Legal Profession Is A Service Rooted In Dharma And State Law Officers’ Rights Cannot Be Curtailed By A “Contractual” Label : Punjab And Haryana High Court
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana Single Bench of Justice Sandeep Moudgil, while describing the legal profession as a service-based institution shaped by India’s dharmic tradition and constitutional development, held that State Law Officers cannot be denied core service benefits solely because their engagement is termed contractual. In a writ petition by Deputy Advocate Generals and Assistant Advocate Generals engaged for Haryana, the dispute was confined to denial of Leave Travel Concession, medical reimbursement and related emoluments despite parity in pay and increments. The Court allowed the petition and directed the State to release these benefits to AAGs/DAGs, including the petitioners, within four weeks.
The petitioners, appointed as Deputy Advocate Generals (DAGs) and Assistant Advocate Generals (AAGs) in the office of the Advocate General, Haryana pursuant to Advertisement dated 29.12.2017, invoked writ jurisdiction seeking quashing of communications reducing their pay scales and ordering recovery of alleged excess salary. They were engaged through letters dated 30.06.2018 for one year, extendable annually, under the Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016. Initially placed under 6th CPC scales, their pay was revised under the 7th CPC by office order dated 18.08.2018.
Following audit objections for the period 01.04.2018 to 31.03.2021, show cause notices dated 23.12.2020 and recovery directions dated 23.06.2021 were issued. The petitioners challenged reduction of pay, recovery, denial of increment from January 2019, fixed medical allowance, LTC, medical reimbursement, earned leave and pensionary benefits.
In written statement, the State conceded grant of higher pay scales, increment from 01.01.2019, and enhancement of fixed medical allowance, but opposed LTC, medical reimbursement and earned leave on the ground that the petitioners were contractual appointees governed by the 2016 Act and not regular government employees.
The Court framed the core issue as “whether the petitioners, in light of the nature of their duties and conditions of service, can be denied core service benefits solely on the nomenclature of ‘contractual engagement’?”
It observed that “The appointment of lawyers by Government and public bodies, and the incidents of such appointment, cannot be examined merely through the narrow prism of contractual terminology.” The Court recorded that "The legal profession, at its core, is a service-oriented profession. The history of the legal profession is inseparable from the history of justice itself. The lawyer emerged as a spokesperson for rights, a mediator of disputes, and eventually as an officer of the court. In India, this journey reflects a distinctive civilizational trajectory, rooted in dharma, refined through colonial institutionalization, and transformed by constitutionalism."
The Court stated that “the engagement of legal professionals as law officers of the State cannot be simply termed as ‘contractual’ in nature to deny fairness and parity in service benefits.” It noted that once the State prohibits private practice and places officers under continuous institutional responsibility, “it must ensure that their service conditions reflect fairness and dignity.”
The Court recorded that the petitioners were appointed against sanctioned posts, draw salary in regular pay scales, receive dearness allowance and increments, are paid from the Consolidated Fund, and are barred from private practice. Their role was described as “institutional and continuous in nature.”
It observed that “Constitutional jurisprudence does not permit such selective parity.” The Court further stated that “Public employment even when contractual is subject to constitutional discipline. Where the substance of the relationship reveals exclusivity, continuity and institutional integration, the Court must look beyond labels to reality.”
The Court noted absence of material justifying denial and stated that “This denial appears not as a considered policy choice grounded in public interest, but as a residual relic of terminology.” It also recorded that denying earned leave and medical reimbursement would be “to impose the rigours of public service without affording its minimal securities.”
On applicability of the 2016 Act, the Court stated that the petitioners were appointed prior to the Act coming into force and held that the provisions would not apply to them.
The Court held that “the petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed by them in terms of LTC, Medical reimbursement and other emoluments. The respondents are hereby directed to release benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other benefits/emoluments to the officers appointed as AAG/DAG including the petitioners.”
“This exercise shall be completed within a period of 4 weeks from date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The present writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Ms. Shruti Jain Goyal, Advocate and Ms. Komal Klana, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Sahni, Additional Advocate General, Haryana
Case Title: Shruti Jain & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Case Number: CWP-16828-2021 (O&M)
Bench: Justice Sandeep Moudgil
