Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Karnataka Single Bench of  Justice M. Nagaprasanna held that Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) cannot claim immunity under Article 194(2) of the Constitution for criminal acts unrelated to their legislative duties. The Court rejected the petition seeking quashing of criminal proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, and various sections of the Indian Penal Code. It was directed that prosecution will continue as per law, finding no merit in the claim of privilege or immunity.

The case arises from a criminal petition filed by Sri C.T. Ravi, a Member of the Legislative Council of the State of Karnataka, seeking quashing of Crime No.186/2024 registered against him. The allegations relate to incidents that occurred on 19.12.2024 during the session of the Vidhana Parishad.

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It was alleged by the second respondent, Smt. Laxmi R. Hebbalkar, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, that during the adjournment of the Legislative Council session, the petitioner made utterances that undermined the dignity of the Vidhana Parishad and outraged her modesty. It was claimed that the petitioner shouted offensive words against the complainant in the House.

Following the incident, a complaint was registered before the Bagewadi Police Station at Belagavi. The offences alleged were under Sections 75 and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The investigation was entrusted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and complaint on the primary ground that the utterances allegedly made by him were protected under Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India. He contended that no proceedings could be initiated against him in any court for anything said in the legislature.

It was argued by the petitioner that the matter had already been considered by the Chairman of the Legislative Council, who had closed the issue, observing that nothing untoward had occurred during the Council session. The petitioner submitted that the Chairman’s findings, rendered in the exercise of the House’s privileges, precluded any external investigation or criminal proceedings.

Further, the petitioner contended that requiring him to provide a voice sample for investigation violated his constitutional rights and was unwarranted when the incident occurred within the privileged domain of legislative proceedings.

The State, through the Special Public Prosecutor, opposed the petition, arguing that parliamentary privilege does not extend to immunize a legislator from criminal liability where the acts alleged amount to outraging the modesty of a woman through spoken words. It was submitted that privileges under Article 194 must have a nexus with the collective functioning of the House, and criminal acts are outside the protection afforded.

The State contended that the privilege cannot be used as a shield to escape prosecution for acts that would otherwise constitute criminal offences under the general law. It relied on the nature of the allegation—that the petitioner had used the word "prostitute" against the complainant—to assert that the offence attracted Section 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and warranted investigation.

The complainant, represented through Senior Counsel, supported the State’s contentions and submitted that if such acts were permitted under the guise of legislative privilege, it would lead to grave injustice and erode the dignity of women legislators. The complainant contended that the allegations, if proven, would amount to outraging her modesty and could not be protected under the constitutional privileges.

It was emphasized that the incident did not pertain to the discharge of legislative functions or the exercise of free speech within the scope of debates, voting, or discussions recognized by the House’s procedures.

The Court also noted that, according to the materials placed on record, the Chairman of the Legislative Council’s closure of the matter pertained only to internal House management and did not preclude criminal investigation if a cognizable offence was alleged.

The petitioner relied upon multiple precedents, including Surendra Mohanty v. Nabakrishna Choudhury, Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, Sita Soren v. Union of India, and A.K. Subbaiah v. Chairman, Karnataka Legislative Council, to argue that absolute immunity is available for anything spoken inside the House.

The State and the complainant relied on judgments such as State of Kerala v. K. Ajith, A. Kunjan Nadar v. State, and Lokayukta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, to argue that criminal conduct within the precincts of the legislature is not protected.

On the basis of these contentions, the matter was placed before the High Court for decision on whether the prosecution should proceed or be quashed under the shield of Article 194(2).

The Karnataka High Court, after considering the submissions and the legal precedents, examined in detail the constitutional position concerning legislative privileges, particularly under Article 194(2) of the Constitution. The Bench began by acknowledging the fundamental purpose of privileges, stating:

"Privileges are protective shields and not swords of aggression against public order and criminal law."

The Court examined the historical evolution of privileges and clarified that they exist to ensure the independence and freedom of debate within legislatures but do not confer unrestricted immunity. It stated: "Privileges are not a mark of status which makes legislators stand on an unequal pedestal. They are not islands shielding those inside from ordinary law."

On the scope of immunity under Article 194(2), the Court held:

"The expressions 'anything' and 'any' must be read in the context of the accompanying expressions in Articles 105(2) and 194(2). The words 'in respect of' mean arising out of or bearing a clear relation to and cannot be interpreted to mean anything remotely connected to the speech or vote."

Relying on judgments including Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha, R v. Chaytor, and Bradlaugh v. Gossett, the Court held that immunity does not extend to acts of criminality, even if committed inside the legislature. It stated:

"The House does not assert exclusive jurisdiction to deal with criminal conduct. Criminal offences committed within the precincts of the House may be prosecuted."

Discussing the Indian context, the Court observed: "Privileges in India have constitutional, not ancient origins. They are subject to judicial review and must conform to constitutional norms."

Referring to Sita Soren v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that bribery and criminal acts are not covered by parliamentary privileges. It noted: "Bribery is not rendered immune under Article 105(2) and Article 194 because a Member engaging in bribery commits a crime which is not essential to casting the vote or making a speech."

Applying this reasoning to the present case, the Court held: "A criminal offence within the precincts of the House does not hold an absolute privilege. The immunity applies only to acts tethered to collective legislative functioning and essential parliamentary duties."

The Court rejected the argument that the Chairman’s closure of the issue in the House precluded criminal prosecution. It observed: "Internal House management or discipline does not oust the jurisdiction of criminal courts where offences under general law are alleged."

In addressing the contention regarding potential misuse and harassment of legislators, the Court observed: "The possibility of misuse does not justify absolute immunity. Legislators, like all other citizens, are subject to the ordinary law of the land."

Finally, distilling the principles from the precedents and applying them to the facts, the Court stated: "The acts alleged — uttering of offensive words and outraging the modesty of a woman legislator — are ordinary crimes and cannot be cloaked with immunity under Article 194(2)."

Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution was maintainable, observing: "Immunity under Article 194(2) does not extend to criminal conduct not directly related to legislative debates or voting. The prosecution must continue as per law."

Before issuing its final directions, the Karnataka High Court reflected on the constitutional philosophy underlying legislative privileges. The Court, speaking to the tension between immunity and accountability, observed:

"In the grand tapestry or the labyrinth of democracy, the privilege of legislative speech is a vital thread. Therefore, it must be woven with the fibers of responsibility and ethical conduct."

It noted that while privileges shield legislative freedom, they do not provide sanctuary for unlawful behaviour. The Court stated:

"The legislature is an exalted forum for deliberation, not a forum for personal vilification. While this Court will always remain the sentinel of legislative autonomy, it cannot permit invocation of privilege to stymie the imperatives of justice."

The judgment closed its reflections with a clear declaration of constitutional balance, remarking:

"The legislature is not a sanctuary for defamation or gendered invective, rather an institution where robust debate must be tempered with decorum and respect. I find neither in the alleged acts of the petitioner."

The Court issued the following orders:

The writ petition filed seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings was dismissed in unequivocal terms. The Court held: "For the aforesaid reasons, the petition lacking in merit should necessarily meet its rejection. It is accordingly rejected."

The Court clarified that the rejection of the writ petition was confined to the issue of immunity under Article 194(2) and would not impact the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and contentions on merits. It recorded: "It is made clear the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of considering the case of the petitioner under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The observations would not influence or bind the investigating agency or the concerned Court."

All interim orders granted during the pendency of the writ petition were vacated: "Interim order of any kind operating, shall stand dissolved."

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Consequently, the prosecution initiated against the petitioner in Crime No.186/2024 for offences under Sections 75 and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, was permitted to continue in accordance with law.

Finally, the Court recorded that the petitioner would be free to urge all defences before the trial court, which would consider them independently: "All contentions on merits are left open to be raised by the petitioners before the trial court, which shall consider the same uninfluenced by any observations herein."

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Prabhuling K. Navadgi, Senior Advocate assisted by Siddharth Suman, Advocate

For the Respondents: B.A. Belliappa, State Public Prosecutor, B.N. Jagadeesha, Additional State Public Prosecutor, K.N. Phaneendra, Senior Advocate

Case Title: Sri C.T. Ravi v. State of Karnataka and Others

Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 791 of 2025

Bench: Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Keywords: Article 194(2), Legislative Privilege, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Outraging Modesty, Criminal Prosecution, Karnataka High Court, Justice M. Nagaprasanna 

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