Madras High Court Upholds Pastor’s Conviction For Sexually Assaulting Disabled Minor
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Madras, Division Bench of Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and Justice R. Poornima upheld the conviction and sentence of a pastor for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor with physical and intellectual disability, confirming the judgment of the Special Court under the POCSO Act. The Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused challenging his conviction under Section 6 of the Act. The case arose from allegations that the pastor sexually assaulted the child when she had been left in his care at a church. Relying on the testimony of the victim, the surrounding circumstances, and the accused’s failure to rebut the statutory presumption under the law, the Bench concluded that the prosecution had established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution alleged that on 03.05.2022 at about 09:00 p.m., the minor victim and her mother had gone to a church managed by the appellant. The mother left the victim in his care and went out to meet a person. On her return, she found the appellant fleeing and the victim in a disturbed condition. The victim later disclosed that the appellant had sexually assaulted her. A complaint was lodged on 11.05.2022. The prosecution examined nine witnesses and marked fifteen documents. The defence examined two witnesses. The medical evidence indicated that the victim’s hymen was not intact, and psychiatric evaluation revealed moderate intellectual disability with an IQ of 36.
The appellant challenged the conviction citing delay in complaint, absence of injuries, contradictions in evidence, and alleged previous enmity.
The Bench framed issues relating to alleged previous enmity, applicability of aggravated offences under the POCSO Act and the Disabilities Act, and the evidentiary value of alleged discrepancies. On the question of enmity, the Court recorded that “there was no previous enmity between P.W.1 and the appellant’s family and they had been in an amicable relationship even till the day of the alleged occurrence.”
Regarding medical evidence, the Court referred to the doctor’s testimony and observed that “there were no injuries found on the breasts of the victim girl” and that the hymen was not intact. Relying on precedent, the Court observed, “In the absence of injury on the private part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident had not taken place…” and further stated that “The absence of injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix can be of no consequence in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
On delay in filing the complaint, the Court observed that “the delay of eight days between the date of occurrence and the lodging of the complaint is wholly immaterial.”
With respect to mental disability, the Court recorded that “P.W.2 has features of moderate intellectual disability and her IQ is 36.” It stated that since the statute refers to “physical or mental disability,” proof of mental disability was sufficient.
On discrepancies in evidence, the Court referred to Supreme Court precedent and recorded that “Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case… would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.” The Court concluded that “all the discrepancies pointed out by the appellant are minor in nature and do not in any way shake the core of the prosecution’s case.”
Referring to Section 29 of the POCSO Act, the Court noted the statutory presumption and recorded that the accused had not raised any significant doubt to rebut it. It further observed that the prosecution evidence was “reliable, cogent, and trustworthy” and that there was no perversity or illegality in the trial court’s judgment.
The Court further noted: “Regrettably, society has yet to overcome the stigma and moral judgment that continue to attach themselves to such disclosures…To overcome these deep-rooted psychological and social barriers and to ultimately approach the police is neither immediate nor effortless; it is a process that understandably consumes time. Viewed in this backdrop, and recognizing that the reporting of sexual offences is far from a simple or mechanical act, this Court is inclined to hold that the delay of eight days between the date of occurrence and the lodging of the complaint is wholly immaterial.”
The Court recorded: “In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in this appeal. The conviction of the appellant for offences under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is sustained. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is appropriate and proportionate to the gravity of the offence. In the result, the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. No costs.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. K. Samidurai
For the Respondents: Mr. R. Meenakshi Sundaram, Additional Public Prosecutor
Case Title: Joseph Raja v. Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Rajapalayam
Case Number: Crl.A(MD)No.436 of 2023
Bench: Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and Justice R. Poornima
