In a significant judgment in Giriraj v. Regional Forest Officer & Ors. [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1243/2016], the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, under the adjudication of Justice Sudesh Bansal, examined the evidentiary standards required for a workman to substantiate claims of wrongful termination under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”). The Court upheld the Labour Court’s findings that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving continuous service of 240 days, which is a prerequisite to invoking the protections under the Act.

The judgment reaffirms established legal principles regarding evidentiary burdens in employment disputes and clarifies the scope of judicial interference in matters adjudicated by tribunals.

The petitioner, Giriraj, was employed as a Watchman by the respondent department from March 11, 1997, to March 31, 1998. His employment was terminated on April 1, 1998. Giriraj raised an industrial dispute alleging wrongful termination, asserting that the respondent failed to adhere to the procedural safeguards stipulated under Sections 25F, 25G, and 25H of the ID Act.

The dispute was referred to the Labour Court, which concluded that the petitioner had worked only for 131 days during his tenure. As a result, the protections under Section 25F, which require 240 days of continuous service in the preceding 12 months before termination, were not applicable. Furthermore, the Labour Court held that the petitioner’s appointment fell under the exclusion provided in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act, which exempts certain contractual appointments from the definition of retrenchment.

Aggrieved by this decision, Giriraj approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner argued that his termination violated the procedural safeguards under the ID Act. He contended that the employer had failed to produce employment records, including muster rolls, attendance registers, and wage receipts, which would have substantiated his claim of continuous service for 240 days. The petitioner further urged the Court to draw an adverse inference against the employer for the non-production of such records.

The petitioner relied on his affidavit as evidence to assert his claim of continuous service and argued that the Labour Court failed to appreciate the evidence in his favor.

The respondents refuted the petitioner’s allegations, asserting that the termination was carried out in accordance with the law. They contended that the petitioner had failed to discharge the onus of proving his continuous service of 240 days. It was argued that the affidavit submitted by the petitioner was self-serving and insufficient to establish his claim. The respondents also emphasized that the petitioner’s employment was contractual and fell within the exclusion under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.

Justice Sudesh Bansal conducted a scrupulous examination of the Labour Court's adjudication and the evidentiary materials adduced by the parties.

The High Court enunciated the following legal principles:

1. Onus of Proof on the Workman: The Court reaffirmed that the burden to prove continuous service of 240 days rests with the workman. This principle was derived from the precedents established in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani [(2002) 3 SCC 25] and R.M. Yellati v. Asst. Executive Engineer [(2006) 1 SCC 106], where the Supreme Court held that the workman must substantiate his claim through cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. The Court observed that the petitioner failed to produce documentary evidence such as wage receipts, appointment letters, or attendance records. The petitioner also did not summon the employer’s records to support his claim.
2. Self-Serving Affidavit: Referring to judicial precedents, the Court held that an affidavit submitted by the workman is merely a self-serving statement and cannot by itself constitute sufficient evidence to establish the fact of continuous service. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the petitioner’s claim.
3. Adverse Inference Against Employer: The Court declined to draw an adverse inference against the employer for non-production of records, noting that the petitioner had neither made efforts to summon the relevant records nor pleaded suppression of evidence by the employer. Relying on Chairman, Municipal Board v. Mahavir Prasad Sharma [RLW 2007(3) Raj. 1999] and Dhara v. Presiding Officer [2007 141 DLT 104], the Court held that an adverse inference is not warranted unless there is evidence of deliberate suppression.
4. Section 2(oo)(bb): The Court upheld the Labour Court’s finding that the petitioner’s employment was contractual in nature and fell within the exclusion provided under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. This provision exempts termination of services in accordance with a stipulated contract from the definition of retrenchment.
5. Supervisory Jurisdiction Under Article 227: Justice Bansal emphasized that the scope of interference under Article 227 is limited to examining perversity or jurisdictional errors in the impugned order. The Labour Court’s findings, being based on a proper appreciation of evidence, did not warrant interference.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner failed to discharge the evidentiary burden required to establish his claim of continuous service. Justice Bansal remarked, “The jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory in nature and does not permit reappraisal of findings of fact absent evidence of perversity or illegality.”

Case Title: Giriraj v. Regional Forest Officer & Ors.
Case Number: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1243/2016
Bench: Justice Sudesh Bansal