Orissa High Court: Time Spent Obtaining Death, Legal Heir, and Distress Certificates to Be Excluded from Limitation in Compassionate Appointment Cases
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Orissa, Single Bench of Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad directed the State Government to reconsider a woman’s claim for compassionate appointment following her father’s death in 2010 and to determine whether the time spent in securing documents such as the death, legal heir, and distress certificates should be excluded while calculating the limitation period. The Court observed that such certificates cannot reasonably be applied for in anticipation of an employee’s death, as the right to obtain them arises only after the death occurs. Drawing an analogy from the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows exclusion of time required to obtain certified copies of judicial orders, the Bench held that a similar principle could guide consideration of rehabilitation assistance claims to ensure fair and lawful adjudication.
The petitioner, Rasmita Nayak, approached the High Court after her application for compassionate appointment was rejected by the competent authority on the ground that it was time-barred under the Odisha Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules, 2020. Her father, Dhoba Nayak, who was employed as a Peon at KSUB College, Bhanjanagar, had died in harness on December 22, 2010. Following his death, the petitioner applied for a compassionate appointment on September 10, 2011, before the concerned authority.
However, her application faced opposition from one Smt. Ranjani Nayak, who claimed to be the widow of the deceased. Due to this objection, the petitioner obtained a legal heir certificate on December 27, 2012. Ranjani Nayak subsequently filed Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 2013 challenging the grant of the legal heir certificate, which was dismissed by the Sub-Collector on July 5, 2014. The Governing Body of KSUB College recommended the petitioner’s case on April 19, 2013, and it was forwarded to the Collector, Ganjam, who issued a distress certificate. Despite these developments, the Director of Higher Education rejected the application on August 3, 2021, citing delay as per Rule 7(5) of the 2020 Rules.
The petitioner contended that her claim should have been considered under the 1990 Rehabilitation Assistance Rules, not the 2020 Rules, as her father’s death occurred in 2010. She further argued that the time taken to obtain essential certificates should be excluded from the limitation period and that the government had the power to condone delay under Rule 9(11) of the 1990 Rules. The State, on the other hand, defended the rejection, arguing that the Rules prescribed a strict limitation period and that the petitioner had not sought condonation of delay.
Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad examined the entire record and observed that the petitioner’s application had been made within one year of her father’s death and that the authorities’ reasoning was legally untenable. The Court recorded that “the first contention that the application was time barred, does not merit acceptance, the same having been made within one year reckoned from the date of death of the employee in harness.”
The Court further stated that obtaining supporting documents was an unavoidable procedural necessity. “The extant Rules require that the applicant has to produce vouching material such as Death Certificate, Legal Heir Certificate, Distress Certificate... These certificates obviously have to be applied for and obtained only after the demise of the bread winner. A living person has no legal heir.” The Court added that requiring a person to procure all such documents within the prescribed time would amount to demanding the impossible. Quoting from legal maxims, the Court noted: “Law does not expect anyone to do the impossible (lex non cogit ad impossibilia).”
It recorded that “while computing the period of limitation, be it one year or two years, the time taken for procuring the requisite certificates should be excluded.” The Court cautioned that denying relief in such cases would defeat the purpose of the Rehabilitation Assistance Rules, which were promulgated as a welfare measure to assist the bereaved families of government employees.
Justice Shripad remarked that both the 1990 and 2020 Rules mention the date of death as the starting point for limitation but do not preclude exclusion of time required for obtaining certificates. Drawing an analogy from the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court said: “Although these provisions are not applicable to RA claims, analogical wisdom can be drawn from them.”
The Court found fault with the authority’s approach for ignoring the fact that the petitioner was compelled to secure her legal heir certificate only after contesting objections raised by Ranjani Nayak. “That being the position, the matter ought to have been referred to the Government for considering as to whether there was delay and if there was any, the same merited condonation.” The Court held that failing to do so amounted to a “grave legal infirmity to the enormous prejudice of the petitioner.”
Justice Shripad also observed that “while construing social welfare legislations like RA Rules, one has to take into account the realities of life and its underlying policy content and intent. Otherwise, it ceases to be ‘living law of the people’.” The judgment stated that the purpose of compassionate appointment was to provide relief to families facing sudden distress and that compassion should be the guiding principle in interpreting such laws. “Compassion should be the substratum or undercurrent,” the Court recorded, warning that literal interpretation would undermine the welfare objectives of the Constitution.
The Court concluded that applying the 2020 Rules instead of the 1990 Rules constituted “gross non-application of mind to the legal position and to the material borne out by records.” It held that “under the 1990 Rules, there is a provision for condonation of delay... whereas such a provision is conspicuously absent in 2020 Rules.” Therefore, the rejection order could not be sustained.
The Court directed that “the matter is remitted to the portal of OP No.1 and not OP No.2, with a direction to decide the same afresh within an outer limit of three months.” It further ordered that any delay in compliance would result in personal liability for the concerned officer. “If delay is brooked, OP No.1 shall pay to the petitioner Rs.500/- (rupees five hundred) only per day from his pocket and not from the public money.”
“It is open to OP Nos.1 & 2 to solicit any information or documents from the side of petitioner or from any other offices, as are required for due consideration of the matter; however, in that guise no delay shall be brooked.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: M/s. Lingaraj Mohanty, P. Pattanaik, and T. Sahoo, Advocates.
For the Opposite Parties: Mr. J.K. Khandayatray, Additional Standing Counsel.
Case Title: Rasmita Nayak v. State of Odisha & Others
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 32953 of 2024
Bench: Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad
