"Reasonable Grounds" For NDPS Bail Not Same As 'Proof' Under BNS : J&K High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh Single Bench of Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani, while allowing a successive bail application, directed the release on bail of an accused charged with financing illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, subject to stringent conditions. In a case arising from recovery of commercial quantities of codeine-based cough syrup and tramadol capsules from a co-accused, with the prosecution relying mainly on disclosure statements and limited bank transfers, the Court held that there are no reasonable grounds at this stage to conclude the accused’s involvement so as to attract the bar under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court stressed a balanced reading of “reasonable grounds” as requiring more than suspicion yet less than full proof.
The petition concerned a successive request for bail filed under Section 483 BNSS by the accused, who was arrested in connection with Crime registered by the Narcotics Control Bureau, Jammu Zonal Unit for offences under Sections 8, 21, 22, 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner asserted false implication, stating that he was a businessman and a permanent resident with no criminal antecedents. He contended that the allegations were primarily based on statements under Section 67 NDPS Act made by him and a co-accused, despite no recovery from his possession or at his instance. He argued that two monetary transfers to the co-accused were unrelated to narcotics and that the disclosures were inadmissible unless leading to recovery. He further submitted that the investigation had not adhered to mandatory procedural safeguards, and the alleged supplier was still unapprehended.
The respondent resisted the bail plea on grounds of the seriousness of the offences, asserting that commercial quantities of contraband had been recovered from the co-accused and that the petitioner had financed procurement of narcotics, relying on his and the co-accused’s statements and alleged financial transactions.
The respondent invoked Section 37 NDPS Act, arguing that the statutory bar operated and that the petitioner posed a risk of absconding or reoffending. The trial court had earlier rejected bail. Both sides referred to various precedents to support their respective positions.
The Court recorded that it had considered the petition, the objections, and the scanned trial court record and stated that it was “of the opinion that it may meet the ends of justice in case the petitioner-accused is admitted to bail…”.
The Court observed that assessment under Section 37 NDPS Act required a judicial determination of “reasonable grounds” and that such grounds must be inferred from the evidence but “cannot be read to mean proved” because that interpretation “would… set at naught the power vested in a court to grant bail pending trial.” . It further recorded that reasonable grounds mean “something more than mere suspicion and conjectures and something less than proof,” enabling “a person of ordinary prudence to believe that the accused is or is not guilty.”
The Court stated that it must examine material placed before it to conclude whether such grounds exist and that the expression “cannot… be put into a straight-jacket,” as each case must be evaluated on its own facts. It recorded that at the bail stage, the Court is “not required to conduct a preliminary trial” and cannot exceed its functions by attempting to determine guilt or innocence, noting that the question must be decided “judicially” on tangible evidence.
The Court analysed broader considerations of bail, referring to the likelihood of the accused fleeing or tampering with evidence, noting that these factors relate to securing a fair trial. It cited judicial principles, including that liberty must be balanced with societal interest, that nature of accusations and evidence are relevant, and that the courts must weigh “pros and cons varying from case to case.”
The Court recorded authoritative extracts from Supreme Court judgments regarding the purpose of bail, including the statement that “the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive” and that deprivation of liberty before conviction must be justified only by necessity.
Ultimately, the Court observed: “there appear no reasonable grounds of involvement of the petitioner/accused in the commission of offences…” and that there was “nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner if admitted to bail will jump over the concession by absconding at the trial or repeating the commission of crime.”
The Court directed that the petitioner-accused is “admitted to bail, subject to his furnishing surety and personal bonds to the tune of Rupees One lac each (surety bond of Rupees One lac to be furnished by two sureties from amongst the relatives of the petitioner-accused each liable to the extent of Rupees fifty thousands) respectively to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and the superintendent of jail concerned.”
The petitioner-accused “shall remain punctual at the trial of the case” and that he “shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any of the unexamined complaint’s witnesses so as to dissuade them from making their factual statements at the trial.” The petitioner “shall not leave the limits of UT of J&K without the prior permission of the learned trial court” and that he “shall not repeat the commission of any crime.”
“In case the requisite surety bonds are furnished to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and duly attested, a formal release order shall be issued by learned trial court directing the release of the petitioner-accused from the place of his lodgment… subject to petitioner’s furnishing of personal bond in the amount of Rupees One lac to the satisfaction of the Superintendent of jail concerned.”
The learned trial court “shall be competent to proceed against the petitioner-accused in terms of provisions of sections 491 and 492 BNSS in the event of violation of any bail conditions.”
“Nothing in this order shall be construed as any interference with or pre-judging of the merits of the case which obviously shall be subject matter of the final outcome of the trial case.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Mr. Prince Khanna, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI
Case Title: Arfaz Mehboob Tak v. Union of India & Anr.
Case Number: Bail App No. 144/2025
Bench: Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani
