to whom compensation is payable, the matter shall be referred by the Competent Authority to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The appellant maintained that his challenge fell within this provision and that the authority acted without jurisdiction in disbursing the compensation.
The respondents defended the disbursal by producing valid title deeds demonstrating ownership of the acquired land. The Competent Authority, upon examining the documents, accepted them as facially valid and complete. No independent proceedings had been initiated by the appellant in a civil court to impeach the validity of these deeds.
The Single Judge dismissed the appellant’s writ petition, observing that any such challenge was barred by limitation. On appeal, the Division Bench considered the precise scope of “dispute” under Section 3H(4), and whether the Competent Authority was obliged to make a reference to the civil court in the circumstances presented.
It recorded that the provision envisaged reference of disputes by the competent authority to the decision of the civil court in limited circumstances: “(a) Dispute as to the apportionment of the amount. (b) Dispute as to the person to whom compensation is payable.”
The Court stated that the legislature was conscious that the competent authority could not decide questions relating to the title of the land subjected to acquisition. It therefore observed that the statutory provision must be interpreted with the objective of the legislation in mind.
The judgment recorded: “A dispute may arise in several circumstances. The question, however, is whether the statutory provision contemplates that every such dispute must be referred to the civil court for decision.” The Court noted that disputes qualified for reference were only those where the competent authority could not, without adjudication, decide the title or interest of a party.
The Bench observed that where a claimant relies on a title deed or document that is complete and valid on its face, the competent authority is not expected to refer such a dispute to the civil court. It recorded: “Unless and until the document is impeached in proceedings before a competent civil court, it continues to remain valid and binding for the competent authority to act upon.”
It further stated that merely because a third party raises a challenge to a document, the competent authority is not obliged to refer the matter. The proper remedy for such a person was to institute proceedings before the civil court to impeach the document.
The Bench noted that in the present case, the appellant challenged a settlement deed executed by his father in 1968, alleging lack of civil court permission. It observed that the competent authority had acted upon the respondents’ title deeds and had not committed any error in acknowledging them. It stated: “There was no need for referring such a dispute to the civil court under Section 3H(4) of the NH Act.”
The Court also recorded that any challenge to the deeds could be pursued independently, subject to the law of limitation: “Sometimes, such a challenge will be barred from adjudication by operation of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and such parties cannot get immunity from the limitation law in the guise of a reference from the competent authority.”
In disposing of the appeal, the Division Bench clarified: “We reserve liberty to the appellant to challenge the title of the party respondents before the civil court, independent of the acquisition proceedings under the NH Act, subject to the law of limitation.”
“Any observations in the impugned judgment stand modified as to the application of the Limitation Act. The question of limitation can be decided in such a civil suit and accordingly is left open.”
“Given the fact that compensation was disbursed based on the title deed produced by the party respondents and that the competent authority had not committed any error in acknowledging the said title deed, there was no need for referring such a dispute to the civil court under Section 3H(4) of the NH Act.”
“The Writ Appeal stands disposed of with the above findings.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner/Appellant: Shri. P.K. Sreevalsakrishnan, Shri. K.R. Prathish, Shri. S. Unnikrishnan (Nellad), Smt. Krishna Das, Shri. Akhil Babu
For the Respondents: Shri. Mathews K. Philip, Standing Counsel, NHAI, Shri. Philip T. Varghese, Shri. Thomas T. Varghese, Smt. Achu Subha Abraham, Smt. V.T. Litha, Smt. K.R. Monisha, Shri. T.K. Shajahan, Senior Government Pleader
Case Title: Saravanabhava v. The District Collector & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:67466
Case Number: WA No. 2098 of 2025
Bench: Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque, Justice Harisankar V. Menon