No Proximate Instigation Or Mens Rea Made Out | Bombay High Court Quashes FIR And Chargesheet Against Businessman Named In Suicide Note
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Bombay Division Bench of Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale quashed the FIR and subsequent chargesheet registered against the petitioner for offences under Sections 306 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. The Court directed that there was no prima facie case made out against the petitioner and accordingly held that the proceedings instituted against him warranted termination in the interest of justice. The Division Bench found that even assuming the prosecution's case as it stood, the alleged acts of the petitioner did not constitute the requisite ingredients of abetment to suicide or criminal intimidation. The Bench accordingly allowed the writ petition and directed the quashing of FIR C.R. No. 515 of 2017 registered with Khar Police Station, Mumbai, and the charge-sheet filed pursuant to it.
The petitioner, a businessman engaged in manufacturing electrical control panels under the name 'Elec Mac Corporation', approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the FIR registered against him under Sections 306, 506(2), and 34 of the IPC. The FIR was based on allegations arising out of the suicide of Navroz Tejani, a businessman operating 'Tejani Stores' in Bandra for over five decades.
According to the record, the petitioner had a longstanding acquaintance with the deceased and his family, marked by cordial relations that eventually deteriorated following monetary transactions. The petitioner had advanced several loans to Navroz Tejani and his son Arshad Tejani. While one such loan was documented through a written agreement, a prior sum of Rs.25 lakhs extended by the petitioner's wife was initially informal but later incorporated into a formal agreement dated 17 March 2017.
On 24 July 2017, Navroz Tejani committed suicide. His son Arshad’s statement was recorded the same day, wherein no allegations were made against any person. Subsequently, the deceased's family relocated from Khar to Bandra on 1 September 2017. While unpacking at their new residence on 10 December 2017, the deceased's wife, Nazeem Navroz Tejani, allegedly discovered a suicide note.
Based on this suicide note, an FIR was lodged on 22 December 2017 by Nazeem Tejani at Khar Police Station. The FIR named several individuals including the petitioner. Investigation commenced, and the police relied mainly on the suicide note and the statement of Ranchod Himaram Parmar, a staff member at Tejani Stores, recorded on 28 January 2018.
In the suicide note, the deceased wrote that several individuals, including the petitioner, had taken money from him, cheated him, and threatened him. Specifically, the note recorded: "Nishit Patel was also very harsh in collecting his interest money, did not cooperate at all." The note also included a statement exonerating family members: "No one from my family is responsible for the step I am taking."
The statement of Ranchod Parmar asserted that the deceased had borrowed a significant amount from the petitioner and that despite repeated requests to lower the interest rate, the petitioner refused. Parmar also alleged that the petitioner, among others, subjected the deceased to mental harassment over financial dues.
The prosecution relied solely on the suicide note and the statement of Parmar to attribute criminal liability to the petitioner. The petitioner, in turn, contended that the documents did not disclose any offence under the IPC and that the case fell within the parameters established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, justifying the invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction to quash proceedings.
The Court recorded: "Having perused the charge-sheet in particular, the suicide note and the statement of Ranchod Parmar relied upon by the prosecution, to show the petitioner’s complicity and the law in this regard, we are of the opinion that taking the prosecution case as it stands, no offence as alleged is disclosed qua the petitioner."
The Bench elaborated on the essential ingredients for invoking Section 306 IPC by referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 IPC: "The act of instigation, in order to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC, is required to be of such an intensity, so as to push the deceased to such perplexity under which he has no choice, but, to commit suicide."
The Court further observed: "Such instigation must also be in close proximity to the act and time of suicide... All of this is absent in the facts of this case."
Relying on a series of decisions including Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2025 SC 568 and Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438, the Bench reiterated: "Mere allegation or accusation of harassment made by the deceased prior to his death, cannot be held as the fulcrum of an offence under Section 306 of IPC."
With reference to Prakash and Others v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3835, the Court stated: "To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased."
The judgment also cited Ude Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301: "If the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC."
The Bench examined whether the statement of Ranchod Parmar provided any evidence indicating such instigation and found: "The statement of Ranchod Parmar does not reveal when the petitioner had come to the shop and demanded money. Nor, does the suicide note reveal any proximity between the petitioner’s act and the deceased committing suicide."
The Court held that the mental torture alleged by Parmar was insufficient to constitute abetment, citing Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2024) 3 SCC 573: "Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused... conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
Finally, the Bench concluded that even if the prosecution case was accepted as true, "the act of the petitioner be said to constitute an act of instigation towards the deceased compelling him to commit suicide... is completely amiss."
The Division Bench concluded that the evidence produced by the prosecution did not meet the threshold for proceeding under Sections 306 or 506(2) IPC. Accordingly, the Court issued the following directions:
"The petition is allowed."
"The FIR bearing C.R. No.515 of 2017, registered with the Khar Police Station, Mumbai, is quashed and set aside and consequently the charge-sheet filed qua the petitioner, is also quashed and set-aside."
"Rule is made absolute on the aforesaid terms. Petition is accordingly disposed of."
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Rahul Moghe a/w Ms. Kalyani Rathod
For the Respondents: Ms. S. S. Kaushik, APP; Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh
Case Title: Nishit Patel v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025: BHC-AS:24054-DB
Case Number: Criminal Writ Petition No. 3388 of 2024
Bench: Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale
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