No Circumstance Exists Through Which Appellant Can Be Held Guilty | Jharkhand High Court Acquits Accused In 1994 Child Murder Case Based On Flawed Circumstantial Evidence
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Jharkhand Division Bench of Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Arun Kumar Rai set aside the conviction and life sentence imposed on an accused for the murder of a minor, holding that the circumstantial evidence relied upon was insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court allowed the appeal, reversed the trial court’s conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and discharged the appellant from bail obligations.
The case arose from a criminal trial in which the appellant was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution's case stemmed from a missing person report filed on 27.01.1994 after a minor boy failed to return home. The informant alleged that the appellant had taken the boy on a bicycle towards a nearby pond on the evening of 26.01.1994. Subsequent searches yielded no results, and suspicions intensified after the appellant’s relatives were seen frequenting a hut. Eventually, on 07.02.1994, the boy’s body was discovered buried beneath the floor of the hut.
The police initiated an investigation under Sections 364, 302, 201/34 of the IPC. The case proceeded to trial following the filing of a charge sheet.
The prosecution examined nine witnesses in total. P.W.1, a relative of the deceased, claimed he was informed by another family member that the appellant had taken the child towards the pond. He further stated that he received letters from the appellant allegedly admitting guilt, but no originals were produced and their authenticity was questioned.
P.W.2, a social worker, stated that another co-accused confessed to him about committing the murder. This witness also recounted seeing the appellant lowering his head when confronted. P.W.3 reiterated the timeline involving the accused and described the circumstances surrounding the search and discovery of the body. In cross-examination, he admitted not seeing the appellant with the deceased.
P.W.4, father of the deceased, testified that his wife informed him that their son had gone with the appellant. He further recounted that the confession of the co-accused was relayed to him by a third party.
P.W.5 stated that the appellant had taken the boy on a bicycle and allegedly admitted to leaving the child near the pond. However, this admission was claimed to have been made under coercion. P.W.6, the child’s mother, stated that she had personally seen the boy leave with the appellant.
The medical officer, P.W.9, conducted the post-mortem examination and reported that the body was in an advanced state of decomposition. No injuries or cause of death could be determined.
The police officials (P.W.7 and P.W.8) testified regarding the investigation, recovery of the body, and collection of evidence. The police had seized tools such as a shaft and spade but found no direct link connecting the appellant with the murder site.
The defence argued that the conviction was based on weak circumstantial evidence and that the primary suspect—whose hut allegedly contained the body—was acquitted. It was also pointed out that no independent witnesses saw the appellant with the deceased and that the authenticity of alleged jail letters was questionable.
The defence presented D.W.1, a police official who confirmed entries in the station diary, including the initial missing person report. No forensic report linking the accused to the crime scene or murder was presented.
The Division Bench recorded that the prosecution’s case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence. It noted: “Admittedly, there are no eyewitnesses to the murder…” and the trial court relied solely on the circumstances that the “deceased was last seen with the appellant” and that “the dead body was recovered from the house of the father of the appellant.”
The Bench scrutinised each witness’s testimony and observed that P.W.1 “had not seen the appellant and the deceased together.” P.W.3 and P.W.4 had similarly not witnessed the appellant in the company of the deceased. P.W.5 admitted the appellant’s alleged confession was made under pressure, making it unreliable: “Such admission would not be of any consequence, as the same was stated under coercion and duress.”
The court further recorded: “P.W.6, however, is the only witness who had seen her son going with the appellant… but none had seen the said occurrence.” Given the time and setting—5:00PM in a populated locality—the court found it “strange” that no other person saw the alleged movement.
On the recovery of the body from the hut, the court noted that “the needle of suspicion has been consistently pointed towards (another accused), the owner of the hutment but he has been acquitted by the learned trial court.” The court found this inconsistency relevant, observing: “There does not appear to be any circumstance through which the appellant can be held guilty for the offence of murder.”
Citing M. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2024) 4 SCC 633], the Bench clarified the inapplicability of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act: “Section 106… cannot be used to shift the burden of proving the offence from the prosecution to the accused… It can only when the prosecution led evidence, which, if believed, will sustain a conviction… that the question of shifting the onus… would arise.”
The court concluded: “Since we have already come to a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to sustain the allegations… the question of shifting the onus upon the appellant… evaporates.”
The Division Bench held: “We, therefore, on the basis of what has been discussed above, set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 10.09.1997 passed by Sri Abhaya Shankar Prasad, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bokaro in S.T. No. 187/95.”
The court allowed the criminal appeal: “This appeal is allowed.”
It further directed: “Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.”
Lastly, the Bench stated: “Pending I.A.s, if any, stands closed.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Public Prosecutor
Case Title: Rajendra Mahto v. The State of Bihar (now Jharkhand)
Neutral Citation: 2025:JHHC:15206-DB
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 238 of 1997(R)
Bench: Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Arun Kumar Rai
[Read/Download order]
