“No Order Could Have Been Passed…Without Leading Evidence”: Delhi High Court Stays BCI Direction Prohibiting Punjab-Based Lawyer from Legal Practice
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Mini Pushkarna suspended the operation of paragraph 15(iv) of an order passed by the Bar Council of India, which had prohibited a petitioner from engaging in legal practice pending disciplinary proceedings. The Court issued notice in a writ petition challenging the BCI’s decision and directed that the specific clause prohibiting the petitioner from legal practice shall remain suspended until the next date of hearing.
The petitioner filed the writ petition challenging two specific decisions: the order dated 27 February 2025 passed by the Bar Council of India (BCI) and the order dated 23 March 2024 issued by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. The impugned BCI order had dismissed the petitioner’s Revision Petition No. 21/2024 and imposed additional directions, including barring the petitioner from practicing law during the pendency of certain proceedings.
The petitioner’s counsel, led by a Senior Advocate, placed before the Court the operative portion of paragraph 15 of the BCI’s order dated 27 February 2025. This portion included five directives, the relevant one being sub-paragraph (iv), which stated that the petitioner was “prohibited from doing legal practice as they may tamper with the evidence, and moreover, statedly, he is very popular and dominant in District Bar Association, Rohtak.”
The BCI had simultaneously directed the Secretary of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana to lodge a police complaint, preferably with the Vigilance Department of Police, against the petitioner. It had also requested the Chairman of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana to initiate proceedings under Section 35 of the Advocates Act against certain respondents and conclude those proceedings preferably within six months.
The petitioner’s counsel argued that the BCI, by imposing the prohibition on legal practice without initiating a formal inquiry or providing an opportunity to present evidence, had acted without jurisdiction. In support of this submission, the petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another, (1998) 4 SCC 409.
Relying particularly on paragraph 76 of the said judgment, counsel submitted that the issue of professional misconduct must be tried by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council in accordance with the Advocates Act, 1961. The petitioner argued that without such a trial and without any evidence being led before a Disciplinary Committee, a bar on legal practice cannot be imposed.
The petitioner submitted that the Supreme Court had held in the above case that “a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of a criminal case by a court of law” and that “an advocate may be punished on the basis of evidence led before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council after being afforded an opportunity of hearing.”
The petitioner’s legal team submitted that the impugned direction had the effect of prejudging guilt without due process. Further, it was submitted that the direction was passed in the absence of a completed disciplinary inquiry and contrary to the statutory framework prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961.
The BCI’s directive also requested the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana to issue a show cause notice to the then-President of the Bar Association, seeking an explanation as to why he should not be barred from contesting or holding any position in the Bar Association for alleged failure to act impartially.
Notice was accepted on behalf of all respondents by their respective counsel. The Court granted four weeks for filing replies and an additional two weeks for the petitioner to file a rejoinder, if any.
The Court took note of the contentions raised by the petitioner and referred to paragraph 76 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, which was cited by the petitioner. In that paragraph, the Supreme Court stated, “A complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council...after being afforded an opportunity of hearing.” The judgment further recorded, “It is therefore, not permissible for this Court to punish an advocate for ‘professional misconduct’ in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body exercising ‘original jurisdiction’.”
It was also observed that “an advocate may be punished on the basis of evidence led before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council.”
The High Court recorded the petitioner’s submission that, based on the above principles, “no order could have been passed by the BCI debarring the petitioner from practicing” without the matter being duly tried before the Disciplinary Committee and in the absence of evidence or hearing.
The Court issued notice in the matter and passed the following directive:
“Considering the submissions made before this Court, it is directed that Para 15(iv) of the impugned order dated 27th February, 2025, shall remain suspended, till the next date of hearing.”
The case was directed to be listed on 1 August 2025. Time was granted to the respondents to file replies within four weeks, with liberty to the petitioner to file a rejoinder within two weeks thereafter.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Mohit Mathur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nipun Arora, Mr. Shivender Gupta, Mr. Aman Singh, Ms. Kesri Gupta, Mr. Chinmay Dubey, Mr. Harsh Gautam, and Mr. Vignesh, Advocates with the petitioner in person
For the Respondents: Mr. Preet Pal Singh, Advocate Mr. HPS Ishar, Mr. Jasbir Singh Malik with Ms. Rhythm Bharadwaj, Advocates
Case Title: Lokinder Singh Phougat v. Bar Council of India & Ors.
Case Number: W.P.(C) 4154/2025
Bench: Justice Mini Pushkarna
[Read/Download order]
