Police Recruitment Can Be Denied To Candidate Acquitted On Benefit Of Doubt In Heinous Crime; Involvement In Moral Turpitude Sufficient Ground For Screening Committee To Reject Appointment: Supreme Court
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice N.V. Anjaria has held that an acquittal granted on the basis of benefit of doubt does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment in public service, and that mere involvement in conduct amounting to moral turpitude may itself constitute a relevant ground for assessing a candidate's fitness for employment. The Court restored the Madhya Pradesh Police Screening Committee's decision declaring a constable (driver) aspirant unfit for appointment, after the candidate had been tried for serious offences involving the kidnapping and rape of a minor girl and subsequently acquitted only on benefit of doubt.
The dispute arose from the rejection of a candidate’s candidature for appointment to the post of constable (driver) in the police force during a recruitment process initiated in 2016. The candidate had qualified in the selection process and secured a place in the merit list under the unreserved category. Before joining service, he submitted an affidavit disclosing that a criminal case had earlier been registered against him and also produced the trial court’s order acquitting him.
The criminal case related to allegations of kidnapping, criminal conspiracy, and rape of a minor girl. The trial court conducted the trial and ultimately acquitted the accused persons, including the candidate, by granting them the benefit of doubt. During the recruitment process, the screening committee undertook character verification of the candidate and examined the details of the criminal case and the nature of acquittal. On this basis, the committee treated the candidate as unsuitable for appointment in the police force and rejected his candidature.
The candidate challenged this decision before the High Court. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the acquittal was not a clean acquittal but one based on benefit of doubt and therefore the rejection of candidature was justified under the applicable police regulations. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge’s judgment and quashed the order of the screening committee, directing the authorities to reconsider the candidature by treating the acquittal as honourable. The State challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court observed that "the quality of law and order in the society and maintenance thereof depends upon the character of the persons serving in the police force" and that "recruitees in the disciplined force should be the persons beyond reproach and men with rectitude."
On the nature of the acquittal, the Court stated that "what the court held was that the charges against the four accused including the respondent herein were not proved beyond reasonable doubt." It held that "an honourable acquittal may be one where court comes to a definitive conclusion at the end of the trial upon full-fledged appreciation of evidence that the accused had not committed an offence for which he was charged," which "would stand in sharp contrast against arriving at a finding that because of some lacuna in the prosecution case or in the leading the evidence or on account of non-availability of credible evidence, the offender is not convicted by giving him the benefit of doubt." The Court further recorded that "the acquittal founded on benefit of doubt is an acquittal based on technical ground."
On what weighed with the screening committee, the Court stated that "the respondent was found to be involved in the serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt."
On the scope of the employer's discretion, the Court observed that "whether it is a question of recruiting a person into the service or continuing him in service or extending an employee some service benefit, his criminal antecedents, involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane considerations to be applied. The employer who would be acting through a screening committee to sift such cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though without becoming arbitrary."
The Court further observed that "mere involvement of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to moral turpitude without anything else may become relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the employment," and added that "in a given case where the facts are stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate to be offered employment. Antecedents of a candidate play an important role in the decision-making process by the screening committee. This dictum would operate with greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and appointment to the disciplined force like police."
On the limited scope of judicial review, the Court stated that "where the employer or the screening committee of the employer has acted to discard, exclude or reject the candidature by applying relevant considerations and has not acted arbitrarily or whimsically, the courts have no role to interpose" and that "the courts are not expected to override the wisdom of the employer in judging the suitability of a candidate and in considering the relevance of the antecedents of the candidate and would not substitute its own view."
The Court ordered that “the impugned judgment and order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court allowing Writ Appeal No. 297 of 2023 cannot be sustained in eye of law. The same is set aside. The appeal stands allowed. All Interlocutory Applications, as may be pending, will not survive in view of the disposal of the main appeal.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sarthak Raizada G.A., Adv. Mr. Sarad Kumar Singhania, AOR Mr. Anil Hooda, Adv. Ms. Mrigna Shekhar, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Santosh Kumar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajiv R. Mishra, Adv. Mr. Suruchi Yadav, Adv. Mr. Ashutosh Yadav, AOR
Case Title: The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Rajkumar Yadav
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 225
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 3279 of 2026 (@ SLP (Civil) No. 10967 of 2024)
Bench: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice N.V. Anjaria
