Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Meghalaya Single Bench of Justice W. Diengdoh held that the writ petition filed seeking enhancement and reassessment of compensation for land acquired for the establishment of the Balpakram National Park was not legally maintainable. The Court declared that the matter had previously been adjudicated and that the principle of res judicata applied. It recorded that the petitioners had already approached the Court on the same issue in an earlier writ petition that was disposed of on 02.03.2011. The Court held that the subsequent representations and communications relied upon by the petitioners did not give rise to a fresh cause of action. Accordingly, the petition was disposed of at the threshold without issuing further directions to the respondents.

The petitioner, Balpakram A’king Nokmas Social Welfare Association, was represented by its attorney Smti. Ruthilla R. Marak. The Association consists of Nokmas of A’king land located in the South Garo Hills District, Meghalaya. The petitioner was authorized to act in the interests of the members of the Association.

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The petitioner submitted that vast tracts of A’king land, approximately 352 sq. kms, were acquired by the respondent authorities in multiple phases between 1985 and 1995 for the creation of Balpakram National Park. It was alleged that the land acquisition process did not follow due procedure, except for the issuance of purported notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner submitted that the Nokmas, being illiterate, were made to sign blank papers without being informed of their rights, including the right to receive compensation under protest.

It was further submitted that the rate of compensation awarded by the respondent authorities did not reflect the land value determined by the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council (GHADC), which had fixed the rate at ₹1000 per bigha. The awarded compensation was instead calculated at ₹200 per bigha. Additionally, no compensation was provided for standing trees, crops, mineral deposits, or the statutory solatium.

In response to the alleged irregularities, the petitioner initially approached the then Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court through W.P.(C) No. 315(SH) of 2002. This petition was disposed of by order dated 02.03.2011, in which liberty was granted to petitioners in certain other cases to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court, however, held that in relation to the 352 sq. kms of land, the writ petition was barred due to non-exhaustion of the alternative statutory remedy.

Following the 2011 decision, the petitioner’s Association submitted multiple representations to the Collector, South Garo Hills, Baghmara, on 05.04.2011, 03.02.2012, 12.09.2012, and subsequently on 22.05.2017. Receiving no positive response, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 500 of 2018 before the High Court, which was disposed of on 11.02.2019 with a direction to Respondents 3 and 4 to dispose of the pending representation by a speaking order.

Thereafter, the Collector, South Garo Hills, rejected the petitioner’s representation by communication dated 04.03.2019. The rejection was conveyed with the observation that the petition for enhancement of compensation could not be entertained, as the quantum had been accepted in full without protest and the petition was time-barred.

The petitioner argued that although the initial order of 2011 had disposed of the matter, subsequent developments and communications constituted a fresh cause of action. Reference was made to a communication dated 21.12.2011 issued by the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Law Department, where it was stated that the land was not properly measured and that adequate compensation was not paid in accordance with Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Secretary opined that the case could be referred to the District Collector or the appropriate Civil Court.

Another communication dated 17.08.2012 from the Deputy Commissioner, South Garo Hills, addressed to the Under Secretary, Revenue & Disaster Management Department, Shillong, was cited. The Deputy Commissioner, after examining the matter, stated that a reassessment should be considered and had placed the matter before the Government.

The learned Government Advocate for the respondents submitted that the writ petition was barred by the principle of res judicata as the issue had already been settled by the order dated 02.03.2011. It was submitted that the petitioner was not among those petitioners who were granted liberty to approach the Collector under Section 18 of the Act, and hence, their subsequent representations were based on a misreading of the judgment.

It was argued that the filing of successive representations could not revive a claim that had been time-barred, and no fresh cause of action arose from the internal communications or recommendations made by government officers.

The Court stated: “This Court has noted the case of the parties and have also recorded the submission and contention made by the respective counsels.”

It observed that the petitioner sought enhanced compensation for land acquired for Balpakram National Park, and that this issue had previously been raised in W.P.(C) No. 315(SH) of 2002. The Court recorded: “This Court vide order dated 02.03.2011, has rejected the claim of the petitioner’s Association mainly on the ground of delay in approaching the concerned authority with an appropriate application, particularly one under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”

It further observed: “There was no challenge to this order by the petitioner’s Association before any higher forum, the said order is deemed to have attained finality.”

On the petitioner’s reliance on the liberty granted to other petitioners in companion cases, the Court stated: “The petitioner being misled by another portion of the said order dated 02.03.2011… a reading of the whole order would clearly show that the operative part as far as W.P.(C) No. 315(SH) 2002… has barred further action by the petitioner’s Association as far as claimed for enhancement of compensation is concerned.”

The Court accepted the respondents’ submission that the matter was barred by the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Explanation V. It quoted the judgment in P. Bandopadhya & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, (2019) 13 SCC 42: “The relief sought by the appellants before the High Court was barred by the principle of res judicata.”

It further recorded: “The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law… and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal.”

Addressing the argument on fresh cause of action, the Court cited Union of India v. C. Girja & Ors, (2019) 15 SCC 633: “When a belated representation in regard to a ‘stale’ or ‘dead’ issue/dispute is considered and decided… the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the ‘dead’ issue or time-barred dispute.”

It noted that the representation submitted by the petitioner and rejected on 04.03.2019 did not generate a new legal right. It stated: “Even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix.”

On the relevance of repeated representations, the Court referred to State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, and recorded: “Filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration.”

The Court further stated: “Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.”

The Court recorded that the petitioner’s claim for reassessment of compensation had been finally decided by the High Court in its earlier order dated 02.03.2011 in W.P.(C) No. 315(SH) of 2002. It observed that the judgment had attained finality and could not be reopened by subsequent administrative representations or correspondence.

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It stated: “The case of Surjeet Singh Sahni (supra) is not required to be discussed herein in view of the opinion of this Court on the issue of res-judicata.”

The Court further held: “In view of the observations made hereinabove, this Court finds that the petitioner has not been able to sustain this petition on legal grounds, particularly on the point of res-judicata. The same is found not maintainable at the threshold.”

“Petition is hereby disposed of accordingly.”

Advocates Representing The Parties :

For the Petitioners: Mr. P. Yobin, Advocate; Ms. B. Ramsiej, Advocate; Mr. B. Komi, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr. S. Sen, Government Advocate; Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Additional Senior Government Advocate; Ms. S. Laloo, Government Advocate, Dr. N. Mozika, Deputy Solicitor General of India with Ms. R. Fancon, Advocate

Case Title: Balpakram A’king Nokmas Social Welfare Association v. The State of Meghalaya & Ors

Neutral Citation: 2025:MLHC:476

Case Number: WP(C) No. 194 of 2019

Bench: Justice W. Diengdoh

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