Labour Court Retains Power To Extend Time For Compliance With Awards Even After Enforceability Under Section 17A Industrial Disputes Act; Kerala High Court
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Kerala, Single Bench of Justice Gopinath P., recently held that a Labour Court retains the power to extend time for compliance with its awards even after the award becomes enforceable under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Dismissing a writ petition filed by a pharmacist who was dismissed from service by a cooperative bank, the Court observed that a Labour Court does not become functus officio merely because thirty days have elapsed from the publication of its award.
A pharmacist employed at a medical store operated by a cooperative bank was subjected to disciplinary proceedings, resulting in her dismissal from service in November 2012. Following unsuccessful conciliation before the District Labour Officer, she approached the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking redress against her dismissal.
The Labour Court set aside the disciplinary proceedings and permitted the bank to initiate fresh proceedings from the stage of the charge memo, directing the same to be concluded within three months from the date of the award. It further directed that failure to comply would entitle the employee to reinstatement with all benefits.
The bank subsequently filed an application before the Labour Court seeking extension of the stipulated time, citing delayed receipt of the award. The employee raised objections contending that the application was filed beyond the enforceable period under Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that the Labour Court had become functus officio. The Labour Court granted a partial extension of one and a half months, which the employee challenged before the High Court.
The court, after hearing both parties, recorded that the petitioner had not made out any ground for interference with the impugned order of the Labour Court. On the central question of whether the Labour Court becomes functus officio after the period of 30 days prescribed under Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the court stated that "the question is no longer res integra in view of the law laid down in Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. (supra), where it was held (after considering the judgment in Jammu Tehsil (supra), on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner) that even after the period of 30 days prescribed in Section 17A of the I.D Act, an application for setting aside an ex parte order could be entertained by the Labour Court/Tribunal."
The court further stated that "I find no authority to hold that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court/Tribunal should be restricted to applications for setting aside the ex parte order" and that "such jurisdiction must, by necessary implication, extend to other matters even after the period of 30 days prescribed in Section 17A of the I.D Act."
On the question of the power to extend time, the court referred to the principle in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, where it was stated that "where the court fixes a time to do a thing, the court always retains the power to extend the time for doing so" and that "the principle of this section must govern in not whittling down the discretion conferred on the court."
The court recorded the principle drawn from Paul D.V v. Manisha Lalwani that "when any period or time is granted by the court for doing any act, the court has the discretion from time to time to enlarge such period even if the time originally fixed or granted by the court has expired" and that "the power given to the court is discretionary and intended to be exercised only to meet the ends of justice."
The court further drew upon the principle from Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder that "if a court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it" and that "the principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitate extension of time."
The court also referred to the passage from S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, as noted in Vasakumar Pillai S.P. v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, that "courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of statutory limitations and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their powers, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted."
On the basis of these principles, the court concluded that "in the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments and in the absence of any express provision in the I.D. Act prohibiting the extension of time after the period of 30 days from the date of the publication of the award, I must hold that such power is always available to the Labour Court/Tribunal functioning under the provisions of the I.D. Act."
The Court directed "Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this Writ Petition. The writ petition fails, and it is accordingly dismissed."
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Sri. Gopakumar R. Thaliyal, Sri. M.S. Vijayachandra Ababu, Sri. R.B. Balachandran, Shri. Jithu S. Babu
For the Respondents: Sri. N. Anand, Sri. T.L. Sreeram, Shri. Rajesh O.N., Shri. Roy Antony; Smt. Mable C. Kurian, Government Pleader
Case Title: Bindhu I. v. Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-Operative Bank Limited and Another
Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:14641
Case Number: WP(C) No. 25229 of 2024
Bench: Justice Gopinath P.
