No Constitutional Infirmity in Tribal-to-Non-Tribal Land Sale Restriction | Bombay High Court Upholds Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of 1975 Rules as Safeguard Against Tribal Exploitation
- Post By 24law
- May 31, 2025

Safiya Malik
The High Court of Bombay Division Bench of Justice A.S. Chandurkar and Justice Rajesh S. Patil has held that Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Transfer of Occupancy by Tribals to Non-Tribals) Rules, 1975 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The court dismissed a constitutional challenge brought under Article 226 against the validity of the said Rule, which restricts the transfer of tribal-owned agricultural land to non-tribals unless the land is intended for non-agricultural use.
The court upheld the validity of the rule, stating that the restriction serves a legitimate purpose of safeguarding the rights and welfare of tribals as mandated by Article 46 of the Constitution. The bench found no merit in the argument that the rule imposed unreasonable fetters on the discretion of the Collector or that it led to discriminatory treatment. Consequently, the writ petition seeking to invalidate the provision was dismissed.
The petitioner, a member of the "Mahadev Koli" Scheduled Tribe, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Transfer of Occupancy by Tribals to Non-Tribals) Rules, 1975. The petitioner claimed ancestral rights over land situated at Mouje Ashagad (Asave), Taluka Dahanu, District Palghar, which had been leased in 1940 to the father of the fourth respondent, a non-tribal.
According to the petitioner, an amicable settlement had been reached with the fourth respondent to facilitate the transfer of the said land. An application dated 23rd February 2004 was made before the Collector, seeking permission for such transfer under Section 36A(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. However, by communication dated 1st September 2006, the Collector rejected the application, citing Rule 4(1)(a)(i), which permits such transfers only for non-agricultural purposes.
A similar application to the Revenue Minister yielded the same result in 2010. The petitioner then filed a revision application dated 20th June 2014, which remained pending. Letters dated 3rd May 2016 and 23rd August 2016 were issued to expedite the matter. Eventually, in 2024, the petitioner withdrew the revision application and associated correspondence to focus on the writ petition.
The petitioner argued that the Rule violates Article 14 of the Constitution, asserting that it irrationally distinguishes between transfers for agricultural and non-agricultural purposes without any nexus to the objectives of the legislation. The petitioner also contended that the Rule imposes unreasonable restrictions on the discretion vested in the Collector under Section 36A (2) of the Code, which permits transfers in prescribed circumstances.
In support of these claims, the petitioner cited multiple precedents, including Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, and Shri Rama Sugar Industries Ltd v. State of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner further sought the court's indulgence to read down Rule 4(1)(a)(i) to allow discretion in exceptional or deserving cases.
Representing the State of Maharashtra, the learned Advocate General argued in defence of the Rule, stating it was backed by a clear legislative intent to protect tribals from exploitation, a rationale well within the scope of Article 46 of the Constitution. Referring to the legislative history and the report of a government-appointed committee from 1971, the State contended that the provision was based on ground realities that necessitated preventing accumulation of agricultural land by non-tribals, which could lead to the exploitation of tribals.
The Advocate General noted that the provision did not impose an absolute ban, as tribals could transfer occupancy to other tribals without any such restriction. He relied on judgments such as Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra, Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde, and Atul Projects India Ltd v. Babu Dewoo Farle, to demonstrate that legislative safeguards for tribals had withstood constitutional scrutiny in the past.
The State further maintained that the discretion afforded to the Collector was not illusory but well within the legislative framework that allowed the Collector to assess applications based on the stated criteria. It was also argued that judicially reading down the Rule was unnecessary since the Rule itself was valid and not ultra vires the Constitution.
In rejoinder, the petitioner argued that the restriction lacked justification in the current factual matrix, where both parties had voluntarily agreed to the transfer for agricultural use. The petitioner stated that the transferee had been tilling the land for decades and intended to continue its agricultural use.
The Court observed that "there is no prohibition on the transfer of a tribal occupancy. A tribal is free to transfer his occupancy in favour of another tribal. It is only when a tribal intends to transfer his occupancy to a non-tribal that the previous sanction of the Collector is necessary." The Bench noted that "this provision has been found to be constitutionally valid" and that "the restriction placed on grant of sanction to the transfer of occupancy by way of sale in favour of non-tribal only when the transferee intends to use it for non-agricultural purpose is legally justifiable."
The Court recorded that "the object behind the same appears to be to prevent non-tribals from accumulating agricultural lands of tribals which could result in future exploitation of tribals and requiring them to undertake agricultural operations on the very lands of which they were owners." Further, the Court noted that "modern agricultural activities could be undertaken by non-tribals after purchasing such lands from tribals which would then affect the agricultural income of tribals in the vicinity."
The judgment further clarified: "In our view, the restriction placed on the Collector while granting sanction to the transfer of occupancy by sale by a tribal in favour of a non-tribal who intends to use it for agricultural purpose is reasonable in nature and does not fall foul of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."
On the matter of discretion, the Court stated: "Within the contingencies indicated in Rule 4(1), the Collector has the entire discretion and he can consider the request for grant of sanction for transfer under Section 36A of the Code." It added: "The question of exercising discretion would therefore be only within the permissible limits of Rule 4(1)(a)(i) and not de hors the same."
In dealing with the petitioner's request to read down the rule, the Court held: "Once it is found that the restriction placed on a tribal on the transfer of his occupancy to a non-tribal for agricultural purpose is reasonable in nature, it cannot be said that the discretion to be exercised by the Collector in this regard is restricted."
The Court also noted: "Individual hardship by itself cannot be a ground to hold a provision to be invalid or unworkable especially in the light of the fact that such provision has been enacted keeping in mind the Directive Principles under Article 46 of the Constitution of India for the larger good and welfare of tribals."
In its final directive, the Court stated: "We do not find any merit whatsoever in the challenge raised to the validity of Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Rules of 1975." It held that "the writ petition is therefore dismissed."
It further observed: "In absence of any bar for a tribal to transfer his occupancy in favour of another tribal who can continue to use such land for agricultural purpose, such restriction on the transfer in favour of a non-tribal by way of sale if the land is to be used for agricultural purpose does not suffer from the vice of classification." The court concluded that "the challenge to Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Rules of 1975 on that count cannot be accepted."
Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the validity of the impugned rule.
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioners: Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud with Ms. Unnati Ghia and Mr. Subodh Kurudkar, Advocates, i/by Kurudkar Associates
For the Respondents: Dr. Birendra B. Saraf, Advocate General, with Ms. Neha S. Bhide, Government Pleader, Mr. A.I. Patel, Additional Government Pleader, Mr. Vaibhav Charalwar, 'B' Panel Counsel and Mrs. M.S. Bane, Assistant Government Pleader; Mr. Dharmesh Pandya with Ms. Tejal Pandya, Advocates, i/by Ashwin Pandya & Associates.
Case Title: Mahendarsingh Digvijaysingh Mukne v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025: BHC-AS:22208-DB
Case Number: Writ Petition No.2727 of 2018
Bench: Justice A.S. Chandurkar and Justice Rajesh S. Patil
[Read/Download order]
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