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Patna High Court Flags Juvenility Claim After 32 Years | Allows Convict To Seek Inquiry, Says Plea Can Be Raised At Any Stage

Patna High Court Flags Juvenility Claim After 32 Years | Allows Convict To Seek Inquiry, Says Plea Can Be Raised At Any Stage

Sanchayita Lahkar

 

The High Court of Judicature at Patna Single Bench of Justice Jitendra Kumar has directed the Juvenile Justice Board, Siwan, to conduct an inquiry to determine the juvenility of a convicted appellant in a pending criminal appeal. The direction followed an interlocutory application filed by the appellant who raised, for the first time during the appellate stage, a claim that he was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged offence.

 

Upon examining the materials submitted in support of the application—including a matriculation certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board reflecting the appellant's date of birth as 15.06.1975—the Court found that the appellant was 17 years, 11 months, and 15 days old at the time of the alleged offence on 01.06.1993. Consequently, the Court held that a prima facie case for juvenility had been established and that an inquiry was warranted under the applicable legal framework. The matter has been listed for further hearing following the submission of the Juvenile Justice Board’s report.

 

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The matter arose out of a criminal appeal filed against the conviction and sentencing order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-1, Siwan, in Sessions Trial No. 11 of 1995. The appellants had been found guilty under Sections 307, 148, 149, and 326 of the Indian Penal Code for their involvement in an alleged offence committed on 01.06.1993. The trial court sentenced each of the appellants to five years of rigorous imprisonment under Sections 307 and 326 IPC and two years under Sections 148 and 149 IPC. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

 

During the pendency of the criminal appeal, Appellant No.8 filed Interlocutory Application No. 01 of 2022, wherein he raised the plea of juvenility for the first time. The appellant annexed his matriculation certificate with the application to establish that his date of birth was 15.06.1975. Based on this document, it was asserted that the appellant was 17 years, 11 months, and 15 days old at the time of the incident and therefore entitled to claim juvenility under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as amended.

 

The appellant explained that the plea had not been raised during the trial due to lack of proper legal advice and awareness. The State, represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, opposed the application. It was contended that on the date of the alleged incident, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force, under which the age of juvenility for male offenders was 16 years. Thus, the appellant would not qualify as a juvenile under the operative law at that time. The APP further submitted that the amended definition of "juvenile" under the 2000 Act should not be applied retrospectively.

 

The Court noted that as of 01.04.2001, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 had come into force and that its provisions had been amended in 2006 to expressly apply retrospectively to pending cases. The Court stated that Section 20 of the 2000 Act and Section 25 of the 2015 Act collectively ensured that pending appeals and trials would be governed by the provisions of the 2000 Act if the accused was under 18 years on the date of the offence.


The Court recorded in several authoritative observations. "Section 20 of the Act of 2000, as amended in 2006, clearly provides for application of the Act of 2000 in all pending cases which were earlier governed by the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986." The Court further explained the statutory basis for this conclusion: "The application of the Act is not only in pending trial proceedings, but even in pending revisional and appellate proceedings."

 

With respect to the legal effect of subsequent legislation, the Court stated: "Section 25 of the Act of 2015 protects and affirms the application of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000 in the pending cases." Therefore, it was concluded that the 2000 Act governed the present case.

 

In elaborating the judicial precedents on the issue, the Court quoted from Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211: "The determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act." The Court also cited Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2011) 2 SCC 224, noting that the 2000 Act's retrospective application had been judicially recognised.

 

The judgment further discussed judgements in Abdul Razzaq v. State of U.P. (2015) 15 SCC 637, Raju v. State of Haryana (2019) 14 SCC 401, Ashok Kumar Mehra v. State of Punjab (2019) 6 SCC 132, and Satya Deo v. State of UP (2020) 10 SCC 555—each confirming that the plea of juvenility could be raised at any stage and must be adjudicated on merits.

 

The Court referred to Section 7A of the 2000 Act, observing that "a claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case." The Court reiterated that when such a claim is raised, the court "shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary... and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not."

 

Relying on Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489, the Court reiterated that even if a claim is raised for the first time before the appellate court, the courts are obligated to consider it provided the initial burden of proof is met. It was observed that a matriculation certificate is an admissible and sufficient documentary proof to prima facie satisfy the court.


The Court concluded that the appellant had discharged the initial burden of proof by submitting the matriculation certificate showing his date of birth as 15.06.1975. Accordingly, it held: "prima facie it appears that the Appellant No.8 is below 18 years of age and hence, inquiry into his juvenility is imperative before I proceed in this appeal."

 

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Allowing the application, the Court directed: "J.J. Board is directed to conduct enquiry regarding juvenility of the Appellant No.8 and send his report within three months." The Court also instructed that the inquiry should commence from 18th August, 2025, with the appellant required to appear before the Board on that date.

 

The order further stated: "Further dates for inquiry may be fixed by learned J.J. Board as per his convenience and send a report of the enquiry to this Court within three months without fail."

 

The Court scheduled the matter for further listing as follows: "List this case on 31.10.2025 awaiting the enquiry report from the Juvenile Justice Board, Siwan."

 

Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Appellants: Mr. Dewendra Narayan Singh, Advocate
For the State: Mr. Abhay Kumar, Additional Public Prosecutor


Case Title: Shiv Jee Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 67 of 2018
Bench: Justice Jitendra Kumar

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