Orissa High Court Directs Grant-In-Aid For Unaided Girls Schools | State Cannot Discriminate Among Similarly Situated Institutions | Tribunal’s Order Upheld For Equitable Relief
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Orissa Single Bench of Justice Biraja Prasanna Satapathy has directed the State authorities to extend the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under the 1994 Order to the employees and institutions involved in the present batch of appeals. In a comprehensive judgment dated 23 June 2025, the Court held that respondents in these cases are entitled to the same treatment as other similarly situated schools that have already received such benefits following Tribunal orders.
The Court dismissed all appeals filed by the State challenging Tribunal decisions that had granted relief under the 1994 Grant-in-Aid Order. Simultaneously, it allowed appeals challenging Tribunal orders where relief had been denied, thereby reversing those decisions. The Court specifically directed the State to extend the benefits previously granted via notification dated 24 June 2017 to the petitioners in the current batch of cases. The State is mandated to complete this process within four months from receipt of the Court's order.
The appeals were filed against decisions passed by the State Education Tribunal involving Grant-in-Aid (GIA) claims under the GIA Order, 1994. While the State challenged orders allowing such claims, affected employees and institutions contested decisions denying similar relief. These appeals were consolidated for hearing and disposal due to the identical nature of the issues involved. FAO No.281 of 2018 was treated as the lead case.
The primary contention of the State was that the eligibility of the respondent institution, Jayadev Girls' High School, Barahipur, Cuttack, for GIA from 01.06.1994 under the 1994 Order, was not sufficient for actual grant disbursement. The Tribunal had allowed the institution's claim in GIA Case No.43 of 2012 by its judgment dated 04.10.2017, prompting the State’s challenge.
The State argued that eligibility under the 1994 Order does not confer an absolute right to receive Grant-in-Aid. Citing Section 7-C(1) of the Odisha Education Act, 1969, the State submitted that the Government has discretion to allocate funds based on its economic capacity. The school was later found eligible under the 2004 GIA Order and notified for Block Grant from 01.01.2004, which had been accepted. According to the State, the 1994 Order had been repealed by 05.02.2004, and any subsequent claim should be governed by the 2004 Order.
Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Anup Kumar Senapati v. State of Odisha, (2019) 19 SCC 626, the State contended that only institutions already receiving Grant-in-Aid prior to the 1994 Order’s repeal retained the right to continue such benefits. New claims under the repealed order were impermissible. It was asserted that rights under a repealed statute do not survive unless specifically saved, and mere eligibility without actual receipt did not qualify as an accrued right.
Additionally, the State referred to its earlier resolutions including those dated 17.03.1979 and 23.09.1981, which governed eligibility norms for Grant-in-Aid prior to the 1994 Order. It also stated that institutions seeking recognition had provided undertakings under Section 6-A (2) of the Act that they would not claim Grant-in-Aid from the Government.
In response, the respondents argued that the school had obtained permission for Class VIII during the 1988-89 academic session and was recognized by the Board of Secondary Education in 1993. By virtue of Clause 12 of the 1994 Order, they were eligible for Grant-in-Aid from 01.06.1994. Supporting documents included letters from the Director of Secondary Education dated 05.01.1995 and 29.06.1995 listing 109 unaided Girls' High Schools as eligible.
Only five of those schools were granted aid under the 1994 Order via notification dated 04.07.1998, with four more added subsequently. The remaining 100 were included in a 2004 notification under the new GIA Order, receiving Block Grants from 22.09.2007 pursuant to the Amendment Order of 2007.
The respondents submitted that despite approval of their services from 01.06.1994, they were denied GIA under the 1994 Order while similarly situated schools were granted such relief following favourable Tribunal orders affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. Examples included GIA Case Nos. 368/2011, 219/2011, and 281/2009. The State eventually modified its earlier notifications and extended GIA benefits to 29 Girls' High Schools through notification dated 24.06.2017.
Further reliance was placed on judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, State of Karnataka v. C. Lalitha, Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, and Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi v. State of Manipur. These decisions affirm that similarly situated persons should receive similar benefits, even absent individual litigation.
The Court noted that in terms of paragraph 12 of the 1994 Order, 109 Girls’ High Schools were initially identified as eligible. It stated, "As found in terms of para 12 of 1994 Order, 109 Girls’ High Schools were initially held eligible to get the benefit of Grant-in-aid under the 1994 Order."
Five were granted GIA through a 1998 notification, and four more were added later. The remaining 100 were brought under the 2004 GIA Order. However, "a fresh notification was issued by the Department on 22.09.2007, making eligible 100 unaided Girls’ High Schools to get the benefit of Block Grant under Amendment Order, 2007."
The Court further observed, "Basing on such notification issued on 22.09.2007, services of the respondents though was approved w.e.f 01.06.1994, but they were held eligible to get the benefit of Block Grant w.e.f 22.09.2007."
It noted the Government’s decision via its notification dated 24.06.2017 to grant GIA benefits to 29 schools based on orders from the Tribunal, High Court, and Supreme Court. The Court stated, "... it is the view of this Court that the respondents herein are liable to get similar benefit as has been allowed by the Tribunal."
In addressing the applicability of Anup Kumar Senapati, the Court recorded, "decision in the case of Anup Kumar Senapati cannot be taken as a complete Bar in those cases where the employees and/or institutions were otherwise eligible to get the benefit of grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994 and recommendation has been made by the respective Directorate prior to such repealing of GIA Order, 1994."
On the issue of equality, the Court placed reliance on various Supreme Court decisions. Quoting Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak, the Court stated: "On accepting the said decision, the respondent-Corporation should have uniformly applied and granted the benefit to all its similarly situated employees affected by the order dated 28th October 2010."
Similarly, it quoted Ram Gopal to observe: "The State and its instrumentalities are expected in such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts."
The Court concluded its reasoning with the observation: "this Court placing reliance on the decision in the case of Arvind Srivastav, C. Lalita as well as Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak, Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi and Ram Gopal... is of the view that the respondents herein being similarly situated as like the 29 schools who were extended with the benefit... cannot be discriminated."
The Court explicitly stated, "This Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment dt.06.02.2017 so passed by the Tribunal in GIA Case No.43 of 2012. While not inclined to interfere with the said order, this Court dismiss the appeal."
It further directed: "This Court is inclined to dismiss all those appeals filed by the State where similar order passed by the Tribunal is under challenge. This Court is also inclined to set aside the judgment in such appeals where similar claim has been rejected by the Tribunal."
In terms of actionable relief, the Court ordered: "this Court directs the State machineries to extend the benefit of Grant-in-aid under GIA Order, 1994 in respect of the employees and/or institutions in the present batch of appeals so extended vide notification dt.24.06.2017."
On the timeline, the Court mandated: "This Court directs the State machineries to complete the entire exercise within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of this order."
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioners: Mr. P.K. Panda, Additional Standing Counsel
For the Respondents: Mr. B. Routray, Senior Advocate with Mr. J. Biswal, Advocate
Case Title: State of Odisha & Others v. Sadhana Pradhan & Others
Case Number: FAO No.281 of 2018 & batch
Bench: Justice Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
