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No Exclusive Right Over Descriptive ‘Glucose’ Marks : Himachal Pradesh High Court Declines Zydus’ Interim Relief In Glucon-D vs Glucose-D Trademark Dispute

No Exclusive Right Over Descriptive ‘Glucose’ Marks : Himachal Pradesh High Court Declines Zydus’ Interim Relief In Glucon-D vs Glucose-D Trademark Dispute

Sanchayita Lahkar

 

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh Single Bench of Justice Sandeep Sharma, in an order dated November 11, 2025, declined the request for interim relief made by the petitioner company seeking to prevent the respondent from marketing glucose-based products under the names “Glucose-D” and “Glucose-C.” The Court noted that no exclusive proprietary claim can be asserted over descriptive expressions relating to glucose products. The dispute concerned allegations that the respondent’s use of the impugned marks and packaging created a likelihood of confusion with the petitioner’s established energy-drink brands. The Bench ultimately refused to restrain the respondent at this stage, holding that the petitioner had not demonstrated a prima facie right to bar the use of such descriptive terms.

 

The matter arose from a commercial suit filed by the plaintiff’s seeking protection of their registered trademarks “Glucon-D” and “Glucon-C,” alleging that the defendants were manufacturing and selling energy drink powder under the marks “Glucose-D” and “Glucose-C” using what the plaintiffs described as deceptively similar packaging and trade dress. The plaintiffs submitted that they had long-standing registrations for their marks and substantial market presence and contended that the defendants’ adoption of identical suffixes “D” and “C,” together with similar colour combinations, placement of elements, and overall packaging layout, amounted to infringement, passing off, and copyright violation.

 

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The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants’ products were offered in orange and green variants similar to their own and that the competing packaging depicted pictorial representations similar in orientation and appearance. They relied upon trademark registrations, sales invoices, market presence, and samples of both product variants to assert imitation. They invoked provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 relating to trademark infringement and passing off, asserting statutory rights flowing from registration as well as common-law rights arising from use.

 

The defendants submitted that “glucose powder” was a descriptive product and argued that the plaintiffs could not claim exclusivity over the words “Glucose-D” or “Glucose-C,” particularly when the latter were not registered trademarks of the plaintiffs. They submitted that their packaging was distinctive and bore multiple differences, including brand names, logos, and distinct artistic features. They further contended that the plaintiffs had suppressed material facts by not disclosing that they themselves did not hold registrations over “Glucose-D” or “Glucose-C.”

 

The Court examined the rival marks, packaging samples, supporting documents, sales material, and the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations. The Court assessed whether the plaintiffs could claim an interim injunction restraining the defendants from manufacturing or selling products under the impugned marks pending trial.

 

The Court recorded that “plaintiffs have placed on record photographs of their product bearing the trademark ‘Glucon-D’ and ‘Glucon-C’, whereas defendants are using ‘Glucose-D’ and ‘Glucose-C’.” It observed that “prima facie, the rival trademarks are not identical.” The Court stated that “the only commonality is the word ‘Glucose’ which is publici juris.”

 

The Court recorded that “the plaintiffs have not placed on record any material to show that they have registration of the marks ‘Glucose-D’ or ‘Glucose-C’, which are the very marks now complained of.” It further noted that “no prima facie case is made out that defendants have copied any registered trademark of the plaintiffs.”

 

The Court stated that “in an action for interim injunction, the Court must be satisfied that the plaintiff has a prima facie case, that balance of convenience is in its favour, and that irreparable loss would be caused.”

 

On the plaintiffs’ reliance on trade dress, the Court observed that “a bare perusal of the two packagings shows that the brand names are different, the logos are different, and the overall get-up is also different.” It recorded that “the colour combination adopted by the defendants is not uncommon in the trade of glucose powder.”

 

The Court stated that “use of the letter D or C is not exclusive to the plaintiffs and has not been shown to be associated only with their goods.” It further observed that “plaintiffs have failed to prima facie demonstrate that any essential or distinctive feature of their packaging has been copied.”

 

The Court recorded that “infringement of a registered mark must be shown with respect to the registered mark and not with respect to an unregistered variant.”

 

Regarding passing off, the Court stated that “plaintiffs have not demonstrated that defendants intended to ride upon their reputation or cause confusion.” The Court observed that “the rival packagings contain distinct brand names, and a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection is unlikely to be deceived.”

 

It finally recorded that “the plaintiffs have not satisfied the three-fold test for grant of interim injunction.”

 

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The Court stated that “in view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction.” It recorded that “Respondents are however directed to maintain accounts in respect of sale of the products and to furnish copy of such accounts to the plaintiff. The application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is dismissed.”

 

“Any observation made herein above shall not be construed to be a reflection on the merits of the case and shall remain confined to the disposal of the present application alone.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Plaintiff: Mr. Guru Natraj, Ms. Shradha Karol and Mr. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan, Advocates.

For the Defendant: Mr. Neeraj K. Grover, Advocate and Mr. Yash Sharma, Advocate.

 

Case Title: Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. v. Leeford Healthcare Ltd.

Neutral Citation: 2025: HHC:37871

Case Number: COMS No. 63 of 2023

Bench: Justice Sandeep Sharma

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