Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Rajasthan Single Bench of Justice Anand Sharma held that an acquittal, even if rendered on the basis of benefit of doubt, does not automatically disqualify a candidate from public employment unless additional material establishes moral turpitude or deliberate criminality. The Court quashed the order of the respondent-Bank which had denied appointment to the petitioner on the ground that his acquittal in two criminal cases was not honourable but based on benefit of doubt. The Court directed the Bank to process the petitioner’s appointment, subject to the verification of other formalities, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order.

The petitioner challenged the decision of the respondent-Bank denying him appointment to the post of Probationary Officer despite being selected, on the ground that the acquittal in criminal cases against him was not honourable but based on benefit of doubt.

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The respondent-Bank had issued an advertisement dated 07.02.2012 for recruitment to the post of Probationary Officer in JMGS-I. The petitioner, having met the eligibility criteria, applied and was selected. He was issued a provisional appointment letter dated 18.02.2013, subject to certain conditions. He reported at the Regional Training Centre on 02.04.2013 and filled a declaration form, disclosing that two criminal cases were pending against him.

Subsequently, by letter dated 04.04.2013, the respondent-Bank informed the petitioner that due to the pendency of criminal cases, he would not be allowed to join. The two cases against him involved charges under Sections 419, 420, 120B IPC, Sections 65, 66, and 72 of the IT Act, and another case under Sections 147, 341, and 323 IPC. The petitioner contended that the decision to decline his appointment was made without a final verdict in the criminal trials and thus violated the presumption of innocence.

Challenging this, he filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7056/2013, where the Court passed an interim order on 10.05.2013 directing the Bank to keep one post vacant. He was later acquitted in both criminal cases. Consequently, the Court disposed of his earlier petition on 01.07.2020 with directions to the respondent-Bank to reconsider his candidature independently of the earlier decision.

In compliance, the petitioner submitted a representation citing his acquittal, arguing that the criminal cases were false and malicious, and the prosecution had failed to prove any charges. Despite this, the Bank rejected his representation by order dated 24.07.2020, citing its recruitment policy and the non-honourable nature of the acquittal. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

The respondent-Bank in its reply asserted that the position of Probationary Officer required unblemished character and that the acquittal of the petitioner was not honourable but merely a benefit of doubt. Citing policy and judgments including Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471 and State of M.P. v. Bhupendra Yadav 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1181, it defended its discretion in determining suitability for public service.

The petitioner’s counsel contended that the acquittal absolved the petitioner of criminal culpability, and denial of appointment violated Article 21 of the Constitution. It was further argued that the Bank had no additional material suggesting unfitness or moral turpitude.

The Court stated “The pivotal question for determination is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, an acquittal based on benefit of doubt can be equated with an honourable acquittal, thereby entitling the petitioner to appointment in public service.”

It recorded: “It is not in dispute that the petitioner stood acquitted in the said criminal cases. The acquittal, it is alleged by the respondents, was not 'honourable' in the strict forensic sense, but rather one rendered on account of insufficiency of evidence, resulting in the grant of benefit of doubt.”

The Court noted the reasoning given by the criminal courts in both acquittals. Regarding the first case under IPC and IT Act provisions, the judgment had stated: “There is no information available in the electronic records implicating the accused… Hence, decision to acquit on the basis of such sound findings cannot be weighed lightly so as to deny removal of blot attached to the initial accusations.”

In the second case, where initial conviction was set aside, the appellate court observed: “Due to contradictions in witness statements and lack of corroboration, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond doubt… the accused is entitled to be acquitted.”

Relying on the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, the Court stated: “If a person is acquitted honourably, he may be considered suitable. However, even if the acquittal is based on benefit of doubt, there is no absolute prohibition and he may still be considered if no moral turpitude or serious suspicion remains.”

It further recorded: “Respondents have failed to demonstrate the existence of any additional compelling or discernible material suggesting that the petitioner was involved in acts amounting to moral turpitude or deliberate criminality.”

On the principle of presumed innocence, the Court observed: “This presumption, once crystallized through acquittal, must be given full legal effect unless explicitly rebutted.”

The Court remarked: “The invocation of ‘unsuitability’ in such a situation becomes problematic. The concept of suitability must be backed by objective parameters and must not be used as a tool for arbitrary exclusion.”

On youth and reform, the Court cited its judgment in Neeraj Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan: “Young people are still in the process of emotional and intellectual development… youthful indiscretions should not permanently tarnish an individual's future.”

Concluding its judicial reasoning, the Court stated: “The petitioner’s rejection by the respondent-Bank suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and non-application of mind. The decision appears to be predicated on a mechanical invocation of the phrase ‘benefit of doubt’, without any corroborative material suggesting that the petitioner poses a threat to the integrity of the institution.”

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The Court issued the following direction:

“Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed and the impugned communication/order denying appointment to the petitioner is hereby quashed.”

It directed: “The respondent-Bank is directed to process the petitioner’s appointment, subject to verification of other formalities, within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.”

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Mr. Virendra Lodha, Senior Counsel with Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate

For the Respondents: Ms. Anita Aggarwal, Advocate

Case Title: Krishan Gopal Sharma v. The General Manager, UCO Bank & Ors.

Neutral Citation: 2025: RJ-JP: 22893

Case Number: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2106/2021

Bench: Justice Anand Sharma

[Read/Download order]