Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana Single Bench of Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya has dismissed a petition seeking the quashing of a criminal defamation complaint and the consequent summoning order issued by the Magistrate. The Court held that the impugned summoning order had been passed after due application of judicial mind and that the procedural and substantive grounds raised by the petitioner lacked merit.

The Court found no infirmity in the Magistrate's approach in taking cognizance of the offence based on preliminary evidence. It further held that the absence of a report from Twitter Communications India Private Limited (TCIPL) did not vitiate the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), nor did the Magistrate err in not considering the exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at the preliminary stage. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and the pending complaint proceedings were directed to continue before the competent court.

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The complaint in question was filed under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant, identifying herself as belonging to an agricultural family and actively participating in farmers' protests against Central Government legislation, alleged that the accused had defamed her by posting a retweet on the social media platform Twitter (now known as 'X'). The retweet stated: "Ha ha ha she is the same dadi who featured in Time magazine for being the most powerful Indian…. And she is available in 100 rupees. Pakistani jurno’s have hijacked international PR for India in an embarrassing way. We need our own people to speak for us internationally." This retweet included a photograph of the complainant shared by another user.

The complainant contended that she had no connection to the Shaheen Bagh protestor featured in Time Magazine and alleged that the tweet falsely imputed motives to her participation in the farmers' agitation. According to the complaint, the impugned retweet hurt her pride and reputation and subjected her to social questioning by other protestors, including witnesses cited in the complaint.

In support of her complaint, the complainant presented her own testimony (CW-1), documents including the impugned retweet (Exhibit C1), and identification documents. A fellow protestor, Gurpreet Singh (CW-2), corroborated her testimony and affirmed that he had seen the retweet on the petitioner’s official Twitter account.

Upon examination of the preliminary evidence, the Magistrate initially issued directions under Section 202 CrPC, seeking a report from the Director of Twitter Communications India Pvt. Ltd. (TCIPL) to confirm authorship of the tweet. However, TCIPL declined to furnish the requested details, stating that it only engaged in research, development, and marketing, and had no control over the contents of Twitter. It clarified that Twitter’s content was managed by Twitter Inc., based in the United States.

Despite the absence of this report, the Magistrate proceeded to issue summons against the accused, concluding that a prima facie case under Sections 499 and 500 IPC had been made out. The accused approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the complaint and the summoning order.

The petitioner raised several grounds: (i) The Magistrate violated Section 202 CrPC by issuing process without receiving the report requested from TCIPL; (ii) There was no mens rea, and the retweet was made in good faith; (iii) The Magistrate failed to consider the Ninth and Tenth Exceptions to Section 499 IPC; (iv) The order indicated non-application of mind by referring to the retweet as a tweet; and (v) The complaint was mala fide for naming only the petitioner and not the original poster.

The respondent, represented by senior counsel, countered these contentions and defended the Magistrate's order as legally sound, stating that all legal prerequisites had been satisfied, including the establishment of a prima facie case.

Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya recorded that "defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person’s reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally or which make them shun or avoid that person."

Quoting the legal benchmark under Section 499 IPC, the Court outlined the requirements: (i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person; (ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations; (iii) The said imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with the knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.

The Court observed: "Since the accused is a celebrity having an extensive fan following, the publications by her tweet invariably reach millions of people. As she holds a position of influence over the masses, she has extra responsibility on her shoulders to verify the truthfulness of the remarks made by her." It further noted: "It is evident from the evidence led by the complainant that the accused made the impugned defamatory remark without going into the truthfulness thereof and furthermore, she even failed to tender any apology to the complainant after knowing the truth."

On the procedural point regarding Section 202 CrPC, the Court cited the statutory mandate: "Before proceeding against an accused who resides beyond the Court’s jurisdiction, the Magistrate is mandatorily required to inquire into the case himself or direct investigation." It held that non-receipt of the report from TCIPL did not vitiate the inquiry, since the Magistrate had independently assessed the preliminary evidence.

"Receipt or non-receipt of a report called for after recording the evidence, cannot be the sole ground to issue or not to issue the process. The purpose of such a report is to facilitate making an inquiry by the Magistrate, and not the other way round, that is, to make the inquiry dependent on the outcome of the report."

On the question of Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, the Court stated: "As per the settled law, there is no explicit bar on the Magistrate precluding him from considering whether any of the Exceptions protect the person to be summoned; however, such non-consideration by itself would not render the order issuing process illegal." The Court further found that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate how the imputation could be said to have been made in good faith.

"It is not a case that the complaint, supporting documents as well as the statements of witnesses before the Magistrate establish that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Ninth and Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC, nor has learned counsel for the petitioner been able to show even prima facie as to how imputations in the retweet can be said to have been made by the petitioner in good faith for protection of her own interest or of anyone else, nor can it said to be for public good."

Regarding the reference to the retweet as a tweet in the summoning order, the Court held: "Merely because the Magistrate wrongly mentioned the petitioner’s retweet as tweet in the impugned order, it cannot be said that the order is a result of non-application of mind."

Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the complaint was mala fide: "There is nothing on record, nor could any material be shown by learned counsel for the petitioner which prima facie indicates such an intention on the respondent’s part in filing the complaint in question."

Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya concluded the judgment by issuing the following directive: "In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the petition, and it stands dismissed."

Further clarifying the scope of the judgment, the Court stated: "The observations in this judgment will have no bearing on the pending complaint, which will be decided by the Magistrate on its own merits."

The Court affirmed that the summoning order issued by the Magistrate dated 22.02.2022 was passed after due application of judicial mind and in accordance with the requirements of Section 202 CrPC. It held that the failure to receive a report from Twitter Communications India Private Limited was not a procedural lapse warranting interference.

The Court reiterated: "The requirement in law is an inquiry by the Magistrate into the complaint to be satisfied that the offences alleged are prima facie made out; receipt or non-receipt of a report called for after recording the evidence, cannot be the sole ground to issue or not to issue the process."

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On the issue of considering exceptions at the preliminary stage, the Court stated: "Even if the Magistrate, under a misconception of law, refrained from looking into the Exceptions on the ground that it was not required to be done at the stage of issuing process, it is not fatal to the impugned order which has been passed after applying mind to the material on record in accordance with law."

It further held that the accusations in the complaint, supported by documentary and oral evidence, disclosed prima facie ingredients of defamation.

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Mr. Abhinav Sood, Advocate with Ms. Anmol Gupta, Advocate, Ms. Achintaya Soni, Advocate, Ms. Mehndi Singhal, Advocate, Mr. Dhruv Chowfla, Advocate, Mr. Nitesh Jhajhria, Advocate

For the Respondents: Ms. G.K. Mann, Senior Advocate with Mr. Aditya Dassaur, Advocate and Mr. Armaan Sandhu, Advocate

Case Title: Kangana Ranaut v. Mahinder Kaur

Neutral Citation: 2025: PHHC:097370

Case Number: CRM-M-28891-2022

Bench: Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya