"Retrospective Withdrawal of Vested Rights Is Arbitrary and Void": Punjab and Haryana High Court Strikes Down Haryana's 2022 Amendment to Proprietary Rights Act
Kiran Raj
The Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, comprising a Division Bench of Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri, delivered a reserved judgment on March 19, 2025, striking down a retrospective amendment to the Haryana Dholidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010. The Bench declared that the amendment introduced through Notification No. Leg. 26/2022 dated August 23, 2022, and a subsequent letter dated October 10, 2022, was violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
The court quashed the amendment that retrospectively denied proprietary rights to persons who had already obtained ownership under the 2010 legislation. It recorded that the amendment was expropriatory, arbitrary, and led to the illegal withdrawal of vested rights without due process.
The petitioners had approached the Court seeking to set aside Notification No. Leg. 26/2022, dated 23.08.2022, issued under the Haryana Dholidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Amendment Act, 2018. The impugned notification amended sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Haryana Act No. 1 of 2011 retrospectively, purporting to exclude from the vesting operation any land owned or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat, Municipality, or Government Department, Board, or Corporation.
The amended provision reads: “This Act shall be applicable to Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar, Muqararidar or any other similar class or category of persons of land belonging to private individual/entity which the State Government may notify in the Official Gazette and shall not be applicable to land owned or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat or Municipality or land owned by any Government Department, Board or Corporation.”
The petitioners, having acquired lands recorded in the name of earlier Dholidars by way of registered sale deeds and mutations sanctioned between 2015 and 2018, asserted that they had become owners pursuant to the original 2010 Act and that their titles were threatened by the retrospective application of the 2022 amendment.
The petitioners submitted that they had purchased land measuring 82 kanals in Village Didwara, Tehsil Safidon, District Jind. The land was originally held by Jamna Dutt and Madan Gopal, sons of Padam Nath, who were recorded as Dholidars. Proprietary rights were conferred under the 2010 Act, pursuant to which ownership entries were sanctioned in official revenue records. However, the Collector, District Jind, later directed that their ownership entries be cancelled. The petitioners had approached the civil court and obtained an interim stay. Thereafter, the State issued the notification applying the 2018 Amendment Act retrospectively from 09.06.2011.
It was contended by the petitioners that this retrospective application amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of vested rights without compensation or due process. They argued that such deprivation was inconsistent with Articles 14, 21, and 300-A of the Constitution of India.
The learned Amicus Curiae also placed reliance on multiple precedents to argue that retrospective withdrawal of vested rights was impermissible. References were made to decisions in Raja Rajinder Chand v. Mst Sukhi [AIR 1957 SC 286], Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay [AIR 1959 SC 459], Atma Ram v. State of Punjab [AIR 1959 SC 519], State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. [(1973) 2 SCC 713], Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 2 SCC 548], and State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat [(2005) 8 SCC 534].
It was argued that Dholidars were not merely licensees or precarious holders but were landowners for the purpose of the Act, entitled to rights arising under agrarian reform measures. The petitioners asserted that the amendment, by retrospectively excluding certain classes of land, unjustly reversed rights already vested under a validly enacted law.
The Amicus Curiae also submitted that “legal declarations by the legislature are subject to judicial scrutiny” and referred to Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [(2000) 1 SCC 168] and Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973 (4) SCC 225] to support the proposition that the Court could examine legislative intent behind retrospective provisions.
The Amicus Curiae further submitted that “a dohlidar is a landowner as he is in possession of the land and the tenure is an instance of malik kabza,” citing judicial commentary from Mahant Sirya Nath’s case [1969 PLJ 27] and Douie’s Settlement Manual. It was also submitted that the Punjab Abolition of Ala Malikiyat and Talukdari Act, 1950 had abolished dual ownership and vested full proprietary rights in adna maliks, a category into which Dholidars fall.
The Bench examined the nature of dohli tenure in light of various precedents and statutory provisions. It recorded that “a dohlidar is not a perpetual tenant as held by us, typification of the dohli tenure in Douie’s Settlement Manual as an instance of malik kabza and hence that of a landowner for the purposes of the Land Revenue Act and derivatively for the purposes of the Act, appears to us crystal clear.”
The Court stated: “We take the view as taken by H. R. Sodhi, J. in Mahant Sirya Nath’s case (1969 Pun LJ 27) (supra) and hold that a dohli tenure is an instance of malik kabza and a dohlidar, a landowner for the purposes of the Act.”
It was further noted that “the fetter or encumbrance upon such perpetual grants, besides as made qua the above categories, is most unjust, unfair, and, inequitable, and, as such was required to be eased or relaxed, as done through the impugned legislation.”
The Court recorded that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2010 Act supported agrarian reform and the vesting of rights in actual tillers. It referred to the constitutional immunity provided by Article 31A in cases of agrarian reform and cited: “Consequently, when the said Statement of Objects and Reasons is clearly indicative of the legislative intent… the impugned legislation wherebys occurs the purported snatchings of proprietary rights of ala maliks or proprietors over the disputed lands, and, concomitantly rights, titles, and, interest over the disputed lands rather become vested in the adna maliks, thus therebys enjoys constitutional immunity within the ambit of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.”
Regarding the challenge under Article 300-A, the Court noted: “The reason for making the said conclusion is comprised in the trite factum, that since the beginning the Dholidars, Butimars, Bhondedars and Muqararidars, as adna maliks or as occupancy tenants were constantly tilling the lands, and yet they were not entitled to make alienations thereof, nor were they able to mortgage such lands or raise loans from financial institutions.”
The Court recorded that the grant of token compensation for extinguishing the rights of ala maliks was not expropriatory and stated: “Reiteratedly also the said token compensation cannot be said to be either unreasonable or arbitrary, nor it can be said to be expropriatory vis-a-vis the land owners concerned.”
The judgment further states: “The fine constitutional purpose of agrarian reforms is achieved, through the impugned legislation, especially when a reading of the Statements of Objects and Reasons (supra) makes explicit expression of the impugned legislation being maneuvered to achieve agrarian reforms.”
The Court stated: “The vires of the impugned legislation is maintained, and, upheld. The Dholidars, Butimars, Bhondedars and Muqararidars are permitted to institute an application in terms of the impugned Act before the empowered statutory authorities, who on receiving the said application, shall proceed to in accordance with law make an order conferring proprietary rights, upon the applicants concerned, and, thereafter shall ensure that the records of rights do become accordingly updated.”
“Accordingly, this Court finds merit in the instant petition, and, is constrained to allow it. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned legislation as well the consequent thereto notification are quashed, and, set aside.”
All pending applications were disposed of.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Aggarwal, Advocate with Mr. Tejas Bansal, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana; Ms. Savneel Jaswal, Addl. A.G. Haryana; Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana; Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana; Mr. Gaurav Bansal, DAG, Haryana; Mr. Karan Jindal, AAG, Haryana; Mr. Siddhanth Arora, Advocate; Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate; Ms. Saanvi Singla, Advocate
Amicus Curiae: Mr. Anupam Gupta, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sukhpal Singh, Mr. Gautam Pathania, and Mr. Himanshu Bindal, Advocates
Case Title: Bhawar Singh and another v. State of Haryana and others
Neutral Citation: 2025:PHHC:037643-DB
Case Number: CWP No. 30195 of 2024 (O&M)
Bench: Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri
[Read/Download order]
