'Rigour Of Law Applies Equally To All, Including State And Its Instrumentalities': Delhi High Court Rejects Centre's Bid To Revive Writ Dismissed Thrice For Non-Prosecution
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Renu Bhatnagar declined to restore a writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging an industrial tribunal's ex parte award that had granted reinstatement with full back wages to a workman. The Court dismissed both the restoration application and the condonation application for a delay of nearly thirteen months, observing that the rigour of the law applies equally to all litigants, including the State and its instrumentalities, and that no preferential treatment can be extended to government departments in matters of procedural default. The department had allowed the petition to lapse for want of prosecution on three separate occasions, and the explanation offered — attributing the delay to a change in legal representation — was found too vague to constitute adequate cause.
The petitioner, a government department, filed a writ petition challenging an ex parte award dated 15.09.2005 passed by the Industrial Tribunal granting reinstatement to the respondent-workman along with full back wages and continuity of service. The writ petition was initially dismissed for non-prosecution on 13.12.2010 and later restored on 01.11.2011 subject to payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/-. It was again dismissed in default on 13.03.2013 and restored on 29.10.2014 subject to payment of Rs. 15,000/-.
Subsequently, the matter was listed in January and March 2024, when no appearance was entered on behalf of the petitioner. On 27.05.2024, the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution for the third time. The petitioner thereafter filed applications seeking restoration and condonation of 365 days’ delay. The petitioner attributed the delay to discontinuation of its erstwhile counsel and non-receipt of court notice. The respondent-workman opposed the applications, contending repeated negligence and lack of sufficient cause. The Court examined Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and relevant precedents concerning condonation of delay.
The Court recorded that “delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing.” It observed that “no preferential or lenient treatment can be accorded to the state or its instrumentalities, and the rigour of the law applies equally to all.”
While considering the explanation offered, the Court stated that “The explanation offered is rather vague and sketchy.” It further recorded that “The entire blame is tried to be put upon the erstwhile counsel without stating anything about the conduct and efforts made by the petitioner-department during the period when the limitation started to begin till the time the application for restoration was filed.”
Referring to the repeated dismissals, the Court noted that “This is, therefore, the third instance in which the petition has been dismissed for want of prosecution.” It observed that “even the government departments are under special obligation to pursue litigation with due diligence, like an ordinary citizen.”
On the pattern of conduct, the Court recorded that “The record reflects a consistent pattern of a callous and casual approach on the part of the petitioner-department throughout the proceedings.” It further noted that “These defaults from 13.12.2010 to 27.05.2024 leads the respondent to be in the state of perpetual litigation.”
Addressing the petitioner’s reference to merits of the ex parte award, the Court observed that “This Court is unable to appreciate the purpose of addressing such a letter to the learned Tribunal in lieu of entering appearance and raising the grievance in accordance with law.” It recorded that “One thing is clear that even before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner department has not pursued the matter diligently.”
On the scope of condonation, the Court stated that “where there is gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or absence of bona fides, as is evident in the present case, a liberal approach cannot be extended.” It further observed that “In absence of any such plausible and cogent reasons, no such relief could be granted to the applicant.”
Finally, the Court concluded that “Clearly, the vague and inchoate grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay.” It added that “Law cannot help those who are not vigilant and diligent in prosecuting their cases.”
The Court directed that “this court finds no merit in the application seeking condonation of 365 days’ delay as well as the application seeking restoration of the captioned writ petition and the same are hereby dismissed. In view of the order passed hereinabove, all the pending applications also stand disposed of.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Puneet Dhawan, SPC for UOI
Case Title: UOI v. Brijendra Kumar Sharma & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026: DHC:1677
Case Number: W.P.(C) 23584/2005
Bench: Justice Renu Bhatnagar
