Recusal Plea by Madras Race Club Rejected; Status Quo Modified for Public Works: Madras High Court
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Judicature at Madras, Division Bench of Justice S.M. Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq declined a request for Justice Subramaniam’s recusal from an appeal filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the Madras Race Club concerning termination of its land lease. The Club had sought the Judge’s withdrawal citing prior adverse observations in another case involving it. Rejecting the plea, the Court held that such grounds were without merit and cautioned that permitting recusals on such bases would promote forum shopping and bench hunting. The Bench also modified the earlier “status quo” order, permitting the State to proceed with pond and eco-park development works in public interest.
The case arose from a dispute over the termination of a lease by the Government of Tamil Nadu concerning land occupied by the Madras Race Club in Guindy. The Race Club filed a civil suit challenging the termination order and secured an interim order of status quo from a Single Judge. The State, claiming that the order hindered public welfare projects including pond restoration and the proposed Eco Park, filed an appeal before the Division Bench. During the proceedings, the first respondent, Madras Race Club, filed an affidavit seeking the recusal of Justice S.M. Subramaniam on the ground of alleged bias.
The recusal petition was based on two main grounds: first, that Justice S.M. Subramaniam had delivered a prior judgment in 2023 in a writ petition filed by the Race Club, allegedly containing adverse observations; and second, that before his elevation to the Bench, the Judge had appeared as counsel against the Club in suits filed in 2004 and 2005. Senior Counsel appearing for the Race Club, relied on precedents including Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611, State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513, and Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808. He argued that the circumstances created a reasonable apprehension of bias from the litigant’s standpoint.
Opposing the plea, the State, termed the allegations baseless and motivated, intended to delay proceedings. He contended that presiding over an earlier writ petition did not disqualify a Judge from hearing a related appeal as part of a Division Bench, particularly when the earlier matter dealt with a distinct cause of action. The State also cited A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan (2000) 7 SCC 695 and Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 470 to support its position.
The Division Bench examined the principles governing judicial recusal as laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808. The Bench quoted: “It is one of the settled principles of a civilised legal system that a Judge is required to be impartial. It is said that the hallmark of a democracy is the existence of an impartial Judge.” It further referred to the judgement that a Judge’s disqualification is automatic only when he has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, whereas in other cases, an inquiry into the “real danger” or “reasonable apprehension” of bias is necessary.
The Court noted that there was no financial interest of Justice S.M. Subramaniam in the case, and that the plea of reasonable apprehension was unfounded. It observed that the prior writ petition decided in 2023 dealt with recovery of lease amounts, while the present appeal concerned a different cause of action arising from the 2024 lease termination order. The Bench stated: “The observations made while disposing the writ petition may not have any bearing nor impact the present issue raised in the appeal against the order of status quo, which is subsequent and against a distinct cause of action.”
It recorded: “The allegation of likelihood of bias that a suit was filed against the respondent club by one of us two decades back is nothing short of an attempt to avoid the Bench which I am a party.” The Court added that the Race Club had not raised any such objection when the Judge had presided over its writ petition in 2017, indicating that the recusal plea was an afterthought.
The Bench referred to R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (2000) 1 AC 119, noting that automatic disqualification arises only where a Judge has a personal or institutional connection to a cause promoted by a party to the case. The Court stated that no such connection existed in the present matter and that reliance on the Pinochet principle was misplaced. It recorded that the recusal decision rested entirely with the Judge concerned, observing: “A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to.”
The Court stated: “Faith in the judiciary cannot be permitted to be shaken by wayward and pelting of stones of suspicion by every disgruntled litigant.” Justice Subramaniam noted that yielding to unjustified requests for recusal would “pave way to forum shopping or bench hunting” and would be contrary to judicial discipline.
The judgment recorded: “Since the interim order of status quo would adversely affect public interest, we are inclined to modify the said order and permit the State to carry out all works relating to strengthening and development of ponds and any other project of public interest, and the respondent club shall cooperate and not obstruct such work.” The Court invoked Section 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which prohibits injunctions that impede infrastructure projects. It concluded that the Government’s pond restoration and Eco Park initiatives qualified as such projects.
The Bench ordered that the appeal be admitted and issued notice to the other respondents, returnable in four weeks. The matter was directed to be listed thereafter.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Appellants: Mr. P. Wilson, Senior Counsel for Mr. D. Ravichander, Special Government Pleader
For the Respondents: Mr. P.H. Arvindh Pandian, Senior Counsel for Mr. Vaibhav R. Venkatesh
Case Title: The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Madras Race Club & Ors.
Case Number: O.S.A. No. 335 of 2025
Bench: Justice S.M. Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq
