Safiya Malik

The High Court of Karnataka at Dharwad, Single Bench of Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde allowed a challenge to a trial court order and permitted amendment of the plaint, even though the request was made after commencement of trial and about a decade after the suit was filed. The dispute concerns a civil suit relating to rights over the suit property, where the plaintiffs sought to introduce additional pleadings and reliefs through an amendment application. Referring to Order VI Rule 17 CPC on amendment of pleadings, the Court held that the proviso’s due diligence requirement does not apply uniformly to every post-trial amendment request and that, in appropriate cases, such amendments can still be allowed. The amendment was permitted subject to costs, with liberty to the defendants to respond.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that a sale deed executed on 24.04.2009 by their predecessor in favour of the defendants was liable to be cancelled, along with a consequential injunction restraining interference with possession. The defendants contested the suit, asserting title and possession on the basis of the same sale deed.

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During the course of trial, after examination of witnesses, the plaintiffs filed an application seeking amendment of the plaint. By the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs sought to plead that they were dispossessed from the suit property during the pendency of the suit and to incorporate a consequential prayer for possession. The defendants opposed the application, contending that the plaintiffs had admitted dispossession prior to the suit and that the amendment was belated, time-barred, and altered the nature of the suit.

The Trial Court rejected the amendment application on the grounds of lack of due diligence, delay, alleged withdrawal of admissions, and lack of necessity for adjudication. Aggrieved by the rejection of the amendment application, the plaintiffs approached the High Court invoking its supervisory jurisdiction, challenging the order passed on the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Court framed the central issue as “Whether the ‘due diligence test’ envisaged in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applies to every application seeking amendment of pleadings filed after commencement of trial.” The Court recorded that “the proviso was introduced to prevent misuse of the provision for amendment with an intention to delay proceedings.”

While examining the scope of the proviso, the Court observed that “on a careful analysis, it appears that in certain circumstances, applications filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code seeking amendment post commencement of trial need not pass the test of due diligence contemplated under the proviso.” The Court further stated that “whether an application seeking amendment post commencement of trial is to be allowed or not has to be decided on the nature of amendment sought and not necessarily on the due diligence test.”

The Court noted that the main object of Order VI Rule 17 continued to be “to decide the real questions in controversy and to avoid multiplicity of litigation.” It recorded that “a plain and strict application of the proviso in every case would defeat the very object of the main provision.” Referring to illustrative categories, the Court observed that amendments relating to subsequent events, correction of descriptions, or incorporation of consequential reliefs could be permitted even after commencement of trial.

On the issue of delay, the Court observed that “once the application is found to be within the period of limitation, the number of years spent before filing the application may not matter, but the nature of the amendment may matter.” It further stated that “delay of ten years in filing the application seeking amendment is not fatal when the relief sought is possession.”

Addressing the contention regarding admissions, the Court recorded that “the Court is not required to determine the merits of the proposed amendment while considering the application.” It clarified that “permitting the amendment does not amount to recording a finding on the correctness of the plea regarding dispossession.” The Court also observed that “every amendment which appears to take away an admission is not impermissible and must be examined in the context of the facts of the case.”

On the nature of the suit, the Court observed that “a change in the nature of relief shall not be considered as a change in the nature of the suit so long as the basic structure of the claim remains the same.”

The Court directed that “the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 06.09.2025 passed on I.A. No.7 filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in O.S. No.188/2015 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Hungund, is set aside.”

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“The application seeking amendment of the plaint is allowed subject to the plaintiffs paying costs of Rs.7,000/- to the defendants.” It was further directed that “the defendants are permitted to file an additional written statement.”

“The Court has not expressed any opinion as to whether the plaintiffs have been dispossessed in the year 2014 or in the year 2022,” and further directed that “that question has to be decided based on the evidence.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Sri Pranav Badagi, Advocate for Sri S.B. Hebballi, Advocate
For the Respondents: Sri Maqboolhamed M. Patil, Advocate

Case Title: Mohammadrafi & Another v. Bandenawaz & Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: KHC-D:18339
Case Number: Writ Petition No.108512 of 2025
Bench: Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde