Punjab And Haryana High Court Upholds Summoning In ₹1500 Crore Manesar Land Scam | Witnesses-Turned-Accused To Face Trial in Case Involving Former CM Bhupinder Singh Hooda
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana Single Bench of Justice Manjari Nehru Kaul, has upheld the order of the Special Judge, CBI Court, Panchkula, which summoned several individuals, including former public servants, as additional accused in a complex land acquisition case. The Court held that the Special Court's action did not constitute a second cognizance of the offence and that the requirements for prior sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were either not applicable or were correctly addressed. The judgment clarifies the powers of a Special Court under the Prevention of Corruption Act to summon additional accused based on material on record, even if they were initially cited as prosecution witnesses. The Court stated that cognizance is taken of the offence, not the offender, and that the Special Court is not bound by the investigating agency's conclusions. This decision dismisses all connected petitions challenging the impugned order.
The genesis of the litigation lies in a notification issued by the Government of Haryana under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LAA), on August 27, 2004, for the acquisition of approximately 912 acres of land in villages Manesar, Naurangpur, and Lakhnaula in District Gurugram. The stated purpose was the development of an Industrial Model Township. According to the prosecution, private builders and property dealers exploited this notification by inducing fear among farmers, leading them to sell approximately 350 acres of land at significantly undervalued prices, around Rs. 20 to 25 lakhs per acre. Farmers who initially resisted later sold an additional 50 acres at much higher rates, approximately Rs. 1.5 crores per acre, after the issuance of a notification under Section 9 of the LAA.
Subsequently, on August 24, 2007, the Director of the Department of Industries passed an order releasing the land from the acquisition process, allegedly after most of the identified land had been purchased by the "land mafia" under the threat of compulsory acquisition. This release order was purportedly issued in contravention of government policy and favoured private builders and their entities over the original landowners. The prosecution alleged that about 400 acres of land were acquired by the conspirators for Rs. 100 crores, while the prevailing market rate was approximately Rs. 4 crores per acre, resulting in a notional market value of approximately Rs. 1,600 crores. This, it was contended, caused a wrongful loss of approximately Rs. 1,500 crores to the landowners and corresponding unlawful gains to politicians, government functionaries, and their agents.
The land acquisition became the subject of extensive litigation. The State Government formally withdrew the acquisition process on August 24, 2007, a recommendation later supported by an Inter-Departmental Committee, leading to the Department of Industries and Commerce resolving to terminate the proceedings on January 29, 2010. Aggrieved landowners filed Civil Writ Petition No. 23769 of 2011 and connected matters before the High Court, alleging that the entire acquisition process, from initiation to abrupt withdrawal just two days before the award declaration, was malicious and designed to coerce them into selling their land at throwaway prices. They sought, among other reliefs, the cancellation of sale deeds executed in favor of the builders.
These writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on December 15, 2014. The landowners then appealed to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8788 of 2015, titled 'Rameshwar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others'. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated March 12, 2018, allowed the civil appeals, holding that the State Government's decisions of August 24, 2007, and January 29, 2010, and the acceptance of license applications from post-notification land purchasers, were not a bona fide exercise of power but constituted a "fraud on power." The Apex Court further observed that the transactions between landowners and private builders were not voluntary but resulted from coercive and fraudulent circumstances.
Following these developments, FIR No. 510 dated August 12, 2015, was registered at Police Station Manesar, Gurugram, under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the IPC, and Section 13 of the PC Act, naming unidentified public servants and private individuals. Due to the case's gravity, the Government of Haryana requested a CBI investigation on August 14, 2015. The CBI took over the probe on September 15, 2015, registering case No. RCCHG2015A0019.
Upon completing its investigation, the CBI submitted a police report to the Special Court, Panchkula, on February 1, 2018, against numerous individuals and entities, including Bhupinder Singh Hooda, Murari Lal Tayal, Chhatar Singh, Sudeep Singh Dhillon, Jaswant Singh, Atul Bansal, and various private companies. On March 16, 2018, the Special Court took cognizance of the offenses and summoned all named accused. Subsequently, some accused, including Murari Lal Tayal, Sudeep Singh Dhillon, and Jaswant Singh, filed discharge applications. Murari Lal Tayal also sought the summoning of further individuals as additional accused under Section 193 of the Cr.P.C.
On December 1, 2020, the Special Court dismissed all discharge applications and framed charges against the originally named accused. Additionally, the Court summoned Rajeev Arora (Managing Director, HSIIDC), Surjeet Singh (Chief Town Planner, HSIIDC), Dhare Singh (Chief Town Planner, DTCP), Kulwant Singh Lamba (Deputy Superintendent, DTCP), and D.R. Dhingra (Dy. Director, Department of Industries) as additional accused under Section 193 of the Cr.P.C. for various offenses under the IPC and the PC Act. Aggrieved by this order, the newly summoned petitioners filed revision petitions before the High Court.
The High Court addressed the arguments raised by the petitioners, including the alleged second cognizance, the necessity of sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and procedural irregularities.
Regarding the preliminary objection concerning the locus standi of the Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI, the Court stated, “Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the contention of the petitioners is accepted, and the Special Public Prosecutor is not competent to oppose the petition in his representative capacity, that, by itself, does not entitle the petitioners to a grant of relief as a matter of course. This Court is under a solemn obligation to adjudicate upon the matter on its own merits and in accordance with law, irrespective of whether the respondent-CBI has formally opposed the prayer made in the petitions.” The Court further observed that the Special Public Prosecutor, as an officer of the Court, has a duty to assist in the fair administration of justice.
Addressing the issue of alleged second cognizance, the Court found no merit in the petitioners' submission. It observed, “It is pertinent to note that the term “cognizance” has not been expressly defined in the Cr.P.C. However, as per Black's Law Dictionary, it denotes the judicial recognition or judicial consideration of a matter—the exercise of jurisdiction or authority to proceed.”
The Court held the foundational principle that “cognizance is always taken of the offence and not of the offender.” It clarified that a Magistrate is not bound by the investigating officer's conclusions and must independently apply judicial mind to the material. The Court stated, “The scheme of the Cr.P.C. under Section 193 stipulates that a Court of Session cannot take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate.”
However, it noted that a Special Court under the PC Act exercises original jurisdiction ab initio, and therefore, “the Special Court after taking cognizance has the power to summon not only the accused named in the police report, but also any other person whose complicity is disclosed in the material placed before the Court, even prior to the commencement of the trial.” The Court concluded that the summoning of additional accused on the same day as the framing of charges against the original accused, and before the case progressed beyond the pre-trial phase, was a natural extension of the Court's powers and did not constitute a second cognizance.
The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in R.N. Aggarwal's case, stating, “In R.N. Aggarwal's case (supra), the CBI had filed a chargesheet naming six accused. Cognizance was taken and summons were issued. Thereafter, an application was filed by one of the accused under Sections 190 and 193 of the Cr.P.C., seeking summoning of three witnesses, cited by the CBI, as additional accused. The Special Court, after hearing arguments and considering the material, allowed the application and summoned the said individuals as accused. This order was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.”
The Court further observed, “It is thus aptly clear that until and unless the case reaches the stage of inquiry or trial by the court, the power under Section 319 CrPC cannot be exercised. In fact, this proposition does not seem to have been disturbed by the Constitution Bench in Dharam Pal (CB).”
Regarding the petitioners' argument that no new material had emerged to warrant their summoning, the Court stated, “This contention cannot be accepted. It is settled law that while exercising its powers under Section 193 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is only required to ascertain from the material on record whether a prima facie case is made out. The Court is not expected to evaluate the probative value or conclusiveness of the material.” The Court stated that if the material discloses involvement, the Court is obligated to proceed.
Analysing the material on record, the Court noted the prima facie involvement of petitioner Rajeev Arora, MD, HSIIDC, stating, “The file noting of petitioner Rajeev Arora, MD, HSIIDC, recorded that the decision to defer the award was taken based on a letter dated 05.10.2005 from the DTCP. However, no such letter was found on record.” The Court also cited the statement of PW-48, P.K. Chaudhary, IAS, who confirmed that “the deferment decision by HSIIDC was not taken with the approval of the State Government.”
For petitioner D.R. Dhingra, Dy. Director, Department of Industries, the Court found prima facie culpability based on the testimony of PW-20 Ashwani Kumar, who stated that despite repeated communications from the LAC-cum-DRO requesting deposit of compensation, “no order was passed by the then Director Sh. D.R. Dhingra and file was sent back without any remarks and signature.” The Court also noted that relevant files in the Department of Industries were found to be missing.
The Court observed the involvement of petitioner Kulwant Singh Lamba, Deputy Superintendent, DTCP, stating, “the documents on record clearly reflect that it was Kulwant Singh Lamba, the then Dy. Superintendent, TCPD, who had marked the file to the Record Keeper and after that the file remained silent till 09.01.2009.” Similarly, for petitioner Dhare Singh, Chief Town Planner, DTCP, the Court observed that “the files processed by petitioner Kulwant Singh Lamba were approved by petitioner Dhare Singh, culminating in the issuance of licences/ CLUs to ineligible entities.”
The Court firmly rejected the argument that the Special Court assumed the role of an investigator by disagreeing with the CBI's conclusions, stating, “It is well settled that a Magistrate or a Special Judge is not a post-office to mechanically accept the findings of the investigating officer. The Court is not bound by the conclusions drawn in the police report and must independently apply its judicial mind to the material on record.”
Regarding the alleged direction for sanction, the Court clarified, “A plain and purposive reading of the aforesaid direction reveals that the learned Special Court did not issue any binding or peremptory command to the competent authority to accord sanction. Rather, the Court merely directed the investigating agency (CBI) to submit the relevant material gathered during investigation to the appropriate sanctioning authority for its consideration, in accordance with Section 19 of the PC Act.”
On the question of sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. for offenses under Sections 420 and 120-B of the IPC, the Court stated, “The reasoning offered is rooted in the intrinsic nature of the offence of cheating, which, by its very character, is incapable of being committed by a public servant in the discharge or purported discharge of official duty.” The Court relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in K. Satwant Singh's case, which held that “offences such as cheating or abetment thereof cannot be shielded behind the protective cover of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., as they fall outside the ambit of acts committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties”.
Finally, addressing the argument that the 2018 amendment to Section 19 of the PC Act, requiring sanction for retired public servants, should apply, the Court stated, “Cognizance in this matter was taken by the learned Special Court on 16.03.2018, which was prior to the enforcement of the said amendment on 26.07.2018. It is a settled position in law that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender.” Therefore, the amendment does not retrospectively apply. The Court also dismissed the argument concerning Article 20(3) of the Constitution, stating that at the stage of giving statements to the investigating agency, the petitioners were merely witnesses and not accused, and their summoning was based on an independent assessment of other witness statements and material.
The High Court, in its judgement, found no legal infirmity or illegality in the impugned order passed by the learned Special Court to summon the petitioners as additional accused. The challenge to the impugned order was therefore deemed liable to be rejected.
The Court explicitly clarified that anything observed within its judgment shall not be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case itself.
Furthermore, all pending applications, if any, related to these petitions were disposed of by the Court.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Vinod Ghai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Himanshu Arora, Advocate and Mr. Arnav Ghai, Advocate. For the petitioner in CRR-1321-2020: Mr. Vinod Ghai, Senior Advocate with Mr. P.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate, Mr. Shivansh Malik, Advocate, Mr. Randeep S. Rai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anurag Arora, Advocate., Mr. Arun Sharma, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mr. Ravi Kamal Gupta, Special Public Prosecutor.
Case Title: Rajeev Arora Vs Central Bureau of Investigation & Connected Matters
Neutral Citation: 2025: PHHC:066021
Case Number: CRR-1306-2020 (O&M) & connected matters
Bench: Justice Manjari Nehru Kaul
[Read/Download order]
