Kerala High Court | State’s Dubious Attempt to Bypass Article 30(1A) Struck Down | Land Acquisition Proceedings Quashed Under 1894 Act | Fair Compensation Ordered as per 2013 Act
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Kerala Division Bench of Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Harisankar V. Menon delivered a judgment setting aside the entire land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Bench held that the acquisition was a private arrangement lacking the element of public purpose as required under law. The Court directed the State to calculate compensation for the dispossessed landowners strictly in accordance with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It further ordered that upon receipt of such compensation, the landowners shall execute the necessary conveyance deed in favour of the Government or its nominee, with all expenses borne by the State. The Court thus allowed the writ appeal, setting aside the award impugned in the connected original petition.
The proceedings arose out of a dispute concerning land acquisition undertaken ostensibly for widening access to a bridge adjoining a school. The State of Kerala projected the need to acquire land belonging to Sree Venkateswara English Medium School, Thripunithura, an institution claimed to be run by a linguistic minority. A notification was issued on 09.06.2006 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The school authority challenged this notification in a writ petition before the High Court, citing Article 30(1A) of the Constitution of India, which protects minority educational institutions from compulsory acquisition unless a specific law provides otherwise.
Article 30(1A) was inserted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. It provides: “In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.” The Supreme Court in Society of St. Joseph's College v. Union of India [(2002) 1 SCC 273] held that a specific law is necessary to compulsorily acquire such property, and in its absence, acquisition is impermissible.
In light of this constitutional restriction, the State and the school authority arrived at a compromise recorded before the Court. Under this compromise, instead of acquiring land from the school, the State agreed to acquire adjacent land owned by private individuals and hand it over to the school as compensation. Acting on this settlement, the writ petition of the school was disposed of, and a subsequent notification dated 19.05.2007 was issued to acquire the adjacent land belonging to the appellants.
The appellants, being adjacent landowners, challenged this acquisition through W.P.(C) No. 24031/2008, contending that it was a colourable exercise of power, that the claim of minority status by the school was questionable, and that their land was being acquired not for a genuine public purpose but to satisfy a private settlement. The writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge, and an award bearing No. 1/10 was passed on 22.03.2010. The appellants did not participate in the reference proceedings under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, and the Reference Court answered against them, holding they were not entitled to enhanced compensation. They challenged this in O.P.(C) No. 1802/2011. Both matters were tagged together before the Division Bench for final hearing.
The Court examined Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, defining “public purpose.” It observed that the statute restricts acquisitions for educational institutions to schemes carried out or established by the Government and explicitly excludes acquisition for companies from its ambit, limiting such acquisitions under Part VII to specific purposes. It also considered precedents including Gopakumar V.M. v. State of Kerala [2009 (3) KHC 361], where acquisition for temple-related expansion was held to fall within “public purpose.”
In this case, the Court scrutinized the compromise and noted that it was a private arrangement between the State and the school. The State’s action was described as an attempt to bypass Article 30(1A) by shifting the burden of acquisition onto neighboring private owners. The appellants argued that such acquisition was unconstitutional and lacked legal sanction.
The Division Bench recorded: “This is a peculiar case where the State has adopted an ingenious method to acquire the land owned by the appellants by invoking the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” It observed that without a specific law enabling compulsory acquisition of property belonging to a minority institution, it was not possible for the State to acquire the school’s land.
The Court stated: “In order to overcome this constitutional restriction, a compromise was entered into with the school on the promise that the land of adjacent holders would be acquired to compensate for the loss suffered by the school. This is a private arrangement and a private contract. Such an agreement cannot have any backing of law, and to elevate the status of a contract entered into by the State in exercise of its executive or sovereign power… rather reflects a deceitful means adopted by the State to get over the constitutional embargo.”
The Bench further noted: “When the matter is examined from that backdrop, the acquisition of land is, in fact, based on the promise arrived at in a settlement rather than upholding any public purpose related to the school.” It recorded that the school could still function without the land and that its functioning was not impaired by the acquisition. While acknowledging that the school may require the land for playground or other purposes, the Court clarified: “Be that as it may, since it is a private school, there is no public purpose element in light of the restricted meaning assigned to public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act.”
The judgment added that the 2013 Act excluded private educational institutions from its ambit, reflecting the legislative intent to prevent compulsory acquisition for such entities. The Court concluded: “Anyway, we are certain that this acquisition is a dubious attempt to wriggle out the constitutional embargo rather than acknowledging any other elements constituting public purpose under the law.”
The Division Bench held: “Thus, we hold that the entire land acquisition proceedings have to be set aside, including the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act.” It noted that possession of the land had already been taken and handed over to the school authority. The appellants’ counsel admitted before the Court that the appellants only required compensation as per the 2013 Act and agreed to execute necessary documents upon receipt of such compensation.
Accordingly, the Court directed: “In the peculiar circumstances, we direct the Collector to calculate the compensation in accordance with the 2013 Act and on payment or deposit of the amount, the appellants shall execute a conveyance deed, on meeting the entire expenses by the State, in favour of the Government or its nominee.”
The writ appeal was allowed, and the award in O.P.(C) No. 1802 of 2011 was set aside.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Shri. Madhu Radhakrishnan, Advocate
For the Respondents: Sri. Kurian George Kannnathanam, Senior Advocate; Shri. N. Anilkumar, Advocate; Sri. S. Ranjith, Senior Government Pleader; Shri. K.P. Jayachandran, Additional Advocate General
Case Title: Sulaiman M.S. (Deceased) & Others v. State of Kerala & Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: KER:62727
Case Number: WA No.544 of 2010 & OP(C) No.1802 of 2011
Bench: Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Harisankar V. Menon
